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“Sovjet-Estland” wants be the leader and show the path to the true 
socialistic-communistic fundamental ideals. Under the high ideals of 
Lenin-Stalin we begin our work, we attempt to be worthy workers for 
socialism’s development. All of those who would work for our land’s 
prosperity must gather themselves around “Sovjet-Estland” and help with 
the collaboration and distribution of it in their neighborhoods. We are 
ready for our great task. – The Editor1 
 
During the first year of Soviet occupation, the Soviet Union attempted an 
extensive process of Sovietization aimed at all aspects of Estonian society. An integral 
aspect of this year in Estonia was the propaganda aimed at converting the population to 
communism. This included the small ethnic Swedish population, comprising of 
approximately 0.7 percent of Estonia’s population, which had arguably been taken for 
granted by the Tsarist Russian and independent Estonian governments. This propaganda 
campaign actively encouraged the development of an Estonian-Swedish national identity 
through the guise of socialism, with the ethnic Swedes as a group holding an almost 
privileged position. The central organ of this propaganda campaign was the Soviet-
produced Swedish-language newspaper, Sovjet-Estland. The campaign attempted to focus 
the Soviet efforts largely around national identity and Soviet ideology. These efforts were 
largely a failure, though, with a majority of Estonian-Swedes openly declaring their desire 
to emigrate to Sweden. 
Newspapers can often be used as a representation of the times in which they were 
published. While they do not show a complete picture of any given time or event, 
newspapers can demonstrate the opinions and impressions of those at the time – or at 
least the opinions and impressions of those who control the media. Newspapers are used 
to inform the readership, but also to shape opinions; it can be used as a call to action. 
Under the right circumstances and leadership, newspapers can be an effective tool for 
propaganda and agitation. 
                                                 
1 Redaktionen, “‘Sovjet-Estland’ – ny tidning för arbetande svensktalande folket,” Sovjet-Estland, 17 
October 1940, p. 2. Translated from Swedish: “Sovjet-Estland” vill vara ledare och vägvisare till de rätta 
socialistiska-kommunistiska grundtankar. Under den av Lenin-Stalin uppsatta grundtanken börja vi vårt 
arbete, försöker vi vara värdiga arbetare vid socialismens uppbyggande. Alla de som vilja arbeta för vårt 
lands välgång måtte samla sig omkring “Sovjet-Estland” och hjälpa till med medarbete och utspridandet av 





Newspapers can also be instrumental in creating and fostering nationalistic 
sentiments among the readership. Benedict Anderson defines ‘nation’ as, “an imagined 
political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”2 In his 
concepts of nationalism found in Imagined Communities, Anderson places a high 
importance on newspapers, stating that print capitalism leads to the development of an 
imagined community; people and communities begin to think of themselves as part of a 
larger whole, connecting with people further away. Newspapers can be used to unite and 
foster a sense of common identity among people. Anderson states, “Above all, the very 
idea of ‘nation’ is now nestled firmly in virtually all print-languages; and nation-ness is 
virtually inseparable from political consciousness.”3 The strong link between printed 
media and national identity can be seen in numerous examples around the world. 
It can be argued that the pre-Second World War Swedish-language publication in 
Estonia, Kustbon (1920-1940), acted as one of several unifying forces within the ethnic 
Swedish minority community in Estonia following the pattern Anderson laid out. While 
each town had a distinct dialect, the use of “rikssvenska” (continental Swedish) was able 
to unite the ethnic minority, providing news and opportunities to connect with ethnic 
Swedish communities further away. Kustbon enabled the population to gather around 
other areas of the emerging identity, such as the church, education, and politics. While 
first published by a group with a political affiliation, it was later published by the 
Estonian-Swedish cultural organization. 
Realizing the effectiveness of the print-media and with their arrival in Estonia in 
1940, the Soviet’s attempted to take over this role, resulting in a Soviet version of the 
Estonian-Swedish identity being found in the public culture by producing a Swedish-
language publication – Sovjet-Estland – in an attempt to shape the community towards 
the ideals of communism. The Soviets also realized the important role of nationalism; 
Arnold J. Toynbee states, “nationalism is the strongest ideology in the world and no other 
ideology can hold its own against nationalism if and when there is a conflict of 
interests.”4 The Bolsheviks arguably attempted to reshape the Estonian-Swedish 
nationalism with Soviet ideology. If they were to be successful in creating this Soviet 
                                                 
2 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso Books, 1991), 6. 
3 Anderson, 135. 
4 Arnold J. Toynbee, “Looking Back Fifty Years” in The Impact of the Russian Revolution, ed. Arnold J. 





imagined community for the Estonian-Swedes, they would have been successful at 
converting the minority population to the communist ideology. 
The nature of this campaign, as well as the ideology leading them to undertake 
this effort, is the topic of this thesis. This thesis explores the Sovjet-Estland newspaper 
published in the first year of occupation during the Second World War – a newspaper 
produced for an ethnic group of arguably minor political, international, or domestic 
importance numbering less than one percent of the population. Yet, the occupying forces 
saw an apparent benefit for courting this arguably inconsequential segment of society, 
made up of mostly poor farmers, fishermen, and sailors. Can Sovjet-Estland be said to 
continue the imagined community that was started by Kustbon? Whereas Kustbon had 
been the result of a naturally developing nationalism, Sovjet-Estland was arguably a 
consciously crafted work with the idea of agitating the Soviet politics towards the 
Estonian-Swedes. 
 
First Soviet Occupation 
The Soviet Union occupied Estonia for the first time from 18 June 1940 until the 
arrival of the Germans in the summer of 1941, annexing the territory into the USSR on 6 
August 1940.5 The occupation was made possible, in part, because of the 23 August 1939 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-aggression Pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union 
and the Secret Protocols which divided up eastern Europe.6 This was followed by 
increasing ultimatums made against the Estonian government by the USSR and ending 
with a full occupation and the creation of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR).7 
While few countries recognized the Soviet annexation,8 the roughly one year of Soviet 
occupation early in the Second World War marked a period of rapid change in all aspects 
of Estonian society towards complete incorporation into the Soviet system. The change 
                                                 
5 The first Soviet occupation followed months of growing Soviet pressure and began on 17 June 1940 when 
80,000 Red Army soldiers crossed into Estonia. The occupation lasted until the summer of 1941 when the 
German army moved into the area – the last Soviet holdout on Hiiumaa lasting until 21 October. The 
Soviets returned in the summer of 1944, completing the reoccupation of Estonia by 24 November. This 
second Soviet occupation lasted until 20 August 1991. See Mati Laur et. al., History of Estonia, (Tallinn: 
Avita, 2002), 259-276 and 307-315. 
6 The Avalon Project, The Avalon Project : Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941: Secret Additional Protocol, 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/nazsov/addsepro.htm 
7 Similar ultimatums were issues to Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland. Finland was the only country to reject 
the ultimatums, which led to the start of Winter War. 
8 Germany and Sweden both recognized the annexation. The majority of Western European countries and 





included the closure of all organizations and the shutting-down of all publications not 
officially sanctioned, and the opening of new, or replacement, organizations and 
publications under the central control of the Bolshevik party. The intense process of 
Sovietization touched all of the people in Estonia, regardless of ethnicity, location, 
occupation, or previous political affiliation. In essence, it was a process to bring the 
Bolshevik system that had been developing and adapting in Russia since the October 
Revolution to Estonia as quickly as possible. For the Bolsheviks to be successful, the 
change in systems would not only involve changes within the administrative, political, 
and cultural life of Estonia, but also change within the people. This was to be 
accomplished through an intense propaganda and agitation campaign aimed at the people 
living in Estonia. 
Among those living in Estonia was an ethnic minority population of 
approximately 8,000 ethnic Swedes. The Estonian-Swedes inhabited primarily the 
northwestern islands and coastal regions. The heaviest congregation of Estonian-Swedes 
was in the Läänemaa province, although they were also larger settlements in the 
Harjumaa and Saaremaa provinces.9 The propaganda campaign also targeted the 
Estonian-Swedes and included replacing Kustbon, which stopped publication in July 
1940, with Sovjet-Estland, which began publishing 17 October of the same year as an 
official organ of the Estonian Communist (Bolshevik) Party in the Läänemaa province. 
The Swedish-language publication went from being a newspaper created by Estonian-
Swedes to being a newspaper created for Estonian-Swedes, with an ethnic Estonian, 
Anton Vaarandi, acting as the editor of the newly created newspaper.10 The weekly 
publication (Kustbon was published at times weekly, but not consistently throughout its 
pressrun) continued until 13 August 1941 when it was discontinued by the German 
advance into Estonia after 43 issues – missing only a single week, in mid-July 1941. 
                                                 
9 For the purposes of this thesis, place names are used following the Estonian standard. In almost all cases, a 
separate Swedish name was used by the ethnic Swedish population. Articles in Sovjet-Estland use primarily 
Swedish place names, but not exclusively, with several notable exceptions discussed in Chapter 2. In 
instances where the Swedish name published in Sovjet-Estland is relevant, both names will be provided, 
along with an explanation. See Marianne Blomqvist, Svenska ortnamn i Estland med estniska 
motsvarigheter (Ekenäs: Svenska folkskolans vänner, 2000). For a complete listing of the place names used 
in this thesis in both Estonian and Swedish, refer to Appendix A. 
10 Vaarandi was also the editor of several Estonian-language newspapers including: Sirp ja Vasar, Rahva 
Hääl, and Noorte Hääl. Vaarandi oversaw the publication of two Swedish-language textbooks in 1941 





Officially, Sovjet-Estland was the organ of the Estonian Communist Party for the 
Läänemaa region, however coverage included areas outside this region. It is probably 
more correct to state that the newspaper was intended for the Estonian-Swedes, regardless 
of which province they lived in. Arguably, the local party had little to no influence on the 
newspaper’s content. The newspaper was edited in Tallinn at the offices of the ESSR 
National Publication Center’s Newspaper Publishing House (ENSV Riikliku 
Kirjastuskeskuse Ajalehtede Kirjastus) located at Pikk 58 and published at the Red Star 
(Punane Täht) printing house, also located in Tallinn.11 Sovjet-Estland was the sole 
publication representing Läänemaa until the arrival of Töötav Läänlane in December 
1940, also identified as an official publication of the Läänemaa Communists.12 The 
newspaper was typically four pages, although special coverage of the Party Congress 
increased it to six pages, and on one instance – shortly after the German declaration of 
war – a two-page newspaper was published. 
Coverage in Sovjet-Estland can not be seen as a complete coverage of events in 
Estonia nor within the ethnic Swedish communities. According to Martin Ebon, “Lenin 
advocated that information is agitation by means of interpreted facts.”13 This mentality 
continued across the Soviet Union. The interpretation offered in Sovjet-Estland, as well as 
the interpretation in other Soviet-controlled publications, offered the Soviet interpretation 
with the intention for use as propaganda and agitation. Articles were written to show the 
Soviets in a positive light, and often did not present a complete picture. Absent from the 
newspapers was news about deportations, any hardships faced by the citizens, 
discontentment within the population, forced mobilizations, reports of Estonian-Swedes 
departing for Sweden, and opposition to the Soviet regime. Instead, the newspaper 
focused on ideology, administrative changes in Estonian government, and the positive 
future for Estonia and for Estonian-Swedes under the Soviet power. Articles included 
ideology and promises of the Soviet system, particularly promoting the role of the 
workers and the industrial benefits. This was contrasted with the economic difficulties 
covered in international news, with an emphasis in coverage of Sweden. 
                                                 
11 ENSV Riikliku Kirjastuskeskuse Ajalehtede Kirjastus oversaw the publication of newspapers in the 
ESSR. The majority of newspapers – both national and regional – were published in Estonian, with the 
exceptions of Sovjet-Estland in Swedish and two Russian-language newspapers: Sovetskaja Derevnja and 
Sovetskaja Estonia. 
12 However, unlike Sovjet-Estland, Töötav Läänlane had editorial offices within the province. 





The publication of Sovjet-Estland can be seen as a continuation of the Soviet 
newspaper tradition that had emerged since the October Revolution. Within the Soviet 
system, the central government held a complete monopoly of the media, enabling it to 
control and lead the official public culture, shaping the images and messages. Opposing 
viewpoints did not have an outlet for expression within Soviet society. The strict control 
required a censorship of all published materials.14 This censorship provided the 
Bolsheviks to maintain a strict control of the message and better control of the 
propaganda. For the celebration of the Bolshevik Press Day (5 May), Sovjet-Estland 
stated, “In the hands of the working class, the press is the most powerful weapon, an 
indispensable means for enlightenment, for propaganda, for agitation, and for the far and 
wide organization of the masses.”15 The Bolshevik Press Day article in Sovjet-Estland, in 
speaking about the press in Soviet Estonia stated, “Following in the Bolshevik press 
tradition of instructing in the Bolshevik model, and of Lenin’s and Stalin’s written works, 
the Soviet Estonian press serves the purpose worthy of its duty under the Bolshevik 
party’s guidance.”16 The Bolshevik model involved a heavily centralized focus on the 
media. David L. Hoffmann calls the Soviet system “a hyper-centralized system, with 
ultimate decision-making authority for all matters – including cultural issues – in the 
hands of the Politburo.”17 In keeping with the Soviet tradition, the media in Estonia was 
highly centralized and coordinated, under tight censorship to ensure an approved 
Bolshevik message. 
Language was clearly important in Sovjet-Estland. Publishing a Swedish-language 
newspaper can perhaps be seen as a clear attempt to gain favor with the minority 
population. Articles almost always used Swedish names for towns, which had been 
prohibited by the Estonian government in the 1930s. While the majority of articles were 
translated into Swedish from either Russian or Estonian, there was original content 
                                                 
14 For an extensive overview of the development of the Soviet media, see Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You, 
Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2000). 
15 “Den bolsjevistiska pressens dag,” Sovjet-Estland, 8 May 1941, p. 1. Translated from Swedish: I 
arbetarklassens hand är pressen det mäktigaste vapnet, ett oumbärligt medel för upplysning, för propaganda, 
för agitation och för de vida massornas organisering. 
16 “Den bolsjevistiska pressens dag,” Sovjet-Estland, 8 May 1941, p. 1. Translated from Swedish: Följande 
den bolsjevistiska pressens traditioner, lärade av bolsjevistiska förebilder, av Lenin och Stalins skrivna verk 
fyller Sovjet-Estlands press under det bolsjevistiska partiets ledning värdigt sin plikt. 
17 David L. Hoffmann, Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-1941 (Ithaca: 





created and directed at the Estonian-Swedes. However, the editorship was under a non-
native Swedish speaker, and as a result, there were initially frequent spelling and 
grammatical mistakes.18 
 
Dissent among Estonian-Swedes 
Support for the Soviets was far from unanimous. Even from the early stages of the 
Soviet threat, indications were made that the ethnic Swedes were concerned. Initially, 
these concerns were over the displacement of Estonian-Swedes caused by the 28 
September 1939 pact of mutual assistance. The pact led to the establishment of Soviet 
military bases on Estonian soil, including the ethnic Swedish populated regions of the 
Pakrite islands, Osmussaar, and Naissaar. The Estonian-Swedes from the Pakrite islands 
requested permission to emigrate to Sweden. Having been given legal permission, 110 
Estonian-Swedes arrived in Stockholm aboard the “Estonia” on 17 October 1940 – 
ironically arriving on the same day as the first issue of Sovjet-Estland was published. It 
was approximately a third of the island’s inhabitants, and apparently the first to indicate a 
desire to emigrate. During the first Soviet occupation of Estonia, this was the only group 
of people legally permitted to emigrate to Sweden. A committee in Sweden assisted the 
newly arrived Estonian-Swedes to settle in Sweden, collecting and distributing funds, and 
assisting with citizenship problems. This group also acted as advocates for the emigration 
of the majority of ethnic Swedes from Estonia in the years to follow. The first groups left 
on their own illegally in November and December 1940, mostly from Naissaar.19 
Their departures can be seen as the start of the difficulties the Soviets would face 
with the ethnic Swedish minority, with large numbers of the Estonian-Swedes publicly 
stating their desire to emigrate and signing their names on lists throughout the Soviet 
occupation. The Swedish-language Soviet propaganda that followed in the roughly year-
long occupation can arguably be viewed through an attempt to convince the Estonian-
Swedes to remain in the ESSR. However, when the Soviets returned in 1944 following 
the German occupation, the majority of the ethnic Swedes had already left Estonia for 
Sweden. Sovjet-Estland did not resume publication. 
                                                 
18 This thesis has not focused on Sovjet-Estland from a linguistic perspective, although this would prove to 
be an interesting topic for future researchers. 
19 Viktor Aman, “Andra världskriget och överflyttningen till Sverige” in En bok om Estlands svenskar 





Was the campaign a failure? This thesis explores the campaign to provide an 
aspect on the eventual emigration. While this research cannot be used to completely 
explain the emigration, can it be argued that the Soviets failed in their attempts to 
convince the Estonian-Swedes? If so, then a closer look at how the campaign was 
attempted can perhaps raise some conclusions as to why it failed. 
The base assumption for this research is that Sovjet-Estland, as a centrally 
controlled and produced newspaper, was a form of Soviet propaganda and agitation with 
the ethnic Swedes in Estonia as the primary recipient (given the use of the Swedish 
language and use of Swedish place names). The thesis follows Jacques Ellul’s definition 
of propaganda. He states: 
The aim of modern propaganda is no longer to modify ideas, but to 
provoke action. It is no longer the change adherence to a doctrine, but to 
make the individual cling irrationally to a process of action. It is no longer 
to lead to a choice, but to loosen the reflexes. It is no longer to transform 
an opinion, but to arouse an active and mythical belief.20 
The propaganda campaign aimed at the Estonian-Swedes was intended to provoke them 
towards the socialist system, to accept the new ideology, and ultimately to mobilize in 
support of the Soviet Union. The goal of Sovjet-Estland was to convert the Estonian-
Swedes to communism, by introducing them to the various aspects of communism. The 
newspaper also attempted to depict the community-wide response to the Soviets as 
favorable, with the full support of the working people of Estonia. 
The readers of the newspaper were taken into consideration, but only in a limited 
and controlled manner. Soviet media scholar Jeffrey Brooks states “Each newspaper was 
officially a party publication, a fact that determined the staff’s first loyalty.”21 While the 
audience was taken into account in producing the newspaper, the product and content was 
not driven by the community’s needs and desires, and arguably did not even require the 
audience’s participation. The content was, in large part selected for the ethnic Swedes, 
however the sentiments of the population as a whole were not reflected in the newspaper. 
The newspaper was not an economic enterprise, but rather an ideological means for 
propaganda. Ellul states, “The individual is of no interest to the propagandist; as an 
                                                 
20 Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 25. 





isolated unit he presents much too much resistance to external action.”22 The target of the 
campaign was the ethnic group as a whole, and not an individual reader. 
The main focus of this thesis is to look at Sovjet-Estland for why the Estonian-
Swedes as a group were targeted by this campaign, how the propaganda message was 
passed along, what the intended message was, and how receptive this message was. 
According to Ellul, “Propaganda cannot be satisfied with partial successes, for it does not 
tolerate discussion… As long as a noticeable or expressed tension or a conflict of action 
remains, propaganda cannot be said to have accomplished its aim.”23 
Also central to the thesis is the Soviet control in Estonia and the rapid process of 
Sovietization to convert Estonia into the Soviet system. At this point in Soviet history, 
Stalin’s strong hold was dominant. Hoffmann defines Stalinism as the following: 
Stalinism can be defined as a set of tenets, policies, and practices instituted 
by the Soviet government during the years in which Stalin was in power, 
1928-53. It was characterized by extreme coercion employed for the 
purpose of economic and social transformation. Among the particular 
features of Stalinism were the abolition of private property and free trade; 
the collectivization of agriculture; a planned, state-run economy and rapid 
industrialization; the wholesale liquidation of so-called exploiting classes, 
involving massive deportations and incarcerations; large-scale political 
terror against alleged enemies, including those within the Communist 
Party itself; a cult of personality deifying Stalin; and Stalin’s virtually 
unlimited dictatorship over the country.24 
These tenets, policies, and practices are evident in all aspects of the newspaper; the rapid 
process to Sovietize Estonia was articulated and explained throughout Sovjet-Estland in 
order to gain support in its implementation. In this fast-paced environment, Sovjet-
Estland needed to not only inform the population of the changes in all aspects of life, but 
to convert them to the Soviet ideology in order to gain the people’s acceptance. 
 
Overview 
This thesis will evaluate the newspaper propaganda and agitation campaign of 
Sovjet-Estland for the almost one-year of publication. The following chapters are devoted 
to certain aspects of the newspaper and the campaign. In evaluating the propaganda in 
                                                 
22 Ellul, 6. 
23 Ellul, 11. 
24 David L. Hoffmann, “Introduction: Interpretations of Stalinism” in Stalinism, ed. David Hoffmann, 2 





Sovjet-Estland, several questions should be raised: What did the newspaper propaganda 
campaign consist of? What were the goals of the campaign? What was the benefit of the 
campaign, both intended and unintended? Why were the Estonian-Swedes an important 
audience for the new Soviet power? How was the newspaper propaganda campaign 
realized? How was the campaign received? How did the campaign evolve? 
Chapter One focuses on the audience of the Soviet-led propaganda campaign – the 
ethnic Swedish minority population of Estonia. Presented are the economic and 
educational circumstances of the Interwar period for the Estonian-Swedes, in an Estonian 
political environment increasingly becoming nationalistic and the role of the Swedish-
language publication Kustbon in developing an Estonian-Swedish identity. As will be 
demonstrated in later chapters, the Soviets attempted in Sovjet-Estland to exploit many of 
the Estonian nationalistic tendencies and the harsh economic situation from the Interwar 
period. 
Chapter Two looks at the background of Soviet minority politics from the 
Revolution until the Second World War, followed by the role of the Estonian-Swedes in 
Soviet-occupied Estonia, as portrayed in Sovjet-Estland. By arguing for a Soviet-
produced Estonian-Swedish national identity, it is hoped that the reasons for the 
propaganda and agitation campaign can be understood, as well as how this campaign was 
realized. It places the propaganda campaign aimed at the Estonian-Swedes with the 
notion of national identity throughout the Soviet Union. 
Chapter Three examines the messages of Soviet ideology, the introduction of the 
myths of Lenin and Stalin, and the public celebrations of the Soviet Union. How was this 
ideology explained, and how were the symbols presented? In attempting to convert the 
Estonian-Swedes, Sovjet-Estland attempted to draw historical comparisons to illuminate a 
better alternative for the ethnic group. 
Chapter Four explores the changing society in Soviet-Estonia and the 
representations of these various aspects in Sovjet-Estland – specifically in agriculture, 
fishing, education, the youth, and religion. How were these changes explained to the 
people? Can the Estonian-Swedes be seen as a privileged group within Soviet-Estonia? 
Chapter Five looks at the differences in reporting between foreign and Soviet-
wide domestic news, with an emphasis on foreign coverage of Sweden. The coverage can 
be viewed as a fundamental shift in focus (or rather, an attempted shift) from Stockholm 
to Moscow. This chapter explores the roll of the Soviet news agencies, and the use of 





dramatically following Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. The tone 
of the newspaper shifted to an increasing number of generic articles not relating to the 
ethnic Swedish minority, but rather focused on the Soviet Union’s fight against fascism, 
promising defeat of Germany and proclaiming that everyone would rise up to protect the 
fatherland. This is a sharp contrast to the previous tone of the Soviet Union as a nation of 
peace. To what extent was the image of a peaceful nation changed, and how did Sovjet-
Estland cover the sudden approach of war? How did the Estonian-Swedes fit into this 
focus? 
Chapter Six focuses on the overall reporting in Sovjet-Estland. The reception of 
the newspaper by the ethnic Swedes is considered, with specific efforts noted and 
attempted by the Bolsheviks to convince the Estonian-Swedes. A main goal in the 
campaign was to move the Estonian-Swedes away from thoughts of emigration. The 
question is raised as to the success or failures of the propaganda campaign in this regards 
and how the Bolsheviks attempted to gain favor with the Estonian-Swedes. The chapter 
concludes with the German arrival and the mass emigration of a majority of the ethnic 
Swedes to Sweden. 
There are several pitfalls in studying Soviet propaganda and the Estonian-Swedes. 
Kustbon and Sovjet-Estland both come from dramatically different press traditions, 
although the audience would be the same group. Sovjet-Estland was an official 
publication; only views and articles favorable to the Soviet system and ideology made it 
into publication. There was no official outlet for opposing viewpoints. As such, one 
should view the articles with skepticism; the articles in Sovjet-Estland might not be 
accurate or complete. Articles might be based on fact, but may include some fiction. 
Sovjet-Estland was a tool of propaganda and agitation – this needs to be taken into 
account in examining the newspaper. 
Focusing on the Estonian-Swedes can also be problematic. The ethnic group 
numbered only around 8,000 people – less than one percent of Estonia’s pre-war 
population. The group also had close ties to Sweden, ties which were essentially severed 
by the Soviets.25 More research is needed to explain the high percentage of discontent 
noted in the Soviet-occupation26 and why almost all of the Estonian-Swedes emigrated in 
                                                 
25 This shift in focus from Stockholm to Moscow will be an area of investigation in Chapter 5. 
26 As opposed to other groups, the Estonian-Swedes were quite open about their discontent, as shall be 





1944. It would be too early to assume that they emigrated because of the Soviet threat and 
failed efforts by the Soviets to convince them of the benefits of communist ideology. 
Other factors – such as the role of Sweden, the poor land quality in the areas they 
inhabited, and treatment by all the previous governments – may have had a strong role in 
their decision to emigrate. 
However, there are several reasons why studying Soviet propaganda and the 
Estonian-Swedes can be enlightening. Hoffmann states, “Stalinism represents one of the 
darkest and most complex pages of human history.”27 These pages of human history 
dramatically effected Estonia beginning in the summer of 1940. Stalinism affected all 
aspects of society, including the Estonian-Swedes in their final years in Estonia. Sovjet-
Estland can be used to gain insights into how the Soviets positioned themselves in 
Estonia and the attempts at propaganda. In looking at a sliver of the population, additional 
insights into the larger picture can be evident – particularly considering that during the 
Second World War, three minority groups disappeared from Estonia: the Estonian-
Swedes, the Baltic Germans, and the Jews. Focusing on the Estonian-Swedes can cast a 
new light not only on occupied Estonia, but also on the Stalinist view of nationalism put 
in practice in newly acquired territory; while the ethnic Swedes comprised less than one 
percent of the population, the Soviets arguably made a substantial propaganda effort. The 
Estonian-Swedes are particularly useful in this regard because they closely fit Stalin’s 
view of a national ethnic group28 as well as the existence of Soviet propaganda in 
Swedish and government reports on the ethnic Swedes. In some areas, it appears that the 
Estonian-Swedes (as a group) held a privileged status in the ESSR, or what Soviet 
nationality policy scholar Terry Martin would call “affirmative action.”29 To what extent 
this was the case, and what the reasons for it were, is a worthy topic to be explored. 
                                                 
27 Hoffmann, “Introduction: Interpretations of Stalinism,” 7. 
28 This topic will be investigated in Chapter 2. 
29 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
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Chapter 1: The Intended Audience – Ethnic Swedes in Interwar Estonia 
The Estonian-Swede’s fate has been tightly tied to the fate of Estonian’s 
other inhabitants. As a result of their geographic position with the fallow 
sea coast and on the barren islands, the Estonian-Swedes have often 
suffered even larger economic difficulties than their neighbors on the 
mainland. … – Neeme Ruus1 
 
In producing a newspaper for the Estonian-Swedes in 1940, the editors of Sovjet-
Estland were attempting to pander to an audience previous on the fringes of the 
population. The ethnic Swedes were small in numbers, and had little direct political 
influence, although they were connected to their ethnic brethren in both Finland and 
Sweden. Sovjet-Estland attempted to draw on the history to draw sharp comparisons 
between what they viewed as the bourgeois attempts to keep them at the fringes of society 
through cultural and economic oppression. The Bolsheviks drew primarily on the 
Interwar Estonian history – a period when the ethnic Swedish identity in Estonia was 
developing. 
During the initial period of independence – 1918 until 1940 – the Estonian state 
moved from a democratic government to an authoritarian regime with increasingly 
nationalistic policies. While arguably not the target of the nationalistic policies that were 
enacted over this roughly twenty-year period, these laws impacted the ethnic Swedish 
minority living in Estonia – laws that effected not only the political spectrum, but also 
their education, religion, and Swedish-language publications. These policies possibly had 
the effect of moving the Estonian-Swedes to strengthen and develop closer ties with 
Sweden, particularly in areas of education and religion. This is not to say that the 
relationship between the ethnic Swedes and the ethnic Estonians was antagonistic or even 
hostile; on the contrary, the relationship between the majority and minority was, on the 
whole, fairly good. In areas of conflict, the ethnic Swedes sought out amiable solutions. 
However, as shall be demonstrated in later chapters, many of the nationalistic policies 
enacted by the Estonian government during the period of independence (particularly 
during the 1930s) were later highlighted and manipulated by the Bolsheviks. This was an 
attempt to gain favor with the Estonian-Swedes by asserting and repeatedly articulating a 
                                                 
1 Neeme Ruus, “Estlandsvenskarna gå en ny och lyckligare framtid tillmötes,” Sovjet-Estland, 17 October 
1940, p. 1. Translated from Swedish: Estland-svenskarnas öde har varit tät förbunden med de andra 
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policy of inclusion towards minorities. Under such a comparison, the Soviet period and 
the Bolshevik policy can be seen as much more sympathetic to minorities than Interwar 
Estonia. 
Independent Estonia initially sought to guarantee certain protections for its 
cultural minority population. However, in practice, the cost of Swedish-language 
education and some teachers, some healthcare professionals, religious leaders and 
hymnals mostly came from Sweden. With the arrival of the 1930s, increased efforts were 
made to Estonianize the population. While these efforts might have been taken with the 
Baltic Germans in mind, the Estonian-Swedes suffered from many of the policies that 
were adopted. 
The ethnic Swedish minority population primarily lived along the northwestern 
coast and island regions of Estonia with large concentrations on Vormsi, Osmussaar, the 
Pakri islands, Noarootsi, Riguldi, and Ruhnu. Their arrival to the Estonian coastline dates 
back to at least 1294.2 August Tammekann writes, “The Estonian-Swedes’ settlement 
area is characterized completely by its nearness to the sea. Remarkable was also the 
considerable distance between the settlements, which in some places caused a certain 
isolation with disastrous consequences for Swedishness.”3 These regions were typically 
poor in land quality. Tammekann estimates the cultivated land in the Estonian-Swedish 
inhabited regions in 1934 as follows: Ruhnu 19.3 percent, Vormsi 17.7 percent, Noarootsi 
13.2 percent, Sutlepa 17.6 percent, Riguldi (including Osmussaar) 9.4 percent, and 
Vihterpalu 9 percent.4 While less than one percent of Estonia’s population, the 1922 and 
1934 censuses demonstrate that in many areas where there were ethnic Swedes, they were 
in the majority; across Läänemaa, the ethnic Swedes comprised of 7 percent of the 
population. The ethnic Swedes were often farmers, fishermen, and sailors. 
In exploring the Estonian-Swedish national identity, the role of Sweden becomes 
important. There were strong ties between Sweden and the coastal population in Estonia. 
The origins of the national awakening is often linked to the arrival of two missionaries in 
                                                 
Estlandbornas öde. Genom sitt geografiska läge vid den karga havskusten och på ofruktbara öar har estland-
svenskarna ofta fått genomleva ännu större ekonomiska svårigheter än deras grannar på fastlandet. 
2 Evald Blumfeldt, “Estlandssvenskarnas historia” in En bok om Estlands svenskar (Stockholm: 
Kulturföreningen Svenska Odlingens Vänner, 1961), 68. 
3 August Tammekann, “Estlandssvenskarnas bosättningsområde” in En bok om Estlands svenskar, p. 11. 
Translated from Swedish: Estlandssvenskarnas bosättningsområde präglades helt av närheten till havet. 
Påfallande var också de långa avstånden mellan bygderna, som på sina håll orsakade en viss isolering med 
ödesdigra följder för svenskheten. 
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1873, T.E. Thorén and L.J. Österblom, from the Evangelical Native Land Foundation 
(Evangeliska Fosterlandsstiftelse) in Stockholm. One of their goals was “to preserve and 
deepen Swedishness.”5 While the missionaries’ arrival strengthened religious ties 
between the ethnic Swedes and Sweden, it also began the education of the ethnic Swedes 
in Estonia, an important step in their nationalistic awakening. The Swedish 
Enlightenment Society in Russia (Den svenska upplysningsföreningen i Ryssland) was 
established in 1907, to be replaced in 1909 by the Swedish Cultivation Friends (Svenska 
Odlingens Vänner – or SOV). SOV became the main cultural organization for the ethnic 
Swedes, largely shaping the ethnic Swedish identity in Estonia.6 To what extent the ethnic 
Swedes saw themselves as citizens of Estonia as opposed to Swedes living abroad is often 
indirectly mentioned in Kustbon, the pre-Second World War Swedish-language 
publication. Sharing a common language, although it was a distinct dialect, increased the 
opportunities available for Estonian-Swedes and for connections between the minority 
and those in Sweden. Increasingly, as Swedish language education improved, the youth 
were exploring additional opportunities for work, which included moving to Sweden. The 
role of Swedish-language education and Swedish-language church figures were central in 
their identity, and both were initially funded by and came from Sweden. Continental 
Swedish (rikssvenska) was taught in the schools, used in the church, and used in the 
written materials, as opposed to the regional dialects. The Estonian-Swedes were heavily 
reliant on Sweden for financial support; however, it would be incorrect to suggest that the 
Estonian-Swedish identity was entirely reliant on Sweden. 
 
Cultural Autonomy 
After the First World War, the role of ethnic minorities was in a precarious 
position in the newly independent Estonian state. According to the 1922 census report in 
Estonia, the state was comprised of a 12.3 percent minority population. The minorities in 
Estonia included: Russians (8.2 percent), Germans (1.7 percent), Swedes (0.7 percent), 
Jews (0.4 percent), and others (1.3 percent). In many instances, the ethnic minorities 
represented previous periods of “foreign” domination and rule – whether German, 
Russian, or Swedish. The Baltic Germans were placed in an even more precarious 
                                                 
4 Tammekann, 52. 
5 Blumfeldt, 146. 
6 Blumfeldt, 146-151. 
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position than the other minorities because of their historic rule over ethnic Estonians. 
Although a minority, they had held political and cultural majorities in the society for 
centuries. The Estonian state was able to emerge because of a rising nationalistic 
movement among the ethnic Estonians, not to mention the timing with the First World 
War and the Russian Revolution.7 The goal was to establish independence and resist any 
attempts of foreign rule. In a region such as the Baltic States where the majority ethnicity 
was in the political minority for centuries, it would be expected that the population might 
have a negative view of the ethnic minorities who had oppressed them (or represented 
such oppression) for so long. It is quite a surprise, therefore, that the new state established 
such protections for the ethnic minorities. 
There were several waves of nationalistic movements during this roughly 20-year 
period that can be seen in the treatment of the ethnic minorities. While the state is often 
praised for its cultural autonomy legislation for ethnic minorities during this period, the 
minorities were still placed in lower positions without adequate recourse to maintain an 
equal standing in the new states. The political leaders of the country placed the status of 
ethnic minorities at a lower level than the ethnic majority. Through this ebbing and 
flowing disparity of equality in theory and equality in practice, the waves of nationalistic 
sentiments can be followed. Many policies were directed at the Baltic Germans, however 
the decisions also had impacts and repercussions for the Estonian-Swedes. 
Estonia was not unified ethnically as it emerged as an independent state. Prior to 
independence, there were political, social, and economic disparities that can be drawn on 
ethnic lines – the Baltic Germans represented the upper class while the ethnic Swedes 
were among the poor peasantry. Class does not restrict nationalism from forming, 
however, as nationalism scholar Benedict Anderson points out. He states that within the 
community, “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, 
the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”8 Nationalism was 
essential in unifying the Estonians to fight for their independence from foreign rulers. 
Following independence, the national community was based on the largest ethnic group – 
ethnic Estonians. Anderson also states, however, that racism has its origins in class – not 
                                                 
7 The Estonian-Swedish national identity occurred after the start of the Estonian national awakening, often 
following it as a model. 
8 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso Books, 1991), 7. 
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affecting foreign policy, but existing within the national boundaries,9 and this can be seen 
in Estonia, where the Baltic Germans were viewed as oppressors. Despite these 
nationalistic sentiments and rhetoric, however Estonia initially sought to give protections 
to the minorities, perhaps because they could sympathize being in a minority position 
with no, or limited, rights. Estonian historian Toivo Raun states, “Having finally achieved 
cultural autonomy for itself, Estonia took steps to guarantee the same for its ethnic 
minorities.”10 On the whole, minorities in Estonia received unprecedented protections 
from the state during the first period of independence. Some of these protections did not 
prevent discrimination based on ethnicity, which sometimes the state participated in. 
The Estonian state developed under international observation, perhaps more so 
than other emerging states.11 The international community was interested in safeguarding 
the minority rights within the new nations after the First World War, so that they would 
not be forgotten or oppressed by the majority. Nationalist ideologies tend to favor one 
ethnic group unified by language, and in Estonia, it was the ethnic majority – the 
Estonians– which dominated the national culture. 
In the Estonian constitution of 1920, the rights of minorities were mentioned in 
Paragraphs 20 and 21. The rights included the right of any citizen to determine their 
nationality at their own discretion. Additionally, paragraph 21 reads: “The members of 
national minorities within the boundaries of Estonia are granted the right, for furtherance 
of their own cultural and welfare interests, to create autonomous institutions, provided it 
will not conflict with the interests of the state.”12 Conflicts with the interests of the state, 
however, were at the core of the nationalistic debates during the independence period 
between the ethnic Estonian majority seeking to protect and develop their national 
identity and the ethnic minorities attempting to maintain and continue to develop their 
national identities. 
In addition to the protections provided in the constitution, the Estonian National 
Council passed a law for Cultural Autonomy on 12 February 1925. The Cultural 
Autonomy law provided minority groups of at least 3,000 the right to establish state-
                                                 
9 Anderson, 149-150. 
10 Toivo Raun, Estonia and the Estonians (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1995), 133. 
11 Toomas Sillaste, “Protection of Minorities in the Baltic States” (PhD diss., University of Notre Dame, 
1995), 12-27. 
12 Quoted in Karl Aun, “The Cultural Autonomy of National Minorities in Estonia” in Yearbook of the 
Estonian Learned Society in America, Vol. I (1951-1953), 29. 
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supported governing councils for cultural affairs. Only the Baltic German and Jewish 
populations, however, established these councils, because their populations was spread 
out, as opposed to the Swedish and Russians, who were centrally located as a group and 
could wield local control, making the establishment of such governing councils 
unnecessary.13 The fact that the cultural autonomy laws existed is an important point. 
However, that the existence of these laws did not prevent the rights of the ethnic 
minorities to be restricted or violated is also important and needs to be considered when 
evaluating the topic of minorities in the interwar period of Estonia. 
The Cultural Autonomy Laws established in Estonia have been heralded as prime 
examples of protecting the rights of minorities. These laws were far-reaching in some 
regards, and were praised internationally. The international obligation to protect 
minorities was guaranteed by the League of Nations, to the irk of particularly the 
Estonians, who complained that they should be treated like an equal member of the 
League, and not have to be additionally burdened with such requirements which other 
states did not have.14 In objecting to the League’s requirements, Estonia was not opposing 
minority protections, in fact having gone further in protecting minorities than were the 
League’s requirements, but rather that it was an issue that the League required of Estonia. 
The Cultural Autonomy Laws did not protect minorities in all areas, however, and 
failed to provide long-lasting guarantees against discrimination based on ethnicity. 
Tensions grew in Estonia in the 1930s, which resulted in increasing conflicts between the 
ethnic minorities and the Estonians. The tensions were also occurring when an increasing 
global economic crisis was having large effects on the young states and rising waves of 
nationalistic sentiments were appearing. 
A new wave of nationalism emerged with the government coups by Konstantin 
Päts on 12 March 1934, which led to an authoritarian regime. Previous protections 
afforded to the ethnic minorities were altered to become more limiting, or revoked 
entirely, including the Cultural Autonomy Laws. Despite the Cultural Autonomy Laws, 
Päts violated several of the provisions. According to historian Toivo Raun, “In spite of 
the emphasis on nationalism in the Päts years of the 1930s, there was only a minor retreat 
from this liberal minority policy.”15 Indeed, Päts reaffirmed the rights of minorities in the 
                                                 
13 Sillaste, 57-60. 
14 Sillaste, 19-20. 
15 Raun, 133. 
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constitution adopted in 1937,16 which perhaps indicates a position of maintaining the 
democratic nation mentality of still attempting to work with and include the minorities. 
However, the double standing can be seen in language laws, education, and even religion, 
which were no as protected in the 1937 Constitution.17 
As a group, the Baltic Germans were extremely well organized politically, more-
so than any other ethnic minority. The Baltic Germans, as a result, had a higher 
percentage of political representation than other ethnic minorities. This, however, can also 
be said to reflect the fact that in other ethnic groups, member of the ethnic minorities 
were voting in terms of party platform and not in terms of ethnicity. Ethnic Swedes 
organized a political party, the Swedish People’s Alliance (Svenska Folkförbundet), 
although they did not receive enough votes in elections to allow for a parliamentarian. 
Only after joining with the Baltic Germans were they given a seat in the Estonian 
Parliament. 
Despite not being the largest ethnic minority in Estonia, the Baltic Germans 
maintained an influence on the population in various forms. Being extremely politically 
focused and organized assured them of having a larger role among minorities in the 
government. However, perhaps it was in part this visible position that led to further 
tensions between ethnic Estonians and the Baltic Germans. However, the Baltic Germans 
and Swedish minorities periodically collaborated, and the two groups maintained contacts 
with each other. 
 
Estonian-Swedish Press 
The arrival of a Swedish-language newspaper for the ethnic Swedes came in 1918. 
In the years that followed, Kustbon attempted to act as a catalyst to promote a Swedish 
identity and to create a sense of community among Estonia’s Swedish minority. They 
were encouraged to be supportive and active citizens of Estonia, but to also strengthen 
and preserve their distinct culture. Kustbon was an independent newspaper created by 
leaders within the ethnic Swedish community, but was reliant on the economic and 
                                                 
16 Sillaste, 51. 
17 Sillaste, 53. 
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political landscape – narrowly surviving pressures from both until its eventual closure 
with the arrival of the Soviets.18 
The arrival of Swedish-language publications coincided with the growth of the 
national development of the ethnic Swedes. What began with the publication of an 
almanac in 1903 eventually developed into the arrival of a newspaper. Kustbon first 
appeared in 1918, published by the political organization Swedish People’s Alliance. 
While the voice provided by Kustbon united the people, their nationality was also largely 
shaped by their connections with religion and education – both of which used the Swedish 
mainland dialect (rikssvenska) as opposed to any of the regional dialects more commonly 
spoken among Estonia’s Swedish minority. Kustbon had a small-town feel more closely 
resembling a newsletter, with emphases in culture, education, language, religion, and 
politics, as well as the use of advertisements to support the publication economically and 
to announce deaths, births, weddings, and events. 
First and foremost, however, was national identity. National identity based on 
ethnicity took a dominant position throughout Kustbon. Elmar Nyman writes: 
It is above all Joel Nyman who takes to discuss the nationality question. 
He points out the new situation with Estonian [E. Nyman’s emphasis] as 
the land’s main language makes the position particularly grave for the 
Swedish language. The risk that Swedish change to the Estonian camp is 
now much greater than when the Russians and Germans were the 
dominant languages and Estonian was a minority language.19 
The threats from the Estonian language were to be difficult, ultimately affecting the 
Swedish-language publications repeatedly during the Interwar period. 
A May 1930 Kustbon article recognized the important role of a newspaper within 
their community, writing: 
Our newspaper, Kustbon, was founded with the thought of being the 
Estonian-Swedes’ special newspaper, a paper that would show them the 
world’s workings and convey their cause… No cultural work is possible 
                                                 
18 For a look at the Estonian-Swedes in the 1930s, see: Alar Schönberg, “Några inblickar i den 
estlandssvenska identiteten i slutet av 1930-talet” (Master’s thesis, University of Tartu, 2001). The 
Estonian-Swedish identity is also looked at in relation to a greater pan-Swedish identity in (particularly 
chapter 8): Bengt Kummel, Svenskar i all världen förenen eder!: Vilhelm Lundström och den allsvenska 
rörelsen,” (Åbo, Finland: Åbo Akademi University Press, 1993). 
19 Elmar Nyman, “En högre skola för Estlands svenskar” in Birkas: Svensk folkhögskola i Estland, ed. 
Edvin Lagman (Stockholm: Svenska Odlingens Vänner, 1971) 28. Translated from Swedish: De är 
framförallt Joel Nyman som tar till orda i nationalitetsfrågan. Han påvisar hur den nya situationen med 
estniskan som landets huvudspråk gör läget särskilt allvarligt för svenska språket. Risken för svensk 
övergång till det estniska lägret är nu mycket större än när ryskan och tyskan var de dominerande språken 
och estniskan ett minoritetsspråk. 
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without a modern newspaper. The work for the Estonian-Swedish culture 
suffers enormously by not having an effective newspaper at its disposal. 
The editors are the first to understand how insufficient Kustbon is in its 
present condition.20 
The 2 May issue was particularly unique in changing the format from a newsletter to a 
broadsheet, which the editors openly stated was as example of what the newspaper could 
and should be, except for the lack of economic backing to make such a venture possible. 
The cost, estimated by the editors to be an additional 5-6,000 crowns a year, was 
impeding their success. The article continues: 
The deficiencies could not all be remedied through this sum, but the 
newspaper could, however, be a news circulator, a true societal bond 
between Estonia’s Swedish element. Even such an insignificant 
instrument, demonstrated in this issue, could set us capable in a 
satisfactory position to show us the development of “the new age,” show 
us the path we must go, in order that the time would not rush away from 
us.21 
The passage demonstrates the desires for the editor to expand the newspaper, and the role 
it held in the furthering of the ethnic Swedish identity. It states the belief that there is 
potential for greatness within the community, but that because of a lack of funds and the 
deficiencies within the community, that potential was being wasted. 
Interestingly, in articles concerning a national identity, there was more mention of 
“Swedishness” in the ethnic Swedish villages of Estonia, while mentions of “Estonian-
Swedishness” were not as common. In 1924, Hans Pöhl wrote an article with a call to 
arms for unity among the ethnic Swedes: 
Unity gives strength! Unity among us out here brings us ideally with the 
dear tribal kinsmen in the ancient homeland on the other side of the Baltic 
Sea. And the mother tongue is a bond that holds, even when there are 
political shortcomings. In order to better be able to safeguard and further a 
genuine and healthy enlightenment of the national foundations, we need to 
join together. Above all, we must love and further that which is our own. 
                                                 
20 Redaktionen, “Den nya tiden,” Kustbon, 2 May 1930, p. 1. Translated from Swedish: Vår tidning 
“Kustbon” grundades med tanke på att bli estlandssvenskaras särskilda tidning, det blad, som skulle visa 
dem världens gång och förra deras talan... Intet kulturarbete är möjligt utan en modern tidning. Arbetet för 
den estlandssvenska kulturen lider oerhört av att ej ha en effectiv tidning till sitt förfogande. Redaktionen är 
den fösta att inse hur otillräcklig “Kustbon” är i sitt nuvarande skick. 
21 Redaktionen, “Den nya tiden,” Kustbon, 2 May 1930, p. 1. Translated from Swedish: Bristerna kunna ej 
alla avhjälpas genom denna summa, men tidningen kunde dock bli en nyhetsspridare, ett verklighet 
föreningsband mellan Estlands svenska element. Även ett så obetydligt organ, som visas med detta 
nummer, kunde sätte oss i stånd att på betryggande sätt visa oss utvecklingen av “den nya tiden,” visa oss 
den väg vi måste gå, för att ej tiden skall skena ifrån oss. 
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And the language that we have inherited, it is the most beloved that we 
own, and therefore we must call out in our districts, “Be Swedish” [written 
in the local dialect].22 
Pöhl places a strong connection to the links between Sweden, without any distinction 
between Swedish and Estonian-Swedish. 
The authors of the articles, and the participants of Kustbon, viewed themselves as 
a branch on the Swedish tree (using exactly that analogy in a 17 April 1935 article in Nya 
Kustbon23), essentially having a Swedish culture, with strong interactions and connections 
with Sweden. The development of the ethnic Swedish identity received support from 
those abroad, too, connecting the Estonian-Swedes into the larger movement of the Pan-
Swedish identity.24 
By the end of 1932, continued economic difficulties led to a decision by the 
publishers to end the newspaper. They still saw the value of having the newspaper and 
regretted its loss. They wrote: “The step is desperate and constitutes at the same time a 
deathblow for the work of ‘Swedishness’ with us, because a people that lack a newspaper 
is like an animal whose eyes have been gouged out – it thrashes around helpless, however 
intense its physical strength may be.”25 However, the community gathered around the 
publication, and minimal funds were found – although the budget was still tight – to allow 
the newspaper to continue publishing the following year. The near-end of Kustbon 
allowed the ethnic Swedish community to realize the important role the newspaper held 
for their national identity, and encouraged greater participation. 
The newspaper was threatened with closure a second time shortly afterwards. 
While economic difficulties almost ended the paper in 1932, political conditions almost 
brought the end to the Swedish-language press in Estonia in 1935. In March 1935 a law 
was passed in Estonia outlawing political parties. Perhaps as an oversight, the publication 
                                                 
22 Hans Pöhl, “Svenska Odlingens Vänners 15:de årsberättelse,” Kustbon, 20 February 1924, p. 27. 
Translated from Swedish: Enighet ger styrka! Enighet bland oss härute förenar oss ideellt med de kära 
stamfränderna i det urgamla hemlandet på andra sidan Östersjön. Och modersmålet är ett band som håller, 
även när de politiska brista. För att bättre kunna värna och befrämja en sann och sund upplysning på 
nationell grund, behöva vi sluta oss samman. Vi måste framför allt älska och befrämja det som är vårt eget. 
Och språket som vi fått i arv, är det käraste vi äga, och därför må vi ropa i våra bydger “Varer svenske.” 
23 Carl Mothander, “Karaktärsuppfostran,” Nya Kustbon, 17 April 1935, p.1-2. 
24 See Bengt Kummel, Svenskar i all världen förenen eder! (Åbo, Finland: Åbo Akademi University Press, 
1994). 
25 Redaktionen, “Till Kustbons Läsekrets,” Kustbon, 16 December 1932, p. 95. Translated from Swedish: 
Steget är förtvivlat och utgör på samma gång ett dråpslag för svenskhetsarbetet hos oss, ty ett folk, som 
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of Kustbon had remained affiliated with the Swedish People’s Alliance political party, 
meaning Kustbon could no longer be published. Instead, an interim publication was 
quickly organized, coming out under the name Nya Kustbon, overseen and edited 
independently by Nicholas Blees, who had been the chairman of SOV from 1930-1934. 
A law was also passed on 29 October 1934 requiring the use of Estonian place 
names, even in the Swedish-language publication.26 The names of towns and villages that 
the ethnic Swedes had lived in for generations were suddenly to be known only by their 
Estonian equivalent. To solve this difficulty, the newspaper would often print the Swedish 
place name in parentheses. The Swedish names, however, were still used in referring to a 
person, such as stating “Rågöboarna” instead of “Pakriboarna” for a person from the 
Pakri islands – “Rågö” in  Swedish. This indicates that while the letter of the law was 
being followed in the publication, the spirit of the law was not; the vernacular in the 
Swedish regions still employed the Swedish place names. Attempts at Estonianizing the 
ethnic Swedish population, therefore, affected only the surface. 
The following January (1936), Kustbon reappeared, this time under the authority 
of SOV. The cultural organization used their extensive contacts in each ethnic Swedish 
area to streamline local connections, subscription, and submitters. It was hoped that 
because of the connection with the SOV to the communities, the content and the 
subscription rate would both be increased, providing a great dialog among the Estonian-
Swedes. However, the connection with SOV can also be seen as having a more negative 
impact on the publication, in some instances moving it more towards a cultural 
publication (frequently commenting on SOV) and less of a news publication covering 
politics. The new version of Kustbon, however, found a greater support base among the 
organization members. The shift in operation led to increased local participation, with the 
newspaper increasingly becoming a forum for discussion. 
Regardless, the Estonian-Swedish national identity was strained, and was marked 
by a strong connection to Sweden. Carl Mothander wrote in Nya Kustbon in 1935, “Shall 
‘Swedishness’ not stand for other than the Swedish language, the Swedish book – yes, in 
the presence of such a superficial conception of ‘Swedishness,’ one essentially has 
difficulty to understand the necessity that a Swedish strain in Estonia lives further.” The 
                                                 
saknar sitt eget tidningsorgan är likt en djur, vars ögon blivit utstungna, det famlar hjälplöst, hur våldsam 
dess kroppsstyrka än må vara. 
26 Sillaste, 54. 
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Estonian-Swedish identity was more than based on the language and emerged regardless 
of restrictions. 
The strong cultural references to Sweden were repeated in the publications. Carl 
Mothander wrote in Nya Kustbon in 1935: 
Our national cultural work in Swedish-Estonia goes in a Swedish manner. 
We have Swedish elementary schools, Swedish churches, Swedish upper-
secondary schools, and much more. We have organizations that each in 
their towns shall work for Swedish preservation and development. 
However, we always see the concept of ‘Swedishness’ in a fairly narrow 
point of view. We completely forget that Swedishness doesn’t merely 
consist of Swedish language and Swedish schools, but also in disposition, 
character, and action.27 
This is not to say, however, that the Estonian-Swedes thought of themselves more as 
Swedes and not as citizens of Estonia. In one article, the editors urged the Estonian-
Swedes to not only think of themselves as Swedes, but as citizens of Estonia. The 
underlining assumption was that the Estonian-Swedes felt – and were treated in some 
terms – as outsiders from the greater Estonian society. While Kustbon had stressed the 
connections with Sweden, articles also repeatedly refer to Estonia as their homeland. The 
ethnic Swedes were citizens of Estonia. 
The national identity presented in Kustbon was not defined by criticism of the 
Estonian government. It emerged in the news reports about schools, in the anniversary 
celebrations and congratulatory notices, the wedding and death notices, the articles and 
columns that show “this is what is happening where I live,” and in the sermon-like 
columns by the pastors. While the Estonian government placed restrictions on the ethnic 
Swedes, they found ways to express themselves, to create an “imagined community.” 
Kustbon presented an image of a distinct national identity for the ethnic Swedes 
living in Estonia. In Kustbon, the role of Sweden was emphasized numerously in the lives 
of the Estonian-Swedes – in education, healthcare, and religion. Also emphasized, were 
the regional connections in each of the ethnic Swedish communities. 
                                                 
27 Carl Mothander, “Karaktärsuppfostran,” Nya Kustbon, 17 April 1935, p.1-2. Translated from Swedish: 
Vårt folkbildningsarbete i Svenskestland går i svenskhetens tecken. Vi har svenska folkskolor, svensk 
kyrka, svenskt gymansium och mycket annat. Vi ha föreningar som var i sin stad skola arbeta för 
svenskhetens bevarande och utveckling. Men vi begreppet ”svenskhet” se vi alltför gärna under en ganska 
trång synvinkel. Vi glömma bort att svenskheten icke blott består i svenskt språk och svenska skolor utan 
också i sinnelag, karaktär och handlingssätt. 
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A large concern for the editors of Kustbon was emigration to Sweden. Kustbon 
approached this topic directly. Kustbon was concerned about the youth that left the ethnic 
Swedish areas (including, to a lesser degree, heading to Tallinn) and the subsequent loss 
in talent and population. Articles frequently mentioned that those youth that wanted to go 
out to explore and earn a better living should remember their homes and return after a 
time. One method of reaching out to those who emigrated was to include them in updates, 
and examples of Estonian-Swedes living abroad giving back to their communities. 
Participation by the greater Estonian-Swedish community was increasingly 
common in the later years of Kustbon, perhaps not surprising, since the publication was 
produced entirely by the ethnic Swedes and the expanded role of SOV. Kustbon had 
served as a community discussion forum, with letters, columns, and updates about local 
community activities published regularly. 
Throughout this period, the Estonian-Swedish identity was growing. In addition to 
the newspaper and annual almanacs, two Swedish language books were written by an 
Estonian-Swede, Mats Ekman.28 The primary literary avenue, though, was Kustbon, 
which regularly published literary content in addition to the news content. 
 
Education and Religion 
Frequent topics in Kustbon were education and religion, topics with strong ties to 
Sweden; teachers and preachers were frequent contributors. Both areas were also areas to 
which the Estonian-Swedes were reliant on the Estonian government for policy, and on 
Sweden for funding. While certainly the Estonian-Swedish community was small in 
numbers, there was constant overlapping between the publication and SOV – even before 
the organization took over the newspaper. And in addition to the national enlightenment 
of the ethnic Swedes, SOV had connections to religion and education. However, the 
organization’s leadership were largely the educators and priests from the communities.29 
The ability to offer education to ethnic Swedes in Swedish was, in theory, 
protected by the government, but in areas where there were ethnic Swedes and ethnic 
Estonians living next to each other, education in Swedish became more difficult. The 
ethnic Swedes saw their schools as a source of pride, particularly the folk high school, 
                                                 
28 Mats Ekman, En bygdeskald bland den gamla svenska folkstammen i Estland (1924). Mats Ekman, Ekon 
frå n österled / Så nger frå n Birkas (1927). 
29 Kummel, 198-199. 
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Birkas, which opened 6 November 1920. The opening of the school was largely 
organized by SOV, with financial assistance from Sweden. 
SOV was also instrumental in the opening of an upper-secondary school in 
Haapsalu; the first class of Estonian-Swedes graduated from this school on 13 June 1936. 
The graduation offered the editors of Kustbon the opportunity to look towards the future 
with greater hopes. 
May it be said that this advantage is binding. The Estonian-Swedes 
consider it their right to expect something from these young men and 
women... A group of Estonian-Swedes have received a push forward in 
life. May it also mean a push forward for the Estonian-Swedes as a 
whole.30 
The editors devoted almost four pages to the graduation and its larger meaning for the 
Estonian-Swedish identity and future. 
Education was highly valued among the ethnic Swedes and the Swedish-language 
schools were a source of pride for the community. Teachers were regular contributors to 
Kustbon and the school children’s well-being was a source of constant discussion. 
Articles reported that at graduation ceremonies in mixed ethnic areas, speeches were 
given in both Estonian and Swedish, with music also sung in both languages. 
Religion had a strong placement throughout Kustbon. On several occasions, 
lengthy articles were included that can best be described as sermons.31 With the clergy 
having played important roles in the early development of the ethnic Swedish identity, 
religion was a central aspect of their culture. Clergy were not only religious leaders, but 
cultural and educational leaders as well. 
Government politics also affected religion within the ethnic Swedish parishes. 
Kustbon reported in 1936 a government decision that all pastors had to be Estonian 
citizens. In order to remain, the pastors would have to apply for Estonian citizenship, but 
to do this would mean the loss of their privileges with the Swedish Church. This was a 
concern for the ethnic Swedes, as a number of the pastors in Swedish parishes were 
Swedish citizens, none of whom were willing to become Estonian citizens. With the 
salaries for the clergy coming from the Swedish Church, there was also an economic 
                                                 
30 “Till de första estlandssvenska studenterna,” Kustbon, 11 June 1936, p. 1. Translated from Swedish: Må 
det vara sagt, att dessa förmåner förplikta. Estlandssvenskarna anse sig ha rätt att vänta någonting av dessa 
unga män och kvinnor... En skara estlandssvenskar ha fått en stöt framåt i livet. Måtte det också betyda en 
stöt framåt för estlandssvenskarna som helhet. 
31 See, for example: Kustbon, 9 April 1936, pp. 1-2. 
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consequence for the policy, as the communities were unable to afford their own pastors. 
The ethnic Swedes also had no viable candidates to replace the lost clergy, as the first few 
were still a few years away from completing their theological studies in Tartu.32 An 
appeal for them to remain in Estonia was rejected, although a compromise was ultimately 
allowed, which would enable them to remain until several Estonian-Swedes had finished 
their theological studies.33 
Interestingly, in areas where the Estonian culture was being forced onto the 
Estonian-Swedes and in areas where the ethnic Swedish culture was restricted, Kustbon 
rarely cried foul. The newspaper would casually mention the new laws and policies 
without criticizing them; the effects of the changes would be mentioned, but no 
indignation was expressed. For example, an article regarding Estonians in Russian-
dominated areas and the outrage at limited Estonian classes was translated from Estonian 
and published without offering the comparative argument over Estonian-Swedish outrage. 
It was up to the individual reader to make the connection and express frustration. Perhaps, 
the people had become used to governmental restrictions and realized that the best way to 
maintain their cultural freedom was to not publicly criticize, to not rock the boat. Or, 
perhaps this was the result of the shift from political to cultural oversight. 
 
The Start of the War 
In 1939, Estonia held fast to the idea of neutrality, and as the outlook of war 
approached, Estonia reiterated her neutrality stance, relying on the League of Nations to 
guarantee the international security. The lack of the ability of the League of Nations to do 
so was becoming increasingly apparent. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union signed a 
non-aggression pact on 23 August 1939. In the so-called Molotov-Ribbontrop Pact there 
were additional secret protocols which divided up eastern Europe into spheres of 
influence. The Baltic States were included in the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, 
which was soon to have a direct impact on the Estonian-Swedish communities. 
It was not long before Estonia began to feel the effects of the Nazi-Soviet 
agreement. By 28 September, Estonia was forced to sign a Pact of Defense and Mutual 
Assistance with the Soviet Union. Latvia and Lithuania soon followed. Estonia, like the 
                                                 
32 “Rikssvenska präster nekas arbetstillstångd i Estland,” Kustbon, 16 May 1936, p. 1. 
33 “Ljusning i prästfrågan?” Kustbon, 28 May 1936, p. 2. 
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other two Baltic States, was required to defend their borders against a third-party attack, 
which could thereby threaten the Soviet Union. 
In October 1939, Hitler recalled the Baltic Germans to Germany, and the majority 
left Estonia. This led to frequent secret meetings of concern throughout the Swedish 
areas,34 and many began to contemplate emigrating to Sweden. The Baltic Germans 
departure was seen as a sign of the impending war coming to Estonia. Sweden never 
issued a similar recall of the Estonian-Swedes.35 
The next stage of pressure against Estonia by the Soviet Union was a concern over 
Estonia’s inability to defend her borders. Similar concerns were expressed to Latvia and 
Lithuania, although in each case, the country was approached independently and forced to 
approve ultimatums with little deliberation time. In an attempt to accommodate the Soviet 
demands and to avoid involvement in the war, the government agreed. The Estonian 
government was forced to permit Soviet bases within its territory, with 25,000 troops, 
although the agreement was immediately violated with more Red Army troops arriving 
than had been agreed upon. 
The locations of the bases had consequences for the ethnic Swedish population. 
These bases were located on Saaremaa, Hiiumaa, near Haapsalu, and Paldiski. The 
recently renovated Birka folk high school was turned into barracks for the Soviet troops, 
subsequently resulting in extraordinary damage. The school’s headmaster, Pelle Byström, 
headed for Sweden and Fridolf Isberg took over.36 
With the international community preoccupied with the German invasion of 
France in the spring of 1940, the Soviet Union made her move on the Baltic States. On 16 
June 1940, Estonia was given an ultimatum. Two days later, Estonia was completely 
occupied by Soviet forces. Additional military areas were chosen, again having a strong 
impact on the Swedish regions. Beginning in June and ending in July 1940, the Swedish-
populated islands of Osmussaar, the Pakrite islands, and Naissaar were evacuated to be 
used by the Soviet military. A puppet government was established on 21 June, the same 
                                                 
34 Viktor Aman, “Estlandssvenskarna Under Andra Världskriget, Överflyttningen Till Sverige” in En bok 
om Estlands svenskar, 182. 
35 Mats Nyman, “Om 110 Rågöbors Återflyttning Till Sverige” in Estlands Svenskar 25 År I Sverige: 
Jubileumsskrift, Kustbon 1944-1968 (Stockholm: Svenska Odlingens Vänner, 1968), 39. 
36 See: Fridolf Isberg, “Birkas folkhög- och lantmannaskola under tiden 1939-1943,” in Birkas: Svensk 
folkhögskola i Estland (Stockholm, Svenska Odlingens Vänner, 1971). 
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day Osmussaar was evacuated.37 Osmussaar, together with the Hanko peninsula in 
Finland were to act as a protection for the Bay of Finland. Elections were held in Estonia 
on 14 July, although only Soviet-approved candidates could run. The newly “elected” 
government applied for Estonia to join the Soviet Union. The “annexation” was accepted 
by the Supreme Soviet Council on 6 August. 
Approximately 600 Estonian-Swedes (7.5 percent of the ethnic Swedish 
population) lost their homes and had to be relocated following the establishment of 
military bases, making them the largest group to be directly affected by the treaty. This 
was a bit problematic, as other ethnic Swedish areas were already crowded, and there 
were also a number of ethnic Estonians that had to be relocated. Many of the displaced 
ethnic Estonians indicated an interest in continuing on to Sweden.38 Some Naissaar 
fishermen used their own boats and took their families to Sweden prior to the Soviet 
occupation.39  
Prior to the closing of the Swedish embassy in Tallinn, a group from the Pakrite 
islands made an inquiry into immigration to Sweden. Acting on their behalf, the embassy 
then proceeded to work with the Soviets, eventually securing permission for the 
emigration of 110 ethnic Swedes, although their departure was delayed until October 
1940. They were the only group to receive official permission to emigrate from the ESSR. 
The Soviet occupation hampered further efforts for others to emigrate, legally or illegally, 
to Sweden. 
 
The Interwar period in Estonia can be marked by an increasing tendency towards 
Estonianization – an antagonism of the ethnic minorities populating the region in favor of 
a strengthening Estonian nationalism among the political elite. Although it can be argued 
that these policies were largely intended to erode the elite status the Baltic Germans had 
held for centuries, the policies equally affected the ethnic Swedes. Despite cultural 
protections written into the constitution and cultural autonomy laws, minority groups 
remained discriminated against by the ethnic majority. For a minority population in the 
                                                 
37 Days prior to the evacuation, two couples – Sigfrid Erkas and Elvine Brus, Fredrik Brus and Meta Marks 
– became the final two couples to marry in the church on Osmussaar. 
38 “Kommittén för estlandssvenskarna: Redogörelse över dess verksamhet 1940-1950,” Kustbon, February 
1951, pp. 6-7. 
39 “Kommittén för estlandssvenskarna: Redogörelse över dess verksamhet 1940-1950,” Kustbon, February 
1951, p. 7. 
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early stages of its national development, these policies can be seen a blow to their 
identity, just as they were learning to embrace it. During the first year of Soviet 
occupation, many of these policies would be highlighted and manipulated by the 





Chapter 2: Estonian-Swedish National Identity, Soviet Style 
According to the principles of equality and brotherhood, all minorities in 
the great and powerful Soviet Union are equal with all other citizens in 
this land, whatever nationality or race one may be… Since the power in 
the new Soviet republic has now passed into the people’s hands and a true 
people’s government takes care of governing, the Estonian-Swedes no 
longer need to feel like a kind of second class citizen…1 
 
One of the central tenets of the propaganda campaign was to appeal to the 
Estonian-Swedes’ national identity. An often-repeated phrase throughout Sovjet-Estland 
was that under the Soviet system, all nationalities were equal. This was demonstrated 
over and over by drawing on the history of oppression – economically, culturally, and 
linguistically – by the Estonian majority. It was an attempt on behalf of the Bolsheviks to 
link the oppression to the bourgeois Estonian rule in order to create the impression of the 
Estonian-Swedes being saved by the Soviets, and by attempting to portray the Soviet 
policies as being overly friendly towards the Estonian-Swedes. However, this appeal to 
nationalism was not unique to the Estonian-Swedes. It follows a trend within the Soviet 
scholarship of the position and treatment of nationalities in the Soviet Union. 
Already from the first issue of Sovjet-Estland, the unique position of the Estonian-
Swedes was brought to the forefront of the Swedish-language Soviet propaganda in 
Estonia. In his opening remarks on the first page of the first issue, EC(b)P Central 
Committee Secretary Neeme Ruus described the history of the Estonian-Swedes in terms 
of the oppression. “The cultural development of the Estonian-Swedes was prevented, on 
the one hand by difficult economic situations and on the other hand by the bourgeois 
Estonian chauvinistic cultural politics. One wanted to hold the Estonian-Swedes in 
spiritual darkness.”2 Ruus, a periodic visitor to the Swedish-speaking regions, spoke 
Swedish himself – a fact promoted by the Soviets as a sign of their openness of and 
                                                 
1 “Estlandssvenskarnas kulturella rättigheter förr och nu,” Sovjet-Estland, 24 January 1941, p. 1. Translated 
from Swedish: Enligt jämlikhetens och broderskapets princip äro alla minoriteter i det stora och mäktiga 
Sovjetunionen likställda med alla övriga medborgare i detta land av vilken nationalitet eller ras man än må 
vara. ... Sedan nu makten i den nya Sovietrepubliken övergått till folkets händer och en verklig folkregering 
sköter om statsrodet, behöva estlandssvenskarna icke längre känna sig som ett slags andra kategoriens 
medborgare. 
2 Neeme Ruus, “Estlandsvenskarna gå en ny och lyckligare framtid tillmötes,” Sovjet-Estland, 17 October 
1940, p. 1. Translated from Swedish: Den kulturella utvecklingen av estlandsvenskarna förhindrades å ena 
sidan av det svåra ekonomiska läget, men å andra sidan även av det borgerliga Estlands chauvanistiska 





support to Swedish concerns. He stated that the Soviet government wanted to change the 
Estonian-Swedes’ position, both the economically and culturally, away from oppression. 
The Soviet government shall take decisive steps towards the improvement 
of the sanitary conditions among the Estonian-Swedes. In the cultural-
work field, the Estonian-Swedes must begin in earnest their own action as 
soon as possible. In view of that, the publication of the newspaper Sovjet-
Estland should create favorable conditions.3 
Only through socialism could the Estonian-Swedes develop economically and culturally, 
and the Soviets made clear their intentions to encourage the development of the Estonian-
Swedish national identity. According to Ruus, the Soviets wanted the Estonian-Swedes to 
develop their nationalism, with a socialistic culture. He stated that the Soviet government 
would take an active role in improving the lives of the Estonian-Swedes, and an 
environment would exist to allow the Estonian-Swedish national identity (socialistic in 
content) to grow. Ruus’ comments in the first issue conveyed a remarkable understanding 
of the treatment of the Estonian-Swedes during the bourgeois Estonian government, their 
economic situation, and their national identity. 
The following week, Läänemaa EC(b)P Secretary Oskar Cher echoed Ruus’ 
comments, placing the Estonian-Swedes as a group on an equal standing with other 
ethnicities. “In the socialistic society, all nations are equal, at which in particular attention 
is directed at the development of exactly the minorities cultural and at the improvement of 
their economic circumstances.”4 Again, Cher mentioned the previous oppression, 
committing the Bolsheviks to change and improve their economic and cultural standing. 
This would continue to be an important theme in Sovjet-Estland. Cher wanted them to be 
included within the Bolshevik party and gather around Sovjet-Estland. Whereas Ruus had 
signaled the ESSR intentions, Cher signaled the local Läänemaa commitment to protect 
and encourage the Estonian-Swedes. 
In viewing the role of Swedish-language propaganda in Soviet-occupied Estonia, 
the Stalinist view of nationalism and a Soviet-created national identity is readily apparent. 
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därtill. 
4 Oskar Cher, “Estlandsvenskarna äro nu likställda med andra minoriteter,” Sovjet-Estland, 24 October 






The Bolsheviks attempted to merge the Estonian-Swedish national identity with the ideals 
of socialism. Nationalism and cultural development were consistent themes throughout 
Sovjet-Estland. It is the best example of articles written specifically for the Estonian-
Swedes; whereas other types of articles were in some cases translated from either 
Estonian or Russian, articles on nationalism and cultural development were written with 
the Estonian-Swedes as the primary audience. Whereas propaganda aimed at ethnic 
Estonians would emphasize oppression of nationalism of workers by the bourgeois, the 
ethnic Swedes were repeatedly reminded of the oppression of their ethnic group (as a 
whole) by the Estonian bourgeois. Certainly the workers were mentioned or implied in 
this nationalism, but it was an entirely different emphasis, made easier by the poor 
economic situation of the Estonian-Swedes (making them all workers or potential 
workers). Nationalism in Sovjet-Estland can be found in the language, historical 
comparisons, cultural encouragement, and regional identity. However, while the content 
was completely original, the structure and the motivation for the articles was based in 
Soviet theory of nationalism and national development – theories dating to the Russian 
Revolution and coming directly from Lenin and Stalin. 
 
Soviet Nationalism and National Minorities 
The Soviet nationalities policy evolved from the years prior to the Russian 
Revolution, with the two main driving forces being Lenin and Stalin. Having seen the 
effect of nationalism in other areas, Lenin realized the tremendous power that it could 
have. Rather than have the force of nationalism run counter to the revolution being led by 
the Bolsheviks, Lenin sought to incorporate the debate into the Bolshevik ideology, 
attempting to tap into nationalistic sentiments for support. 
Irina Filatova, in stating Lenin’s contribution to the nationalism debate, writes that 
Lenin advanced the topic in two areas. Firstly, by promoting the right for national self-
determination (which was later abandoned after the Bolshevik Revolution) and secondly, 
by placing class and class interests above those of the nation. She explains: 
Both before and after 1917 the Bolsheviks saw the nationalities question as 
subordinate to the task of building socialism. The nationalities problem 
                                                 






itself was attributed to capitalist order and imperialist policy and it seemed 
logical to think that once socialism is achieved it will cease to exist.5 
The Soviet national minority policy had developed from the early days of the revolution, 
when Lenin saw the encouragement of national minorities as an effective means to 
counter capitalism and gain support for Bolshevism. Francine Hirsch writes, “The Soviet 
regime defined itself as the sum of its parts and saw its own interests as linked to its 
population’s rapid national-cultural development.”6 The encouragement of nationalism 
was fortified, although it was restricted to being socialistic in content, giving the 
Bolsheviks the ability to shape and control the growing nationalism. 
However, it was Stalin’s writings and determinations that dominated the Soviet 
nationalities question, even before Lenin’s death. Stalin was appointed to the position of 
People’s Commissioner of Nationality Relations, and was the Bolshevik expert on 
nationalism. In his 1913 essay, Marxism and the National Question, Stalin defined a 
nation as a historically constituted community of people with a common language, a 
community of territory, a community of economic life, and a common community of 
culture.7 Written at the request of Lenin, Stalin’s essay was to counter the claims of the 
Jewish Bund and the Austrian socialists, and based largely on the writings of two 
Austrian socialists, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner.8 However, the fourth point, Hugh Seton-
Watson points out, is so vague as to be useless. “It presumably covers all the complex 
historical factors, including religion, which help to form a nation. The first three points 
are admittedly important, but they are not sufficient in themselves, while the fourth 
amounts to no more than a verbal formula.”9 The culture of minorities was to be 
encouraged by developing cultural institutions and language resources, all of which fell 
under the control of the Soviet state and were subject to periodic purges. 
Terry Martin, in his book The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and 
Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939, suggests that the Soviet nationalities policy 
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was based on three premises. The first, a Marxist premise, viewed nationalism as a 
“uniquely dangerous mobilizing ideology.”10 The Bolsheviks, by promoting and shaping 
their version of nationalism, could mask their ideology while diminishing the potential for 
mobilizing above class levels in pursuit of national goals. The second, the Modernization 
Premise, saw the development of nationalism as an inevitable development of the 
capitalistic world, but also as a sign of modernization. The hope was that by encouraging 
nationalism, the historical stage could be by-passed quickly, creating a more secure place 
for socialism to continue.11 The third, the Colonial Premise, recognizes the value in 
promoting the culture of oppressed people, while suppressing the culture of the 
oppressors, or in the Soviet case, the ethnic Russians.12 
Martin also suggests what he calls “the Piedmont Principle” which provides a link 
between the domestic nationalities policy and foreign policy; by treating ethnic groups in 
the Soviet Union generously, it was hoped that the corresponding groups in other 
countries would respond favorably to the Soviet system. While Martin states that the 
Piedmont Principle was never the guiding force of the Soviet nationalities policy,13 “the 
Piedmont Principle asserted that ethnic ties transcended political borders and therefore 
could be exploited by the Soviet Union to project Soviet influence abroad.”14 He 
specifically points to the cases of Poland, Finland, and Romania, although it can be 
argued that the Estonian-Swedes had the potential to be used to the same effect. Martin 
writes: 
It should be emphasized, however, that this foreign policy goal was never 
the primary motivation of the Soviet nationalities policy. It was seen as an 
exploitable benefit of a domestically driven policy that affected the 
intensity of implementation in sensitive regions, but not the content of the 
policy itself.15 
The implementation of the Soviet nationalities policy was implemented in different 
manners by different regions, although border regions were of special concern. Martin 
writes that according to a 16 July Politburo decree concerning western border regions, the 
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policy towards national minorities in the border regions was to be “especially generous.” 
He continues: 
There should be more national schools, more national territories, an 
expanded native-language press, aggressive recruitment and promotion of 
national cadres, and strict punishment of all Russian chauvinism. Far from 
attempting to further ethnic homogeneity, the Soviet government 
consciously aimed to emphasize and promote the ethnic diversity of their 
border regions.16 
The strong encouragement of national minorities continued up to the time of the Second 
World War. It can be argued that these policies still had an effect in the newly acquired 
territory of the ESSR during the first year of Soviet occupation. 
David Brandenberger views the pre-war period in the Soviet Union through an 
effort to mobilize the population in his book, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture 
and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956. His study examines 
the popular reception of propaganda, relying heavily on the Russian national identity and 
not on the minorities. He notices an increased reliance on popular Russian images, 
historical figures, and icons into the propaganda. According to his theory, the Soviets 
moved away from the previous tendency to de-emphasize the Russian culture and towards 
a populist superiority of the Russians. In Brandenberger’s theory, the shift in policy was 
an attempt to unify the population in order to mobilized the people.17 
David L. Hoffmann goes a step further than Brandenberger, more clearly 
explaining the policies by connecting the changes in focus of the Soviet propaganda to the 
need for a unified set of values across the Soviet Union. Having achieved socialism and 
with the abolition of the class system, the leadership beginning in the 1930s needed to be 
able to mobilize the people together, particularly as the international situation grew more 
tense. This was seen to be most effective through the establishment of a common tradition 
and a common set of values that could be embraced across the Soviet Union by every 
nationality. This took the form of selectively embracing previous Russian historical and 
literary figures, although this had the potential of alienating the national minorities by 
seeming to promote the Russian culture. Hoffmann views this development not as a 
retreat from the socialist ideology of the 1920s, but as a continuation of the ideology, 
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adapting to the change in society with the transformation from socialisms early attempts 
of being established to having been achieved and finally to the maintenance and 
expansion of socialism.18 
In relation to the Estonian-Swedes, the propaganda in Sovjet-Estland was certainly 
in its early stages. Mobilization was a clear concern, particularly following the German 
declaration of war. Russian images, historical figures, and icons, however, were rarely 
employed. The emphasis was on the Soviet symbols and mobilizing the minority through 
other means. This can perhaps illustrate two possibilities. The propaganda aimed at the 
Estonian-Swedes was not following the developing patterns demonstrated by 
Brandenberger and Hoffmann in engaging the use of Russian historical and literary 
figures, but instead focused on the uniqueness of the Estonian-Swedes and the oppression 
suffered under the Estonian regime. In such a highly centralized and controlled effort, the 
propaganda did not intended to antagonize the minority through the employment of 
Russian symbols. Brandenberger’s and Hoffmann’s finding, therefore, can be used to 
emphasize the differences between the propaganda aimed at the Russians and the 
propaganda aimed at minorities, particularly in areas recently acquired. Specifically in 
relationship to Hoffmann’s work, the situation was certainly not the same, with socialism 
being only in the early stages in the ESSR, and therefore the use of Russian images could 
not yet be employed effectively; the ESSR was not in the position in 1940-1941 of 
sharing the same cultural norms as across the Soviet Union. Both efforts, however, had 
the same goal – the mobilization of the people. For the Estonian-Swedes, this meant a 
rapid acceptance of the new ideology and the changes in society. 
 
Estonian-Swedish National Identity 
The ethnic Swedish minority living primarily in the islands and coastal regions of 
Estonia were an ideal ethnicity within the Soviet system of nations. Stalin’s elements of 
what constitutes a nation perfectly meshed with the Estonian-Swedes as a minority living 
in communities primarily of the same ethnicity sharing a common language and economic 
standing, and with a common history and culture. In addition, their status as relatively 
poor farmers and fishermen could possibly have translated to support for the Soviet 
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economic policies. None of the other ethnic minorities living in Estonia fit this 
description as well as the Estonian-Swedes. This made the ethnic Swedes ideally suited to 
being receptive of communist ideology (in theory) and for extensive efforts of 
Sovietization, placing them in a unique position within the Estonian Soviet Socialist 
Republic. 
If Martin’s Piedmont Principle is taken into consideration, perhaps the long-term 
goal was also the encouragement of Soviet policy in Sweden. This possibility can 
supported by the distribution, even on a small scale, of Sovjet-Estland to Sweden and the 
reproduction of news articles in communist newspapers in Sweden. Per Weiselgren, the 
Swedish professor at the University of Tartu at the time, mentions two examples of such 
reception in Sweden of the propaganda in his memoir, Frå n Hammaren till Hakkorset, 
Estland 1939-1941 (From the Hammer to the Swastika, Estonia 1939-1941).19 In the first 
instance, he mentions a letter the newspaper received from 40 workers in Gothenburg 
who expressed a desire to live in “prosperous Soviet-Estonia” and berated the ungrateful 
Pakrite island ethnic Swedes who had legally immigrated to Sweden. The second instance 
caused him greater concern. “Even among the Estonia-interested cultural elite in Sweden, 
one didn’t always understand how the newspaper should be judged. I received a letter 
from a professor who expressed grave concern over the Estonian-Swedes’ conversion to 
communism.”20 
The Bolsheviks attempted to draw conclusions from the historical poor treatment 
of the minority, particularly in terms of linguistic and cultural matters. This was meant to 
gain additional support from the minority for the Soviet policies. A 4 January 1941 article 
states: 
The new regime has given us back out linguistic and cultural rights, and 
we no longer need to go and feel that we are some sort of second-class 
citizens, like we did under Eenpalu’s regime, rather we know with feelings 
of pride equality with our fellow workers of other nationalities within the 
Soviet-republic’s wide borders.21 
                                                 
19 This book has been translated into Estonian: Vasarast haakristini : Eesti 1939-1941 (Tallinn: Kunst, 
2002). 
20 Per Weiselgren, Frå n Hammaren till Hakkorset, Estland 1939-1941 (Stockholm: Idé och Form Förlag, 
1942), 155. Translated from Swedish: Även inom den estlandsintressade kultureliten i Sverige förstod man 
inte alltid, hur tidningen borde bedömas. Jag fick ett brev från en professor, som uttryckte allvarlig oro över 
estlandssvenskarnas omvändelse till kommunismen. 
21 “Vad den socialistiska regeringen gett Estlands svenskar,” Sovjet-Estland, 4 January 1941, p. 1. 






Throughout Sovjet-Estland, the status of the Estonian-Swedes as second-class citizens in 
Interwar Estonia (and tsarist Russia, although this was not emphasized as often) was 
frequently referred to, as a contrasting point to the pro-nationalities policies of the Soviet 
Union. 
The theme of Soviet nationalism, along with the recurring theme of how the 
situation had improved for minorities under the Soviet system (as opposed to under the 
Estonian government) became increasingly significant following the 22 June 1941 
declaration of war by Germany against the Soviet Union. The groundwork that had been 
attempted in fostering the Estonian-Swedish identity in the pre-22 June issues was 
required in order to successfully mobilize the population in the war effort. As 
Brandenberger had noticed in the Russian national identity, mobilization of the 
population was a key factor. 
An example of this groundwork can be seen in a 10 April 1941 article discussing 
the role of Soviet patriotism and nationality. The article states, “Soviet patriotism is an 
unbounded love for the homeland and its interests along with the desire to sacrifice your 
own interests for the native land. But along with that is even an irreconcilable hatred for 
enemies of the Soviet people.”22 The article, a clear example of content translated into 
Swedish for publication in the newspaper, does not attempt to make a clear connection 
between the ideas of the article and the application of those ideas within the Estonian-
Swedish community. Although it does state that each nationality has the “right and 
freedom to live their own national life, at the same time that it is a member of the Soviet 
state’s family of brethren.”23 Although generic in its writing, this article attempted to 
establish a Soviet patriotism sentiment, linking the proletariat to the Soviet state as its 
homeland. 
 
                                                 
vi behöva inte längre gå och känna oss som ett slags andraklass medborgare, som vi fingo göra under 
Eenpalus regim, utan vi kunna med stolthet känna oss likställda med våra arbetskamrater av annan 
nationalitet inom Sovjet-republikens vida gränser. 
22 “Sovjetpatriotismen och nationaliteten,” Sovjet-Estland, 10 April 1941 p. 3. Translated from Swedish: 
Sovjetpatriotsmen är en obegränsad kärlek till hemlandet och dess intressen samt viljan att offra sina egna 
intressen för fostlandets. Men därvid är den även ett oförsonligt hat till sovjetfolkens fiender. 
23 “Sovjetpatriotismen och nationaliteten,” Sovjet-Estland, 10 April 1941, p. 3. Translated from Swedish: 






The Swedish language was an important aspect of the Estonian-Swedish identity. 
The publication of a Swedish-language newspaper can, itself, be seen as an important step 
in the Sovietization of the Estonian-Swedish identity. It was intended not only as an organ 
of propaganda, but also as an act of goodwill towards the Swedish minority. The editor, in 
his opening letter to the readers wrote: “Our working people’s government and our 
leaders in the Estonian Communist Party have shown their goodwill towards the working 
Swedish-speaking people’s ambition and wishes, and intend further to provide for the 
Swedish-speaking coastal people’s well being.”24 
This goodwill towards the Estonian-Swedes was a regular topic throughout Sovjet-
Estland, and is also reflected not only in the publication of a Swedish-language 
newspaper, but also in the usage of Swedish place-names over Estonian names. During 
the 1930s, the Estonian government required the use of Estonian place names, even in 
Swedish-language publications.25 Sovjet-Estland used almost exclusively the Swedish 
names, with the main exceptions being the usage of “Tallinn” over “Reval” and 
“Läänemaa” over “Vik.”26 Whereas the Estonian government had not permitted the usage 
of Swedish place names, the Soviets were encouraging their usage. 
Place names were of significant importance for the Estonian-Swedes. An article 
concerning the town names was published on 20 March 1941. The author, “Astolf,” states 
that one of the injustices of the Eenpalu government was the Estonianization of the 
Swedish place names, which had existed for as long as the ethnic Swedes had lived along 
Estonia’s coast. He writes, “These names grew with time within the inhabitants’ soul and 
became dear, and it should never have occurred to our forefathers to change them.”27 The 
                                                 
24 Redaktionen, “‘Sovjet-Estland’ – ny tidning för arbetande svensktalande folket,” Sovjet-Estland, 17 
October 1940, p. 2. Translated from Swedish: Vår arbetande folkets regering och vår ledare Estniska 
Kommunistiska Partiet har visat sin välvilja mot den arbetande svensktalande befolkningens strävanden och 
önskningar, och ämnar vidare sörja för det svensktalande kustfolkets välbehållan. 
25 Following a 1935 law, Kustbon was required to use the Estonian names, which periodically required the 
Swedish name in parentheses. See Alar Schönberg, Nå gra Inblickar i den Estlandssvenska Identiteten i 
slutet av 1930-talet (Masters’ Thesis, University of Tartu, 2001), 51. 
26 There are occasions where Sovjet-Estland is inconsistent, varying, for example, between using the 
Swedish “Hapsal” (see, for example, Sovjet-Estland, 28 November 1940) and the Estonian “Haapsalu” (see, 
for example, Sovjet-Estland, 4 January 1941). Also, a large error was made translating Noarootsi (in 
Swedish “Nuckö”) as “Nargö” (in Estonian “Naissaar”) in the 17 October 1940 issue, Nargö having already 
been evacuated to allow for a Soviet military base. 
27 Astolf, “Våra ortnamn,” Sovjet-Estland, 20 March 1941, p. 2. Translated from Swedish: Dessa namn 






article continues by expressing outrage at the Estonianization efforts that were also 
undertaken to change farm names, and the people’s last names to make them more 
Estonian. “This can only be explained by the hostility of the then-government towards the 
Swedes.”28 Astolf concludes by praising the Soviet Union’s policy of equality, and 
expressing the Estonian-Swedes’ gladness and approval for the new government. 
Perhaps one of the more surprising exceptions, though, was the use of “Vormsö” 
over “Ormsö” for the island of Vormsi (“ö” is Swedish for island). Marianne Blomqvist, 
in her book Svenska ortnamn i Estland med estniska motsvarigheter (Swedish town 
names in Estonia with Estonian equivalents), states that a “W” was typically used in the 
German name for the island, and was subsequently developed into the Estonia 
“Vormsi.”29 While “Vormsö” had occasionally been used by the Swedes, it is not clear 
why the editors chose to primarily use that name over “Ormsö.” On more than one 
occasion, “Ormsö”30 was used, with one issue using both names in the headline: “Ormsö 
notices: Small notices from Vormsö.”31 Whether this was a conscious decision, and if so, 
the reason, cannot be determined. Sovjet-Estland mentions the discrepancy between the 
two in a profile of Vormsi, printed on 17 April 1941. The article states: 
The beautiful island’s name has produced many heated disputes, because 
sometimes is it written Ormsö, sometimes Vormsö. The legend tells that 
the island got its name from a lost Viking chief Orm, who after many 
hardships settled here, and the island probably has been named Ormsö 
[Orm’s island] after him. The island inhabitants have been, however, with 
help of foreign “connoisseurs” pressured, that it sounds somewhat ugly 
with “orm” [Swedish for snake] and following after the German-born 
landowners’ taste placed an elegant “v” before orm, and so it became 
Vormsö. The inhabitants of Ormsö, however, call their beloved home 
island quite simply “Ormse” and themselves “ormsebo” [residents of 
Ormse].32 
                                                 
28 Astolf, “Våra ortnamn,” Sovjet-Estland, 20 March 1941, p. 2. Translated from Swedish: Detta kan endast 
förklaras med den dåvarande regeringens svenskfientlighet. 
29 Marianne Blomqvist, Svenska ortnamn i Estland med estniska motsvarigheter (Ekenäs: Svenska 
Folkskolans Vänner, 2000), 15. 
30 See for example Sovjet-Estland, 29 April 1941, p. 2, and 8 May 1941, p. 2. 
31 “Ormsö notiser: ‘Smånotiser från Vormsö,’” Sovjet-Estland, 15 May 1941, p. 2. 
32 “Ormsö – Svenskbygdens hjärta,” Sovjet-Estland, 17 April 1941, p. 2. Translated from Swedish, keeping 
the original names in Swedish (and not translated to the Estonian names as is being used throughout the rest 
of the thesis): Den vackra öns namn har vållat många heta dispyter, ty än skrives det Ormsö än Vormsö. 
Sägnen förtäljer, att ön fått sitt namn av en vilseglad vikingahövding Orm, som efter många strapatser 
grundstött här och efter honom lär ön ha uppkallats till Ormsö. Öborna ha emellertid med hjälp av 
främmande “finsmakare” tyckt, att det låter något fult med “orm” och passat på att efter de tyskfödda 
godsägarnas smak sätta ett find “v” framför orm och så blev det Vormsö. Ormsöborna kalla dock sin kära 





However, while the author of the profile clearly tended to prefer the use of Ormsö, the 
newspaper more commonly used Vormsö – including two articles appearing on the same 
page as the profile. 
The use of the Swedish language was not limited to the newspaper. Swedish was 
also used in information for specific agitation uses, radio programs, and voting 
information. Election material was also prepared in Swedish, the first time such efforts 
had been undertaken for the Estonian-Swedes, and further evidence of the equality of all 
nationalities under the Soviet system.33 Neeme Ruus notably used Swedish when 
speaking to the Estonian-Swedes, which was frequently highlighted in articles about his 
visits to ethnic Swedish areas. On one such speaking tour on 4-5 January that included 
Noarootsi, Riguldi, and Vormsi, the author of the article writes: 
While one sat there and listened to comrade Ruus’ speech, one could not 
avoid but do a comparison between the old and the new regime… Now our 
leaders come here from Tallinn and hold talks in fluent Swedish, and 
through that demonstrate that all nations in the Soviet Union have equally 
great rights.34 
All of these efforts were meant to reinforce the Soviet ideology that all nationalities are 
equal in the Soviet Union, and were used as a sharp contrast to the Estonianization efforts 
of the independent Estonian period. 
Weiselgren was highly critical of Sovjet-Estland in his memoir, most notably for 
linguistic reasons. “The first issue of this publication was, however, drawn up in hair-
raising Swedish, because the editor, an Estonian communist who indeed understood 
Norwegian, Comrade Vaarandi, stuffed the newspaper with absolute literal translations 
from Russian and Estonian.”35 As the Swedish professor at the University of Tartu, 
Weiselgren was keenly aware of the linguistic mistakes being made in the newspaper, 
particularly in the first few issues. His memoir berates the grammatical mistakes, 
particularly the use of improper articles. With the newspapers being used in the 
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classrooms (Weiselgren states that bourgeois and Christian books were no longer 
permitted) he took action to remedy the language, sending Vaarandi a former student as a 
translator,36 without success, writing: “Comrade Vaarandi’s suspicions against every free 
translation made an actual language improvement difficult to carry out. One had to be 
content with the good language in the original articles, which the Estonian-Swedes’ own 
scribes wrote.”37 
The Bolsheviks were apparently aware of the weaknesses of Swedish within the 
ESSR. In May 1941, the Central Committee discussed the work done among the 
Swedes.38 The report states that work has been “unsatisfactory.” In some of the 
recommendations of the report, the need for more agitators speaking Swedish was 
expressed, particularly targeting the youth, increasing the subscription and expanding the 
content of Sovjet-Estland, improving the Swedish-language radio programs, and to 
prepare more translations of literature and movies into Swedish. The short-comings of the 
Swedish-language offerings needed to be solved, largely because of concerns among the 
Central Committee over the predominance of emigration thoughts among the Estonian-
Swedes. 
The lack of approved Swedish-language textbooks was also a problem. As 
Weiselgren mentioned, Sovjet-Estland was used in the schools for educational purposes, 
in large part because of this absence. Textbooks from Sweden, reflecting the capitalistic 
and religious society, were no longer acceptable. Preparing new textbooks, however, took 
time. Two new textbooks were finally completed, compiled by Tomas Gärdström, in June 
but distribution was indefinitely delayed because of the sudden arrival of the war.39  
 
Cultural Encouragement 
An important function of the newspaper was to explain the role the group would 
hold and the support they would receive in the furthering of their language and culture, 
although within the confines of the Soviet ideology and socialistic culture. As the central 
organ for the Estonian-Swedes, Sovjet-Estland was also an important cultural function. 
                                                 
36 Weiselgren does not name this former female student. 
37 Weiselgren, 155. Translated from Swedish: Men kamrat Vaarandis misstänksamhet mot varje friare 
tolkning gjorde en verklig språkförbättring svår att genomföra. Man fick nöja sig med gott språk i en del 
originalartiklar, som estlandssvenskarnas egna skribenter författat. 
38 ERAF [Eesti Riigiarhiivi Filiaal] 1-4-71, Öå íòðàëûé Ê î ìèòå ò Ê Ï  (á) Ýñ ò î í è è Îñîáûé Ñå ñòîð, 36-





However, the cultural role went largely ignored within the newspaper for the first half of 
the year. Instead, cultural articles focused on the legal rights and the ideological rights for 
the protection and encouragement of all nationalities. While cultural activities such as 
visiting theater troops and musicians were included in articles, there was little mention of  
Estonian-Swedish participation in these types of activities. It was not until spring 1941 
that Estonian-Swedish participation was also mentioned in the newspaper. 
Perhaps one reason for the lack of cultural reporting was the loss of the main 
cultural organization for the ethnic Swedes. Throughout the independent Estonian period, 
the Cultural Union of Swedish Cultivation Friends (Kulturföreningen Svenska Odlingens 
Vänner), or SOV, enriched and coordinated the Estonian-Swedish culture. However, SOV 
was closed by the Bolsheviks, with no single organization being opened to replace it. 
SOV was mentioned only twice in the year-long run of Sovjet-Estland – in the 31 October 
194040 and the 4 January 194141 issues. In both occasions, it was in reference to the 
history of Swedish-language education in Estonia, particularly as the founding 
organization for both the Birkas (in Estonian, Pürksi) school in Noarootsi and the 
Swedish school in Tallinn. And in both cases, the references were positive. There was no 
negative interpretation of SOV offered in Sovjet-Estland and no explanation provided as 
to the reason for its closing (such as it being representative of the capitalistic, bourgeois 
independent period). 
Without SOV or a replacement organization to oversee the cultural development 
of the Estonian-Swedes, it was left to the local initiative for all cultural activities. 
Whereas Sovjet-Estland routinely sought to educate the readers in areas of politics and 
history, culture was only discussed in abstract methods. There was no intelligentsia from 
which the Bolsheviks could draw in order to lead and form the cultural aspect of the 
Estonian-Swedes, as this had been a limited group of people before the occupation began. 
In order to be effective, a central organization would have been needed to lead the 
cultural development of the Estonian-Swedes. 
The May Central Committee report mentions the cultural shortcomings that were 
to be addressed by the Bolsheviks in Estonian-Swedish cultural encouragement. 
Specifically, cultural events were to be organized for the Estonian-Swedes. These were to 
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include the establishment of choirs, orchestras, dramatic groups, dancing, ensuring that 
equipment and repertoire was available. The Central Committee also wanted the 
Estonian-Swedes to participate in the Estonian art Olympiad to encourage amateur art 
groups (and ensuring that this art was formally national and socialistic in content).42 On 
some levels, the report’s decisions were implemented. For several issues, the cultural 
reporting increased in Sovjet-Estland. The lead article in the 22 May issue, for example, 
focused on the Estonian-Swedes’ culture independence. 
Ethnic Swedish participation in an art festival in Tallinn, and later in Moscow, 
also was meant to encourage the Estonian-Swedish cultural identity. The 22 May issue 
reported the translation of the songs for the upcoming art festival into Swedish by 
Hjalmar Pöhl,43 a luminary in the Estonian-Swedish culture. A committee was also 
established to oversee the ethnic Swedish participation in the festival. The committee 
included representatives from the various Estonian-Swedish regions to be overseen by L. 
Malmre, Fridolf Isberg, and Hjalmar Pöhl. Representing Vormsi were Alexander 
Hammerman, Tomas Gärdström, and Viktor Aman. Representing Noarootsi were Viktor 
Pöhl and Alexander Samberg. Representing Riguldi were Anton Vesterberg, Arvid 
Nyman, and Besterman. In regards to their 18 May meeting, Sovjet-Estland reported: “All 
agreed that the Estonian-Swedes were for the first time now properly able to demonstrate 
what they were capable of producing in the areas of singing, music, and folk dancing.”44 
Sovjet-Estland reported in the 18 June issue on an upcoming joint meeting of the 
“Estonian-Swedes’ circles for cultural activities” (Estlandssvenska självverksamma 
cirklarna). The meeting was to be held at the Birkas school on 22 June, with the program 
to include choral singing, and folk dancing, and would be a preparation for the cultural 
exposition in Moscow. An additional ferry would be run from Vormsi to increase 
participation in the event. The article states, “The festivities are the first of its type in the 
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Seating of the Central Committee, dated 15, 21, and 22 May 1941. 
43 “Sånger för dekaden på svenska,” Sovjet-Estland, 22 May 1941, p. 1. 
44 “Svenskbygden rustar sig för konstdekaden,” Sovjet-Estland, 22 May 1941, p. 2. Translated from 
Swedish: Man kom överens om att estlandssvenskarna först nu riktigt kunde visa vad de mäkta åstadkomma 





Swedish region, and so it is hoped that the Estonian-Swedes numerously participate in 
them.”45 
Attempts were made to increase the cultural growth of the Estonian-Swedes, 
particularly in the later stages of the occupation. While it was intended that this cultural 
growth would be socialistic in content, it is notable that a number of those on the 
committee had been largely involved in the Estonian-Swedish culture in the bourgeois 
Estonian period. Finding new cultural leaders who were accepting of the Bolsheviks 
would certainly have taken more time, and would have been at the expense of furthering 
the Estonian-Swedish culture. The extent that the resulting cultural expression changed 
and adapted to the socialistic constraints cannot be determined from Sovjet-Estland, 
except in its mentioning that such activities were taking place and that their representation 
was sought after in both Tallinn and Moscow in the cultural exhibitions. 
The coverage in Sovjet-Estland, as well as the minutes of the Central Committee 
found in the May report can be used to show an almost privileged status for the Estonian-
Swedes within the ESSR. This is what Martin refers to as “affirmative action.” The ethnic 
Swedes were being encouraged to develop their identity in ways they had never been 
encouraged before, including the publication of a Swedish-language newspaper, 
development in the arts, and articulating the equal status of the ethnic group repeatedly. 
However, the May report points to certain areas where the Estonian-Swedes should, in 
theory, receive extra protections or attention that was not available for the ethnic 
Estonians. For example, the report suggested adequate compensation for those ethnic 
Swedes that had been displaced for the military regions on the islands, lowering the 
harvest norms due to the poor quality of the soil, and delaying any mobilization efforts 
among the ethnic Swedes for a year. In practice, however, these areas were not put into 
action; perhaps the lack of action can be attributed to the sudden development of war and 
the need to shift their attention elsewhere. In theory, though, the Estonian-Swedes were to 
have been treated differently than their ethnic neighbors if the Sovietization process had 
not been interrupted by the war. 
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In addition to the promotion of the Estonian-Swedish national identity, regional 
distinctions and identities continued to play a role. This can be seen as a continuation of 
regional coverage and regional identities found in Kustbon. These articles can be divided 
into two categories. The first category focuses on news from specific regions (towns or 
islands), which were explicitly linked with the Soviet ideology, while the second category 
(more infrequent) completely lacked any ideological focus. This second category, 
arguably, could have just as easily have been found in Kustbon. 
Fostering a regional identity, there were regular articles for particular regions, 
most notably for Vormsi, Riguldi, and Noarootsi. These articles covered a wide range of 
topics, typically involving how national policies were being applied in the local arena, 
and in an attempt to demonstrate the growing support in these largely ethnic-Swedish 
areas. Articles from Ruhnu were less frequent, largely due to the isolation the island faces 
during the winter months. 
Starting in March, a series of articles demonstrated a shift in content away from 
ideology, if ever so slight. The articles featured short profiles of towns, highlighting the 
communities of Ruhnu, Põõsaspea, Rooslepa, Noarootsi, and Vormsi. What is striking 
about the profiles is the complete absence of Soviet ideology, or even a mention of the 
Soviet Union. To further offset these articles, literally, from the rest of the pages, the type 
was italicized, with the exception of the Vormsi article which was significantly longer in 
length than the other four profiles. Each of the five articles ran without mentioning the 
author or authors (which was not at all uncommon for Sovjet-Estland). The language used 
clearly suggests a native-Swedish speaker with a superb knowledge of the Swedish 
language, not employing regional dialects or common mistakes found in translated 
articles. 
The profiles described the nature surrounding the region, daily life for the 
residents, and its unique position within the Estonian-Swedish community, with an almost 
poetic quality to the writing. They provide a glimpse into the different regions, and the 
areas of pride the inhabitants held for their homes. The complete Ruhnu profile, for 
example, ran as follows under the headline “Spring winds over Ruhnu”: 
Far down in the Bay of Riga lies Ruhnu, “the Bay of Riga’s pearl.” Its 
unparalleled forest and sandy beach have awoken nothing but admiration 
with tourists. The forest is thick and in many places impenetrable. It 
creates a half-circle protection towards the north and east, behind which 





There live a people, which one would not easily forget when one has lived 
among them. They are people full of vitality, who take life as it comes. 
Being accustomed to everything, feeling uncomfortable nowhere, they are 
content with their lot, whatever it may be. 
The people of Ruhnu do not live, like one would believe, in a far-removed 
world, an isolated life, but on the contrary – they follow the happenings 
out in the far world just as good as everyone else, thanks to the radio. 
Around ten apparatuses are on the island. In the evenings, most of the 
people gather at the farms with a radio to listen to the daily news. After the 
so-called “radio time” the current questions are discussed. 
When everyone has gone to rest at night, the peace is absolute over the 
island. Only the lighthouse beacon’s light sweeps over the sleeping forest. 
The silence is broken only by the ice flows’ crashing against the beach, 
and far-off one can hear the ships’ machines thumping.46 
The other towns were equally poetic, switching between the nature descriptions and the 
mentality of the people. The people of Põõsaspea have “the wave’s restlessness in the 
blood. They belong on the sea. It is only the love for the native district that binds them, 
which forces them to sooner or later return to the barren land at home.”47 In Rooslepa, 
“every young man has spent some years on the world’s seas. They are a little romantic, 
full of vitality and enterprising people, who neither shrink from breaking the stone-bound 
turf nor flinch from an autumn storm on the sea.”48 
The profile of Noarootsi attempted to bring out not only the unique qualities of the 
people of the region, but added the importance to the Estonian-Swedish culture and 
                                                 
46 “Vårvindar över Runö,” Sovjet-Estland, 20 March 1941, p. 2. Translated from Swedish: Långt nere i 
Rigaviken ligger Runö, “Rigavikens pärla.” Dess enastående skog och sandstrand ha väckt idel beundran 
hos turister. Skogen är tät och på flera ställen ogenomtränglig. Den bildar en halvcirkelformig förskansning 
mot norr och öster, bakom vilken den lilla idylliska byn ligger försvarad mot de kallaste vindarna. 
Där bot ett folk, som man inte lätt glömmer bort, då man en gång levat bland det. Det är levnadsglada 
människor, som taga livet som det kommer. Vana med allting vantrivas de ingenstans och äro nöjda med 
sin lott, hurudan den är vore. 
Runöborna leva icke, som man kunde tro, ett från yttervärlden isolerat liv, utan tvärtom – de följa med 
hänelserna ute i vida världen lika bra som alla andra, tack vare radio. Ett tiotal apparater finnas på ön. På 
kvällarna samlas mestadels männen på de gårder, där radio finns, för att lyssna på dagsnyheter. Efter den 
s.k. “radiotiden” diskuteras aktuella frågor. 
Då alla gått tll vila på kvällen, är friden över ön fullständig. Blott fyrens sken sveper över den sovande 
skogen. Tystnaden brytes bara av isflakens brak mot stranden, och i fjärran kan man höra fartygsmaskiner 
dunka. 
47 “Spithamn – stormarnas udde,” Sovjet-Estland,  27 March 1941, p. 2. Translated from Swedish: 
…vågornas oro i blodet. De höra hemma på havet. Det är endast kärleken till fosterbygden som binder dem, 
som tvingar dem att förr eller senare återvända till den karga jorden därhemma. 
48 “Roslep – flera sjömäns hemmahamn,” Sovjet-Estland, 3 April 1941, p. 2. Translated from Swedish: 






identity, placing themselves as the guardians and continuers of that national spirit. For the 
people of Noarootsi, their greatness lies not within the natural surroundings, but within 
themselves: 
Gray and poor are the villages that lie scattered about over the Noarootsi 
plain. The stranger would get an impression of poverty and backwardness. 
But in reality, the resident of Noarootsi moves ahead, awake, tending to 
firmly seize new ideas and struggling to get the most out of the scant 
possibilities that the hometown offers.49 
Whereas the other region profiles sought to define itself through the nature, Noarootsi 
described the setting in harsh terms, while also drawing distinctions from a number of the 
other Estonian-Swedish regions. 
While Noarootsi was referred to as the cradle of the Estonian-Swedish culture, 
Vormsi was referred to as the heart of the ethnic Swedish district, with 2300 of the islands 
2500 inhabitants ethnic Swedish. The article states that many of the older Estonian-
Swedish traditions and folksongs have been preserved on Vormsi (including those that 
had been prohibited by pastors in other ethnic Swedish areas), instilling a sense of pride 
and unfailing love for their island. 
With its many sides – farmers, fishermen, sailors, carpenters – it succeeds 
in winning the people over, despite the difficult working conditions, and 
often live better than their neighbors on the mainland. As far as the home 
culture is concerned, one can certainly say that not in many places in 
Estonia can present such beautifully painted farms, embedded in thickly 
wooded gardens.50 
The residents of Vormsi viewed their island, despite difficulties, as a haven to be 
cherished, and no matter where in the world its residents would find themselves, they 
would fondly recall their homes. 
While the profiles were consistently placed in the upper-left corner of each issue’s 
second page, each issue also carried a front-page photograph showing a local scene from 
                                                 
företagsamma människor, som varken sky att bryta den stenbundna torvan eller rygga tillbaka för en 
höststorm på havet. 
49 “Nuckö – aibokulturens vagga,” Sovjet-Estland, 10 April 1941, p. 2. Translated from Swedish: Grå och 
fattiga äro byarna, som ligga utströdda över Nucköslätten. Främligen får ett intryck av armod och 
efterblivenhet. Men i verkligheten är nucköbon framåtsträvande, vaken, benägen att gripa fast vid nya idéer 
och strävar att få ut det mesta möjliga av de torftiga möjligheter, som hembygden bjuder på. 
50 “Ormsö – Svenskbygdens hjärta,” Sovjet-Estland, 17 April 1941, p. 2. Translated from Swedish: Med sin 
mångsidighet – jordbrukare, fiskare, sjömän, snickare – lyckas den sega befolkningen trots svårigheterna 
slita sig fram och ofta leva bättre än grannerna på fastlandet. Vad som beträffar hemkulturen, kan man med 






the community. The Ruhnu photo was of a women in a local folk costume standing on the 
beach in front of a boat and the ice flows. Põõsaspea gave a nighttime view of Dirhami 
harbor. The breakers of Rooslepa were photographed. The “strange” landscape with farm 
animals was used for Noarootsi. For Vormsi, a young woman standing next to a well, 
with a windmill in the background.51 None of the pictures can be positioned in a Soviet 
context. 
The content is strikingly similar to the type of articles that could have appeared in 
the pre-Soviet publication, Kustbon. Perhaps this was an attempt to attract more readers 
for Sovjet-Estland within the communities by providing some content without an 
ideological background, or to attract attention to the regions for the readers abroad in 
Sweden. However, it also meant to encourage a pride in their nationality and their 
hometowns – pride in the natural surroundings of their homes. These five articles could 
possibly have been an attempt to instill the national identity within the Estonian-Swedes 
as being fixed on their location; their national identity came from themselves and from 
their home regions, not from their connections to Sweden. These profiles can be viewed 
as an attempt to prevent further emigration thoughts among the ethnic Swedes.52 
Regardless of intent, the shift away from ideology was short-lived. 
A sixth article can very loosely be placed in this category; an article highlighting 
Nõmmküla appeared in the 8 May issue. However, this article was quite different than the 
previous profiles. There was no front page photo, although this can perhaps be attributed 
to the 1 May celebration coverage. The profile begins in a similar fashion to the other 
regional profiles, highlighting the surrounding nature and the hard working nature of the 
inhabitants. If one were to leave the region, the article states, certainly he would to feel 
homesick for his region – a much more direct appeal against emigration than any of the 
previous articles had done. However, the larger difference is found in the final two 
paragraphs, where there is a strong Soviet ideological presence. 
The Soviet structure has already done much for their benefit. Among other 
things, the government provided the farmers with animal feed, corn seed, 
fertilizer, and more. The people of Nõmmküla anticipate much from the 
                                                 
51 The following week, 24 April, a second photograph was printed from Vormsi – a woman working a plow 
with a horse. There was no article to accompany this photograph. Likewise, a photograph in the 11 June 
issue pictured a woman from Ruhnu dressed in a folk costume. Again, there was no accompanying article. 





Soviet order and are ready to help in all possible ways so that our 
homeland goes towards a bright and happy future.53 
Whereas none of the previous profiles had even the slightest hint of Soviet ideology, the 
profile of Nõmmküla overtly expressed its support for the new Soviet presence. The 
profile echos many of the themes previously raised in ideological articles, attributing 
them to the sentiments of the inhabitants. 
The regional profiles attempted to foster a stronger sense of identity with their 
land and their communities. This certainly had the added intention of displacing 
emigration thoughts without an overt appearance of ideology. The final profile, if one 
places the Nõmmküla profile in the same category, moved the line of debate, though, 
illuminating this ulterior motive in the articles. 
 
The Soviet version of the Estonian-Swedish national identity sought to combine 
the elements of the developing identity and shape it for its own purposes. In many cases, 
this government intervention in fostering their identity could have held out certain 
benefits for the ethnic group. Arguably, the fostering of the Soviet Estonian-Swedish 
national identity was one of the central focuses of Sovjet-Estland, influencing the 
coverage of a wide range of topics throughout the newspaper’s almost year-long run. 
However, the strong presence of Soviet ideology served to highlight the differences 
between an identity which had been naturally developing from within the community 
itself and the Soviet-influenced identity that was being imposed upon them by others. 
                                                 
53 “Klottop – gammal svenskby,” Sovjet-Estland, 8 May 1941, p. 2. Translated from Swedish: 
Sovjetordningen har redan gjort mycket till deras bästa. Bl. a. har regeringen försett bönderna med 
strüfoder, utsäde, mineralgödsel m. m. Klottorpsborna vänta mycket av sovjetordningen och äro redo att 





Chapter 3: For the Greatness of the Party – Articulating Socialist Ideology 
Every worker’s highest obligation is to prize socialism’s triumphs and 
enhance its numbers. Let us gather our forces and under the leadership of 
Lenin-Stalin’s great party, go towards new triumphs – communism.1 
 
When the Soviet Union annexed Estonia, the people found themselves in a 
political and economic system that was foreign to them. As such, the Soviet communist 
ideology needed to be conveyed to the newly annexed territory in order to incorporate 
Estonian society into the greater Soviet system. As an instrument of propaganda, articles 
in Sovjet-Estland almost always displayed the Soviet ideology. The articles were written 
from the Soviet perspective with no alternate viewpoints. In the recently acquired 
territory with rapidly changing political, social, and economic spheres, the new ideology 
had to be presented to the new population. It was hoped that once understanding the 
background ideology of Communism, the population could then embrace the changes and 
be an actively supportive segment of Soviet society. However, as shall be demonstrated, a 
failure to convince the ethnic Swedish population in the ideology did not deter the 
propaganda effort. 
With a failure to convince the Estonian-Swedes through the propaganda, and with 
the increased threat to Soviet rule following the German declaration of war, the Soviet 
Union moved from a propaganda campaign to a campaign increasingly based on fear. As 
Jeffrey Brooks states, where ideology failed, terror was employed.2 But, as shall be 
demonstrated more in-depth in Chapter 5, the approaching war and the German threat as 
perceived by the Soviets was not as equally perceived by the Estonian-Swedes. The 
failure of the ideological component of the propaganda was realized under this German 
threat with little effort on the part of Sovjet-Estland to adequately address the ideological 
reasons to gather support against the Nazi German advance. 
The nationalities argument was consistently below the surface throughout Sovjet-
Estland, including articles on ideology. One of the central focuses of the propaganda in 
                                                 
1 “Medel av stor betydelse som använts inom vårt politiska och ekonomiska liv,” Sovjet-Estland, 28 
November 1940, p. 1. Translated from Swedish: Varje arbetarens högsta plikt är att skatta socialismens 
segrar och öka deras antal. Låt oss samla våra krafter och under ledning av Lenin-Stalins stora parti gå mot 
nya segrar, kommunismen. 
2 Jeffery Brooks, “The Press and Its Message: Images of America in the 1920s and 1930s” in Russia in the 
Era of NEP: Explorations in Soviet Society and Culture, ed. Shiela Fitzpatrick et. al. (Bloomington: Indiana 





regards to ideology was drawing distinctions between the Estonianization effects on the 
Estonian-Swedes and the Soviet’s favorable treatment of minorities. However, while this 
was a significantly large portion of the Soviet ideology represented in the propaganda, 
other ideological propaganda efforts were undertaken in Sovjet-Estland. This chapter 
explores how Soviet ideology was used and articulated in Sovjet-Estland. Specific 
attention is given to series of articles exploring basic Soviet ideology, the political 
structure, the Stalin Constitution, and Soviet elections; the explanation of Soviet symbols, 
holidays, and people – most notably Stalin, Lenin, Johannes Vares, and Neeme Ruus; and 
emigration. The ideology employed in articulating the changing economic (such as 
fishing and agriculture) and educational arenas, as well as the Second World War, will be 
covered in later chapters. 
Despite the intense focus on the Estonian-Swedes by the Soviets, in the first year 
of Soviet occupation, the only books published in Swedish were two textbooks, which 
were never distributed.3 As a result, the primary printed material in which to educate the 
Estonian-Swedes was the newspaper. In contrast, materials printed in Estonian included 
Soviet histories and ideological books.4 To overcome this shortcoming in the Swedish 
language, Sovjet-Estland assumed the role of historical and political educator. Not only 
reflecting the Soviet ideology, Sovjet-Estland was used to educated the ethnic Swedes on 
the ideological background of the Soviet system. Particularly in the first half-year of 
publication, series of articles were published around different themes – the basics of 
socialism, the role of elections, the political structure of the Soviet Union, the Stalin 
Constitution, and the Party Congress. Implicit in these articles were the rights and 
obligations of the Soviet citizen and educating the Estonian-Swedes not only in the 
ideology of socialism, but also in the role they as citizens were expected to play, within 
the new society. 
 
“What is socialism” 
Sovjet-Estland attempted to educate the Estonian-Swedes in Soviet ideology from 
the first issue. While Soviet ideology can be found, in varying levels, in most of the 
                                                 
3 The two books, both edited by Tomas Gärdström, were printed shortly before the German occupation, 
which hindered their distribution. These books will be covered in the next chapter. 






articles, it was done quite overtly in a four-part series entitled, “What is socialism” which 
ran in issues one, three, four, and five. The series outlined some of the base historical and 
ideological tenements of socialism. These articles were intended to be the first 
introduction to the socialist ideology, providing the groundwork for further ideological 
propaganda. 
The first in the series began under the heading “From fantasy to science” and 
sought to explain the background ideology of socialism, beginning with Thomas Moore’s 
ideas of Utopia: “The utopians criticized the bourgeois society’s lifestyle, depicting the 
proletariats suffering, speaking of the necessity of helping the proletariat. But they did not 
come further than the good-willing wishes.”5 The article then moved on to Marx and 
Engel and their teachings to the proletariat and the necessary struggle against the forces of 
capitalism. The first article in the series concludes with the move from a “utopian dream” 
towards the proletariat’s struggle, applying the lessons of Marx and Engels and the 
leadership of Lenin and Stalin in leading the workers in the 1917 Revolution. There is a 
call-to-arms in the Soviet struggle: “The Soviet people must make an incredible effort, 
abstaining from much in the selfless struggle to transform the forsaken country to a 
powerful and technically exemplary state.”6 
The second article was divided under two headings, “No capitalists, no 
oppressors” and “Socialism and work are inseparable concepts.” The article begins by 
extolling the Soviet Union’s strengths in industry, technology, and growth, stating that the 
Soviet Union has far surpassed the capitalistic countries. In the Soviet Union, the workers 
were free and the exploitation that exists under the capitalistic system has been abolished, 
something previously unknown in human history, according to the article. The changes in 
Soviet society has effected all levels of people, from farmers and workers to the 
intelligentsia. “Workers, farmers, the intelligentsia – everyone carries out the new class-
free society’s development like a large, friendly family.”7 In socialism, resources such as 
the earth, factories, mines, and forests belong to all of the people, making exploitation 
                                                 
5 “Vad är socialism,” Sovjet-Estland, 17 October 1940, p. 3. Translated from Swedish: Utopisterna 
kritiserade det borgerliga samhällets livsformer, skildrade proletariats lidanden, talade om nödvändigheten 
att hjälpa proletarietet. Men längre än till godvilliga önskningar kommo de ej. 
6 “Vad är socialism,” Sovjet-Estland, 17 October 1940, p. 3. Translated from Swedish: Sovjetfolket måste 
göra otroliga kraftansträngningar, avstå från mycket i den självlösa strävan att förvandla det övergivna 
landet till ett mäktigt och tekniskt förebildigt rike. 
7 “Vad är socialism,” Sovjet-Estland, 31 October 1940, p. 3. Translated from Swedish: Arbetare, bönder, 





impossible. “People no longer work for the masters and capitalists, but rather for 
themselves, for their country, for their people.”8 According to the article, work is the most 
important task of the Soviet people, giving the people great joy, creating a great and 
prosperous society. 
The third installment of the series dealt with the topics “How communists 
understand equality” and “Personal freedom in the Soviet Union.” The article begins with 
the mantra: “he that doesn’t work, gets nothing to eat” and “for everyone according to his 
ability, according to his work.”9 According to the Soviet system, the salary was equally 
based on the quantity and quality of work, with differences between qualified and 
unqualified workers reflected in the different salaries. 
In regards to equality, Marxism-Leninism does not mean the equalizing of 
private life, but rather the abolishing of classes, liberation of all the 
workers from exploitation, from the capitalists and the masters’ 
domination; the abolition of private property in the question of production 
materials, everyone’s equal duty to work and rights to wages 
corresponding to the quality and quantity. Such an order prevails in the 
socialist society.10 
All work within the Soviet Union was honorable, regardless of the salary. The differences 
were intended to motivate the workers to improve themselves. “The working wages’ 
socialist principle spurs people to raise their work production, their cultural level, their 
knowledge. Certainly the more people are able to and know, that the better and more she 
works, the better the salary she will get.”11 But while the production materials belonged to 
all of society, the article makes it clear the right of private ownership of personal objects 
as long as it does not go towards the exploitation of others. One of the greatest personal 
freedoms within the Soviet Union was the right to work, which under the Soviet system 
was immune to unemployment and economic crises, and that personal freedom is only 
                                                 
8 “Vad är socialism,” Sovjet-Estland, 31 October 1940, p. 3. Translated from Swedish: Människor arbeta 
icke längre för patroner och kapitalister utan för sig själv, för sitt rike, för sitt folk. 
9 “Vad är socialism,” Sovjet-Estland, 6 November 1940, p. 3. Translated from Swedish: “den som icke 
arbetar, han får ingenting att äta,” “till envar efter hans förmåga, efter hans arbete.” 
10 “Vad är socialism,” Sovjet-Estland, 6 November 1940, p. 3. Translated from Swedish: Med likställning 
menar marxismen-leninismen icke utjämning av privatlivet utan avskaffandet av klasser, alla arbetandes 
befrielse från exploaterande, från kapitalisternas och patronernas herravälde; avskaffandet av 
privategendom i fråga om productionsmaterjal, allas lika plikt till arbete och rättighet till lön motsvarande 
arbetets kvalitet och kvantitet. En sådan ordning råder i det socialistiska samhället. 
11 “Vad är socialism,” Sovjet-Estland, 6 November 1940, p. 3. Translated from Swedish: Arbetslönens 
socialistiska princip eggar människor till att höja sin arbetsproduktion, sin kulturnivå, sina kunskaper. Ju 





possible in a society where exploitation does not exist. In contrast, in the capitalistic 
society, only the richest have personal freedoms. 
The fourth and final article in the “What is socialism” series focused on the topic 
“The Soviet citizen’s great privilege and obligation.” The article states that while the 
Soviet society provides its citizens with great privileges (such as the right to work, to rest, 
to be educated), it also comes with obligations for everyone. 
But socialism does not only give great rights: it also places sacred demand 
on the members of society. The Soviet Union’s socialism is not built up on 
a utopia, isolated from the rest of the world on an island, but on the 
contrary on a sixth of the earth’s surface surrounded by capitalistic 
countries. Therefore our citizens’ foremost and most sacred obligation 
becomes evident: to protect their socialistic native country, strengthen the 
Red Army, the navy and the air force, strengthen the country’s military 
and economic power.12 
The benefits of all society were to be found within the ability of the people themselves to 
come together for the common good of all of society. “Our ideal is a perfect communist 
society, where all classes and class differences are definitively obliterated, where one 
does not have differences between work of the mind and work of the body, between town 
and country.”13 
The four-part series provided an adequate introduction to some of the basic ideas 
of Soviet ideology and the historical origins. While the theory and origins were 
articulated, the articles did not attempt to state how the system worked; this would be 
accomplished in other articles throughout the newspaper. However, the series was clearly 
translated into Swedish, and not prepared specifically with the Estonian-Swedes in mind. 
There was no attempt in this series to connect the Estonian-Swedes into this new 
ideology, or to take into consideration their background. As such, it is doubtful that the 
article would be effective as propaganda. Rather, it would be beneficial only to those who 
already were accepting of the Soviet ideology to gain additional knowledge. 
                                                 
12 “Vad är socialism,” Sovjet-Estland, 14 November 1940, p. 3. Translated from Swedish: Men socialismen 
giver icke endast stora rättigheter: den ställer också heliga krav till samhällsmedlemmarna. Sovjetunionens 
socialism är icke uppbyggd på en utopisk, från hela övriga världen isolerad ö, utan på en sjättedel av 
jordytan omgiven av kapitalistiska länder. Därav framgår våra medborgares främsta och heligast plikt: att 
skydda sitt socialistiska fosterland, förstärka rödarmeen, flottan och luftvärnet, förstärka landets militära 
och ekonomiska makt. 
13 “Var är socialism,” Sovjet-Estland, 14 November 1940, p. 3. Translated from Swedish: Vårt ideal är ett 
fullkomligt kommunistiskt samhälle, där alla klasser och klasskillnader äro definitivt utplånade, där man 





Printed propaganda materials available in the Swedish language was largely 
limited to what was contained the Sovjet-Estland. There was a lack of books available, 
and as such the newspaper needed to provide such background information as was found 
in the “What is socialism” series. Anticipating an expansion of propaganda efforts 
towards the Estonian-Swedes, Neeme Ruus from the Central Committee placed an order 
for a number of books. Ruus requested that Moscow have the Swedish Communist Party 
prepare the 17 titles, featuring works by Lenin, Stalin, Marx, and Molotov. His request 
was for 50 copies of each for distribution in the schools, culture houses, and libraries and 
for an additional 200 copies to be made available to be sold.14 Ruus’ 1 February 1941 
request was not fulfilled by the end of the first Soviet occupation, though. As such, 
Sovjet-Estland remained throughout its year-long pressrun the most widespread source for 
the ideological education of the Estonian-Swedes. 
 
Elections and the Soviet Political Structure 
Having established the base principles of socialism, Sovjet-Estland shifted focus 
to the upcoming elections to be held 12 January and the education of the people in the 
socialistic political system. The election provided the opportunity to put the base 
principles previously established in earlier issues and combine it with the education of the 
Soviet Union’s political structure. “The election campaign is a good political and 
practical school,”15 stated one of the articles in late November. The Soviets were looking 
for high support among the Estonian-Swedes in preparing for the election, although many 
of the agitation areas established for the educating of the Soviet political structure and 
election campaigning remained in place after 12 January to continue the agitation 
process.16 
Central to the ideology was that in the Soviet Union, power lies in the hands of the 
workers, with those representing the people being chosen from among them. Elections 
were viewed as a right, but the people were obliged to maintain a political knowledge. 
This provided a good opportunity to educate the population. A November article stated it 
this way: 
                                                 
14 ERAF 1-1-256, ÜK(b)P KK jt.-ga parteihariduse finatseerimise, poliitilise kirjanduse väljaandmise, 
usuvastase propaganda jt. küsimustes, 12-13. 
15 “Hela det arbetande folket med i valkampanjen!” Sovjet-Estland, 21 November 1940, p. 1. Translated 





The bearer of power in a socialistic land are the country-side’s and towns’ 
working people’s deputies. These representatives are chosen by the 
working people from their own circles. Accordingly, the highest power is 
the people’s own. But in order to be able to utilize this right, one must 
create a sufficiently high political consciousness.17 
Sovjet-Estland chronicles an intense effort of agitation in preparation for the election. 
Among the various methods for agitation in the Läänemaa region included the use of 
schools and school children,18 a navy automobile decorated with slogans and pictures of 
Stalin traveling from town to town,19 and 115 athletes skiing around visiting the various 
locations across the region.20 In all, 115 agitation points had been established by late 
December.21 A wide variety of groups were to come together for agitation purposes in 
advance of the election. 
The approaching election also brought warnings against interference. In a moment 
of candor indicating that there were those who did not approve of the Soviet rule, Sovjet-
Estland promised harsh action against the class enemies. “The election is a matter of the 
working people’s definitive triumph. Therefore, one cannot overlook all of the hostile 
elements working against them by all means. One must strengthen vigilance against class 
enemies. All sabotage attempts must be stopped in its track.”22 In taking such stark tones, 
however, the propaganda indicated that not all members of society were accepting of the 
new Soviet order. 
Combined with the election campaign was the education of the population of the 
government structure of the Soviet Union and the role of the Stalin Constitution. The 
Soviet ideology was enshrined within the so-called Stalin Constitution, which had been 
approved in 1935. Commemorating the anniversary of the Stalin Constitution, Sovjet-
Estland described it the following way in a 6 December article: 
                                                 
16 “Agitpunkterna likvideras icke,” Sovjet-Estland, 24 January 1941, p. 1. 
17 “Hela det arbetande folket med i valkampanjen!” Sovjet-Estland, 21 November 1940, p. 1. Translated 
from Swedish: Bäraren av makten i ett socialistisk land äro landets och stadens arbetande folkets 
deputerade. Dessa äro representanter valda av det arbetande folket ur dessas egna kretsar. Alltså är den 
högsta makten folkets egen. Men för att kunna utnyttja denna rätt, måste man skapa ett tillräckligt högt 
politiskt medvetande. 
18 “Valkampanjen untidgar sid i Läänemaa,” Sovjet-Estland, 12 December 1940, p. 2. 
19 “Rörlig agitationspunkt i Läänemaa,” Sovjet-Estland, 19 December 1940, p. 2. 
20 “Läänemaa idrottsmän i valagitionen, 1000-kilometers agitionstur,” Sovjet-Estland, 9 January 1941, p. 2. 
21 “I Läänemaa 115 agitationspunkter,” Sovjet-Estland, 28 December 1940, p. 2. 
22 “Hela det arbetande folket med i valkampanjen!” Sovjet-Estland, 21 November 1940, p. 1. Translated 
from Swedish: Valen gälla det arbetande folkets slutgiltiga seger. Därför får man ej förbise alla de fientliga 
element, som med alla medel motarbeta dem. Man måste förstärka vaksamheten mot klassfienderna. Alla 





The new constitution defines the results of socialism’s historic triumphs… 
The USSR’s constitution rests upon the principles of socialism. It fortifies 
all property that belongs to the society; it liquidates exploited classes, work 
shortages, and misery… The Stalin Constitution demonstrates no 
divergence, but rather gives all the same political rights, the same 
democratic freedom independent of gender, nation, education, or age.23 
The new political order was enshrined in the constitution and was essential for the new 
voters to learn. According to the propaganda, the new Soviet citizens were vital to the 
progress of the Soviet Union. 
Along with the generics of the Soviet political structure, the individual candidates 
being put up for election by the Bolsheviks were listed in the newspaper, although 
promotion and agitation of the election was present before any candidates were named. 
An article appeared under the banner headline “All Estonian-Swedes to the election!” 
describing the process of the upcoming election and the type of people that could be 
candidates: 
These candidates are members of the working people, they are nominated 
at official meetings by the people themselves. Here there are all sorts of 
workers and intelligentsia, farmers and party members. With one word: 
representatives for all who with fervor and rapture participate in the new 
society’s development.24 
The following week, 19 December, the candidates for the Soviet High Council were 
named in Sovjet-Estland, introduced with short biographies. The 28 December issue’s 
front page was devoted almost entirely to presenting the candidate Johannes Vares. The 
election also brought Neeme Ruus (who spoke in Swedish)25 and August Jakobson26 to 
the ethnic Swedish areas. However, despite the Bolsheviks’ propaganda of being 
representative of the people and their commitment towards the Estonian-Swedes, there 
were no ethnic Swedes nominated for election. 
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The results of the election were published in the 16 January issue, with a 
translation of the 14 January lead article from Pravda. The election was depicted as a 
huge victory for the friendship of Stalin and as support from the people for the new Soviet 
order. It is hardly surprising that the Bolsheviks received almost 100 percent of the vote – 
those who received other votes were never named. Articles were published with specific 
regards to the Estonian-Swedes, marking the large voter turnout – 98 percent for 
Noarootsi, 99.3 percent for Riguldi, and 99 percent for Vormsi – although never 
mentioning the actual election results.27 On Vormsi, it was noted that the elderly were 
transported to the election locations, and election officials visited those too sick to travel, 
“so that all would have the possibility to exercise their right to vote.”28 The election 
results also enabled the editors to attempt to instill an appearance of community-wide 
support among the Estonian-Swedes, in an attempt to isolate those with dissenting 
opinions. The newspaper wrote: 
The above indicated election results are the highest possible that one can 
think of, and they show that the candidate put up, comrade Vares and 
comrade Jakobson, have the Estonian-Swedes’ complete confidence. The 
Swedes knew that through this election they elected men to the governing 
council, men who are free from all chauvinistic oppressive ideas, men who 
come to treat the Estonian-Swedes’ with justice and give them the same 
rights as all the other nations in Soviet Estonia.29 
The Bolsheviks were linked to the freedom of the Estonian-Swedes from oppression of 
previous regimes. 
Sovjet-Estland’s role in the political education culminated in the Party Congress, 
with extensive coverage running for four issues, beginning 6 February and ending 27 
February. This coverage included expanding the newspaper from the typical four pages to 
six pages for the 20 and 27 February issues in order to print a translation of comrade 
Säre’s statement and the various resolutions. 
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As previously stated, one of the longer lasting results of the propaganda and 
agitation campaign leading up to the election was the establishment of agitation points 
throughout the region, which were then kept in place following the election. Another of 
the other lasting results was the establishment and continuation of study groups. In order 
to continue the political education of the people – besides the regular ideological content 
which continue throughout Sovjet-Estland – study groups were formed. Various study 
groups were organized in which to learn the new ideology. Teachers regularly met at 
Birkas to better prepare themselves for instructing in the classroom. 
Interestingly, a 4 January article admits to weaknesses of the political 
enlightenment of the Estonian-Swedes in Noarootsi, stating the it was moving “sluggish” 
in its first six months. The article blamed the slow pace on the lack of suitable leaders 
within the community. Ironically, the article continues by describing a meeting held at the 
Birkas school which seemed to suggest that the only languages used were Russian and 
Estonian.30 However, even by May, “suitable” leaders had still not been established 
within the Estonian-Swedish community. A Central Committee meeting found the 
political work among the people to be unsatisfactory and unbearable. The committee’s 
report stated that individuals friendly to the Soviet Union from within the Swedish-
speaking community needed to be identified and coordinated.31 
Such accounts indicates a failure of the propaganda campaign – and the main 
purpose of Sovjet-Estland – among the Estonian-Swedes. A failure to convince the 
population on an ideological level would domino into a rejection of all aspects of the 
Soviet society. In the Estonian-Swedish case, this translated to increasing thoughts of 
emigration, as shall be demonstrated in later chapters. 
 
Images of Lenin, Stalin, and the Red Army 
Scholars have noted the importance of images in Soviet propaganda, the cult of 
Lenin, the deification of Stalin, and the significance of the image of the Red Army. This 
imagery began during the Russian Revolution, continuing and evolving in the time since. 
Martin Ebon writes that this imagery served an important function following Lenin’s 
death. He writes, “Lenin’s personality succeeded in mobilizing a wide range of human 
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hopes, frustrations, fears, drives, loves, and hates – funneling all this into a movement 
which, ultimately, had only one goal: to extend Soviet power in all directions.”32 The 
Lenin cult that developed following his death had numerous similarities to a religion; 
Nina Tumarkin links the imagery of Lenin after his death towards that of a religion and 
the creation of a human-god, citing the training of a number high members of the 
Communist party in religion and seminary. 
The cult of Lenin came into full view following his death on 21 January 1924. 
However, as Nina Tumarkin states in her book Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet 
Russia, the cult was altered in the coming years away from Lenin and towards Leninism 
and the interpretation of Leninist ideals by those attempting to shape the Soviet Union 
towards their own ideals.33 Most marked in this shaping of Leninism was Stalin, who 
increasingly became linked to Lenin. The strong presence of Lenin, as well as Stalin, was 
in a large sense to promote a sense stability in the Soviet Union. According to Martin 
Ebon: 
Much as a monarch represents ceremonial continuity, the Lenin cult 
provides an image of stability. And while ritual references to Lenin, and 
quotations from his writings, have become less frequent in speeches and 
public documents, the term ‘Leninist’ provides a reassuring stamp of 
legitimacy.”34 
The Lenin legitimacy was a claim that even Sovjet-Estland would employ, as symbolizing 
the strengths of the Soviet system. While some may link this image of stability to a 
continuity of the Russian tsars, David L. Hoffmann states that in the case with Stalin, an 
increasing image of Stalin as a fatherfigure for the Soviet Union beginning in the 1930s 
differentiates the Soviet case from the tsars.35 
Jeffrey Brooks, in his book Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture 
from Revolution to Cold War, chronicles the progression of the Soviet media in relation to 
the almost-deification of Stalin. Through a tight control of the media, the image of Stalin 
was able to be shaped in order to strengthen his power and control, to claim successes as 
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his own and failures as the work of enemies. The growing image of Stalin was the result 
of a tighly controlled propaganda campaign centered on the media.36 
In researching Sovjet-Estland, one notices a difference from the scholarly 
interpretation of other Soviet propaganda. Most notably is the absence of a strong Lenin 
and Stalin image; this is only done minimally. While there were frequent mentions of 
Stalin, similar to what Brooks describes as thanking for the gifts, the Swedish-language 
propaganda rarely pictured the founders of the party. Stalin’s picture was published three 
times – in honor of the 23rd Anniversary of the October Revolution, the 1941 elections, 
and the outbreak of war (accompanying a translation of his 3 July speech).37 Lenin’s 
picture was published only once – in honor of the 17th anniversary of his death.38 This can 
be seen as a dramatic difference with the Soviet media tradition Brooks describes where 
the cult of Lenin and the father-image of Stalin were readily apparent in Soviet media. 
However, while the images of Stalin and Lenin were minimal, there were periodic 
mentions of the leaders, occasionally referring to Stalin as “The Great Stalin”39 The cult 
was not definitively abandoned. While the myth of Lenin and the deification of Stalin 
were minimal, there are minor examples of these themes being present – perhaps 
indicating that these themes would be developed and expanded at a later date, once the 
ideology was more accepted. In promoting the myth of Lenin on the anniversary of this 
death, the role of Stalin carrying on the work of Lenin is readily apparent. A large portion 
of the memorial to Lenin has the appearance of being about Stalin. Stalin was described 
as Lenin’s “loyal friend and co-fighter” towards the struggle for communism.40 Lenin laid 
out that path, and Stalin was following that path towards the Soviet’s greatness. Although 
the Soviet structure is clearly linked to Lenin, the article makes it clear that success is 
only available under the rule of Stalin. 
As the newspaper’s run continued, the role of Stalin began to slightly increase. It 
was Stalin’s policies, which guided Estonia away from the capitalistic war. It was Stalin’s 
policies, which kept the peace. It was Stalin’s constitution, which gave the Estonian-
Swedes with equality. His name was increasingly being invoked to represent the benefits 
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and promises in the ESSR, precisely as Brooks mentions was the case in the Soviet press 
elsewhere, referring to it as a thanking for the gift. 
Other Soviet symbols were presented in Sovjet-Estland, most notably the new 
symbol of the ESSR, which was revealed in the 31 October 1940 issue’s front page. The 
prominent placement of the symbol and the interpretation of its various components were 
somewhat counter-productive, though. The accompanying article was clearly a translation 
from Estonian with not a single reference to the Estonian-Swedish minority. Whereas 
throughout the newspaper the message of inclusion and the Soviet non-discrimination 
policy was brought to the forefront, the explanation of the new seal of the ESSR stated it 
symbolized the working Estonian. The article went to great lengths to explain each of the 
components within the symbol – the hammer and sickle, the red star, the rising sun, 
encircled by pine and spruce branches on one side and wheat stalks on the other, and 
completed with a ribbon expressing “Proletariat in all lands unite!” in both Estonian and 
Russian. 41 However, the role of the Estonian-Swedes was not included in the new symbol 
of the ESSR, or even referenced in connection with the individual components. How the 
ethnic Swedes could be represented in the new symbol of the Estonian proletariat was left 
unsaid. 
Images of the Red Army were minimal. Like the images of Lenin and Stalin, 
photographs of the Red Army were limited, although they became a regular feature of the 
newspaper following the German declaration of war. In the case of the Estonian-Swedes, 
this could have been intentional; a large portion of the population had been adversely 
effected by the forced relocations to make way for Soviet military bases, and there was a 
frequent rumor that all of Vormsi would be evacuated by the military in the near future. 
Printing photographs of the military could have been seen as reinforcing those rumors and 
increasing resentment towards the Bolsheviks. However, there were regular mentions of 
the military and officers were mentioned periodically as participating at various local 
occasions, particularly on the island of Vormsi, where a number of Red Army soldiers 
were stationed. 
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Role of the Soviet Citizen: Holidays and Celebrations 
An active role in celebrating the Soviet Union was expected of the new citizens. 
As Soviet holidays approached, the newspaper provided a background explanation of its 
significance and historical basis. The next stage was to explain how the people of Estonia 
would celebrate these new holidays, with articles appearing afterwards explaining how 
the Estonians, and in some cases the Estonian-Swedes, celebrated these holidays. While 
on some occasions the celebrations consisted of little more than the schools marking the 
day, these holidays and celebrations added to the role of the Soviet citizen in 
understanding the context of the new society. 
All of the celebrations had the same intent. They were meant to strengthen the 
image of the Soviet power, and provide a setting for mass participation in the ritual of the 
holidays. 
They [the Estonian Communist Party’s Central Committee and the 
Estonian Unions’ Central Organization] demand the working people to 
work according to socialist principles, to fulfill their work programs with 
honor, to raise work productivity, develop out socialist industry, raise our 
socialist culture, in order to at a quick tempo catch up to the Soviet 
Union’s other free people and develop the socialist society.42 
These ideals held by the Bolsheviks were celebrated and expressed through the 
celebrations and anniversary commemorations, but were to be continually expressed 
throughout the year. 
The first big celebration marked in Sovjet-Estland was the 23rd anniversary of the 
October Revolution. Preparations for the celebration to be held on 7 November began 
already in the first issue. As the first occasion where Estonia would join the Soviet Union 
in the celebration, this was a momentous holiday. The relevance of this Soviet holiday for 
those in Estonia had to be articulated to the new Soviet citizens; the October Revolution 
23 years ago enabled Estonia to be freed more recently. 
The October Revolution’s remembrance festivities are the working 
people’s festival days for the reason of the victory over capitalism, 
therefore the working people participate in the festivities. All the working 
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people’s groups, workers, farmers, and the intelligentsia participate in it 
without exception and with great delight.43 
Not only did the article provide the background to the celebrations, but stated that 
participation was mandatory across all sectors of society. The specifics provided in the 
article, however, give evidence to the article being a translation from Estonian. The article 
states that committees preparing celebrations must turn in their reports by 12 October at 
the latest – five days prior to the newspaper’s arrival. 
The fourth issue’s arrival coincided with the anniversary, carrying the banner 
“Long Live the October Revolution’s 23rd Anniversary!” Attempting to tie the October 
Revolution in the history of the Soviet Union to the arrival of the Soviets in Estonia, the 
headline proclaimed “October’s triumph is our triumph” besides a picture of Comrade 
Stalin – the first picture of Stalin to appear in the newspaper. The article sought to link the 
workers’ of Estonia’s freedom from capitalism much as the October Revolution had freed 
the people of Russia. It proclaimed that Estonian workers had been prepared in 1917 
along with the Russian workers to join in the revolution, but their efforts were hampered 
by the German occupation followed by the tyrannical Estonian bourgeois government: 
The greater is our delight now after 23 years, to be able to stride together 
with the Soviet people’s happy family, since October’s triumph guaranteed 
even our triumph over capitalism’s power on 21 June. It was the Soviet 
Union’s peace politics and the triumphant Red Army that already a year 
ago saved us from the encounter of the tumult of war, securing us peace.44 
The Soviet Union was the saviors of all of Estonia, and the path towards socialism was 
depicted as inevitable – not as an act of aggression, but rather as an act of peace by 
preventing Estonia from being drawn into the war. The event was followed up afterwards, 
such as the translated publication of Karl Säre’s 5 November speech.45 
While the promotion of the new Soviet holidays are significant, so too is the lack 
of previous holidays once celebrated by the Estonian-Swedes. In Kustbon, the occasion of 
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Christmas and New Years offered the editors to reflect on the past year and to express 
their hopes for the year to come. Religion had been tightly intertwined in these 
reflections, periodically written by clergy in the community. In Sovjet-Estland, the 
absence of religion was replaced by ideology.46 There was no marking of Christmas in the 
Soviet-produced newspaper, although an editor’s note in the first issue of the new year 
expressed: “The editors wish all Sovjet-Estland readers a good and successful new year in 
our wide socialistic work-field.”47 The notice also announced the change in format of the 
newspaper to a larger sized page.48 
The new year also provided the editors of Sovjet-Estland to reflect on the year to 
come. In contrast to the difficulties all around, the Soviet Union was presented as a land 
of opportunity and peace, with economic development and a bright future in the year to 
come.49 The following week, reflections on the year to come were given for the 
capitalistic countries. The picture was bleak for the capitalistic lands as a result of the 
war.50 
It wasn’t until the end of January that an article appeared about the grim previous 
year that Sweden had faced. This article also marks one of the only references made to 
Christmas (written in quotation marks). The article, written by “H.L.” began: 
Ordinarily the Swedish pastors already a few months before “Christmas” 
do an appeal to everyone to carefully prepare themselves for the reception 
of the new year. A rosy optimism, which always appears before Christmas, 
flows all through the columns in the newspapers and publishing houses 
tempt buyers with all sorts of news – from trifling brochures about Queen 
Kristina’s love adventures to pamphlets on the rest of the old Swedes. This 
year, one had little reason for Christmas optimism. But who dares ignore 
traditions!51 
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The article continues as a sharp criticism of the past year in Sweden, as the economy 
worsened (likely due to the effects of the war all around them, although the war was 
never mentioned in the article). The year in review was certainly not presented with 
optimism for the year to come in the capitalistic Sweden. 
Other celebrations marked throughout the year included the 22nd anniversary of 
the Communist International on 2 March,52 International Women’s Day on 8 March,53 the 
International Proletariats’ Day on 1 May,54 and Bolshevik Press Day on 5 May.55 The 
final big celebration marked in Sovjet-Estland was to be the one-year anniversary of the 
arrival of the Bolsheviks to power in Estonia, 21 June. The difference in the reporting 
around the 21 June celebrations, however, was the unexpected declaration of war by 
Germany on 22 June. Whereas previous celebrations typically included a follow-up 
article, the arrival of the war pushed of any review of the 21 June celebrations in the 
issues that followed. 
 
Historical Comparisons 
One of the most common methods in mentioning the future role of the Estonian-
Swedes within the Soviet system was to draw on their history of poor treatment during 
the Tsarist-Russian and independent Estonian periods. It can be argued that this was an 
effective comparison – Estonian-Swedish historian Viktor Aman writes that the ethnic 
Swedish minority in Estonia (as a group) had never been treated so well as during the 
Soviet occupation.56 
In targeting the Estonian-Swedes, the ideological argument was often one of being 
saved by the Soviets. As the argument went, without the Soviet’s arrival, the Estonian-
Swedes would still be poor and oppressed under the capitalistic Estonian government’s 
nationalistic policies. In contrast, Sovjet-Estland brought to the fore specific events and 
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historical moments to highlight the differences in ideology. A late November article 
proclaimed, “Soviet order was Estonian’s salvation. With it opened wide views for the 
future for Estonia’s economical and cultural development.”57 However, Sovjet-Estland 
would later distinguish between a salvation of Estonia and the more directed salvation of 
the Estonian-Swedes, drawing an ethnic argument in addition to the ideological argument. 
Historical comparisons were invoked in the coverage of the election. In addition 
to being the first government to offer Swedish-language voting materials and extensive 
propaganda campaigns, Sovjet-Estland attempted to portray the election as a unity of the 
people against past oppression. A January article stated: “By us Swedes voting with 
comrade Vares and comrade Jakobson, we demonstrate out solidarity with the new 
regime, which has already given us culturally more under this short period than the old 
regime did in twenty years.”58 The solidarity the Bolsheviks were seeking in this 
argument was not a completely ideological solidarity, but largely based on ethnic 
grounds, uniting against the previous oppression and stating their approval of the Soviet 
policies towards minorities. 
The majority of cases drawing on historical standpoints concerned minority rights. 
Articles could heavily focus on the oppression of minorities by the Estonian regime. Less 
invoked was the argument of oppression from tsarist Russia, although on a few occasions, 
this too was used. A 24 January front-page article focused on the cultural rights of the 
Estonian-Swedes, largely centered on a historical comparison. The article basically argues 
that the ethnic group went from Russification under the tsarist Russian rule to 
Estonianization under the bourgeois independent Estonian rule. The article asked if the 
bourgeois Estonians had handled the minority problem in a humanitarian and successful 
manner: 
We must at once answer that Estonia, so long as the capitalistic 
domination was prevalent, not much in that respect differentiated itself 
from the old Tsarist Russia. We principally desire here to only examine the 
Swedish minority’s cultural rights in the so-called “free Estonia.” The 
henchmen for the old system wanted to make it known, that the Swedes in 
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Estonia were a popular minority, and therefore pretended that the minority 
in question was heavily privileged.59 
But the promotion of minority rights in bourgeois Estonia were mostly a façade, 
according to the propaganda. Minority rights were heavily drawn upon in the article. As 
described in Chapter 1, there were numerous examples of Estonianization of the ethnic 
Swedes, particularly in the 1930s. The Soviets were attempting to foster and shape this 
disregard by the Estonian government into resentment of the old system in order to 
portray themselves and their policies on a better, more supportive light. The article 
continues: 
There was surely also a certain truth in the assertion that the Swedes were 
perhaps more popular than any other minority, but notwithstanding that, 
even the Estonian-Swedes were manipulated in many respects like second 
class citizens. One could not avoid feeling like that.60 
The article takes an interesting position, by claiming that while the group was arguably 
the most favourable of the minorities in Estonia, they were still treated poorly. In 
describing the ethnic Swedes as having been treated as second-class citizens, the Soviet 
policy of equality could be described as the salvation of the ethnic group. 
It was, as it has been made evident, there was not much consideration by 
the capitalist government about the Swedish minority’s cultural rights. The 
Swedish cultural friends looked with anxiety towards the future. But then, 
in the right time, can salvation through the events on 21 June 1940.61 
The arrival of the Soviets was portrayed as the saving grace for the Estonian-Swedes. 
Only under the Soviet umbrella could the Estonian-Swedish identity be fostered. While 
they had been previously oppressed, Soviet ideology of equality wanted to raise the group 
                                                 
59 “Estlandssvenskarnas kulturella rättigheter förr och nu,” Sovjet-Estland, 24 January 1941, p. 1. Translated 
from Swedish: Vi måste genast svara att Estland, så länge det kapitalistiska väldet här var det förhärskande, 
icke mycket i detta avseende skilde sig från det gamla Tsarryssland. Vi vilja här huvudsakligen endast 
granska den svenska folkminoritetens kulturrättigheter i det s.k. “fria Estland.” Hantlangarna för det gamla 
systemet ville göra gällande, att svenskarna i Estland voro en omtyckt minoritet och därför lät man påskina, 
att minoriteten i fråga var mycket gynnad. 
60 “Estlandssvenskarnas kulturella rättigheter förr och nu,” Sovjet-Estland, 24 January 1941, p. 1. Translated 
from Swedish: Det låg ju också en viss sanning i påståendet, att svenskarna kanske voro mer omtyckta än 
någon annan minoritet, men det oaktat, behandlades även estlandssvenskarna i flera avseenden såsom andra 
klassens medborgare. Man kunde icke undgå att känna det så. 
61 “Estlandssvenskarnas kulturella rättigheter förr och nu,” Sovjet-Estland, 24 January 1941, p. 1. Translated 
from Swedish: Det var, som av det sagde framgår, icke mycket bevänt med kapitalistregimens omtanke om 
den svenska minoritetens kulturrättigheter. De svenska kulturvännerna sågo med oro framtiden an. Men så 





up; the Estonian-Swedes were to be considered equals to all other ethnic groups across 
the Soviet Union. 
To a large extent, this was a valid argument. As a group, the Estonian-Swedes 
were treated far better by the Soviets than by previous governments, which even Aman – 
an Estonian-Swede who later emigrated to Sweden – admits to. In this instance, the 
Soviets were drawing from history to shape the reaction, as opposed to rewriting the 
history. There was sufficient examples and existing bitterness for the Soviets to draw 
from. The editors of Sovjet-Estland were effective in their historical understanding and 
manipulation in this case. 
However, this was not always the case. In a later article, the Soviets attempted to 
link the ethnic Estonians and the ethnic Swedes in a common struggle against the Baltic 
Germans. This understanding, however, failed to take the Independent Estonian period 
into account and the common problems the ethnic Swedes and the Baltic Germans shared 
in facing Estonianization.62 Certainly, the Baltic Germans could have been labeled as 
class enemies – on the opposite economic spectrum from the ethnic Swedes. However, 
the interwar period was marked by increased cooperation between the Baltic Germans 
and the ethnic Swedes, eventually leading to political cooperation – a sign that previous 
oppression had been forgiven (or at least disregarded) in the face of more current issues, 
namely the threats to their culture by the ethnic Estonians. 
The linking of the ethnic Estonians and the Estonian-Swedes against the Baltic 
Germans was a clear indication of the shifting ideology against Germany. Sovjet-Estland 
attempted to link oppression by the Baltic Germans to thoughts of future oppression 
under Nazi Germany. By linking the Estonians and the ethnic Swedes, it was hoped that 
they would join together in rising up against their common enemy – the Germans. In both 
cases, though, the common theme was a history of oppression based on ethnicity and 
class identification. 
 
There were numerous methods to introduce the Soviet ideology to the Estonian-
Swedish minority. Sovjet-Estland went to great lengths to make the ideology and basic 
Soviet history available to the ethnic Swedes through series of articles (such as “What is 
                                                 
62 See, for example, Mikko Ketola, The Nationality Question in the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church, 





socialism”) to providing an overview of the Soviet political structure. The editors clearly 
attempted to draw the group into the society, to make them feel like they were active 
members, providing them the references and opportunities to join in celebrations. And to 
add additional justification, the newspaper drew in a historical comparison – largely 
justified in its picture – of previous oppression. Such attention had never been previously 
provided to the ethnic Swedes. Through the actions of the newspaper, the population was 
hoped to be drawn into the new political life, an important step in the full conversion of 





Chapter 4: The Sovietization of Society 
Organizing and applying itself of experiences from all the older Soviet 
republics, likewise with energy of our young Soviet republic Bolsheviks, 
the Founding of council institutions in Estonia is taking place after 21 
June, securing the socialistic regime and grandiose development work, all 
with one goal – to catch up to the older federate republics in the shortest 
possible time.1 
 
The first year of Soviet occupation brought about a significant amount of rapid 
change to Estonia. Effected were all areas of life, with dramatic changes not only in the 
political landscape, but in the economic, educational, and social landscapes as well. The 
changes were made with the long-term intention that the socialistic communism would 
remain a fixture in Estonia, bringing the land closer within the Soviet fold. The former 
bourgeois system needed to be completely replaced, following the Soviet model of tight, 
centralized control. 
These changes involved a rapid change throughout society. The Soviet policies 
were implemented at an unprecedented speed, while attempting to keep the appearance 
that the progress was a natural evolution of the working people’s desires. Having been 
freed from the bourgeois capitalists, the propaganda went, the workers were finally able 
to succeed and prosper, and the Soviet experience showed the best path to proceed along. 
This was frequently accomplished by drawing sharp historical connections of oppression 
and abuse. Across all aspects of life in the ESSR – agriculture, fishing, education, and 
religion, to name a few – changes were directly felt.2 
Arnold J. Toynbee argues that the Russian Revolution and the communist regime 
can be placed within a larger context of Russian history, connecting the Russian 
Revolution to Peter the Great. He argues that the Revolution “can be interpreted as 
Russia’s device for catching up, technologically, with Germany and with Russia’s other 
                                                 
1 Neeme Ruus, “Låt oss bli medvetna uppbyggare av socialismen under det nya året,” Sovjet-Estland, 4 
January 1941, p. 2. Translated from Swedish: Organiserade och användade sig av erfarenheter från alla 
äldre Sovjets republiker, likaså med energi av vår unga Sovjetrepubliks bolsjeviker försiggår efter den 21 
juni grundandet av rådsinstitutioner i Estland, tryggandet av den socialistiska regimen och ett mäktigt 
uppbyggningsarbete, allt med ett mål – att hinna efter de äldre förbundsrepublikerna på kortaste möjliga tid. 
2 Industrialization was not a major topic covered in Sovjet-Estland, and therefore is not covered in depth in 
this thesis. Coverage focused more intensively on agriculture and fishing, as these areas were the main 





western neighbours,”3 making industrialization and modernization key components of 
Sovietization.4 This exemplifies the rapid modernization of Russia first undertaken by 
Peter the Great, and continued by the Bolsheviks. “On this interpretation of Russian 
history, Lenin’s mission has been a continuation of Peter’s mission, and the Bolshevik 
Revolution of 1917 was a resumption of the revolution that had been started by Peter at 
the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.”5 This same interpretation can be 
applied in the acquired territories during the Second World War, with bringing the new 
regions to the same level as in Soviet Russia economically and ideologically. The 
propaganda in Sovjet-Estland regularly made reference to the improved economy, 
creation of new jobs, and improved technology, which according to the propaganda was 
only available under the communist system. 
Many of these areas of change – agriculture, fishing, education, and religion – 
were the most negatively received by the Estonian-Swedes. Arguably, these areas had the 
closest links to their national identity. The Estonian-Swedes were largely farmers and 
fishermen, and as a result were largely impacted by the changes implemented by the 
Soviets in these two areas specifically. Drastic alterations could possibly be raised as 
factors to explain the dramatic opposition to the Bolsheviks. While Sovjet-Estland 
attempted to propose a new Estonian-Swedish identity based on Soviet ideology (as 
described in Chapter 2), this new identity had little to do with areas that they had 
previously centered their identity. News of changes in these areas, were included as 
changes in policy and regular news items, as opposed to a change in their identity. 
In some cases, the changes were passed along through official notices in the 
newspaper, as opposed to articles focusing on the changes. Government notifications 
were regularly translated and printed, sometimes reflecting local Estonian changes, while 
other times reflecting changes from higher up in the USSR structure. In some cases, 
articles complimented government notifications, as was the case with the change in 
monetary currency in the 28 November 1940 issue.6 The notice provided information of 
                                                 
3 Arnold J. Toynbee, “Looking Back Fifty Years,” in The Impact of the Russian Revolution, Arnold J. 
Toynbee et.al. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 7. 
4 For an overview of the term ‘Sovietization,’ see Olaf Mertelsmann, “Introduction” in The Sovietization of 
the Baltic States 1940-1956, ed. Olaf Mertelsmann (Tartu: Kleio, 2003), 9-15. 
5 Toynbee, 7. 
6 The change in currency can also be reflected in the price of Sovjet-Estland. From the start of publication 
until 21 November 1940, the price was listed as 5 cents. With the change in monetary currency (at a rate of 






the change in a straight-forward manner. The accompanying article stated that the Soviet 
Union’s currency was the most stable. “This currency gives us the possibility to create an 
invincible state, it is a fixed guarantee for the working people’s future prosperity.”7 The 
notice and the article served to compliment and reinforce each other, although in other 
cases, notices stood on their own without complimentary articles. While these 
notifications were usually minimal in quantity, the 24 April 1941 issue contained almost 
two and a half pages of notifications. The notifications in that issue all pertained to 
agriculture and the obligatory selling of grain, wool, potatoes, meat, milk, and butter to 
the state.8 
The role of the workers was central in the Soviet Union. The Soviet structure was 
designed to emphasize the working people’s liberation. Workers had a set position in the 
Soviet society, and as a result of their performance in that position, were entitled to the 
benefits of the Soviet system. It was a quid pro quo society. On several occasions, the 
role of the worker in the ESSR was described in Sovjet-Estland. Along with the promises 
of work and news of various competitions between workers in similar industries, access 
to vacations and rest were mentioned in Sovjet-Estland. The Soviet system brought access 
to sanitariums and rest homes.9 Hard work was to be rewarded; it was the backbone of 
Soviet society. According to a 12 December article, “The new socialist society did not 
become a paradise for the lazy. Everyone who eats must work.”10 In order to benefit from 
the new Soviet society, the people must be participating workers. This was explained as 
the elimination of slave labor and the end of the exploitation of the working people. The 
laziness that had been pervasive under the capitalist system would not be tolerated under 
the communist system, and those that did not work their land would have it taken away. 
                                                 
cents. Both prices were printed until the end of the year, when only the price in kopeks was listed. (The 16 
January 1941 issue price was 30 kopeks because it included a calendar.) There was another price increase 
beginning on 3 April 1941 when the price was raised to 10 kopeks. 
7 “Medel av stor betydelse som använts inom vårt politiska och ekonomiska liv,” Sovjet-Estland, 28 
November 1940, p. 1. Translated from Swedish: Denna valuta ger oss möjlighet att skapa ett oövervinneligt 
rike, den är en fast garanti för det arbetande folkets framtida välgång. 
8 Sovjet-Estland, 24 April 1941, pp. 1-3. 
9 See for example, “5 millioner rubel till permission för gruvarbetare,” Sovjet-Estland, 6 February 1941, p. 
3. 
10 “Förändrad uppfattning,” Sovjet-Estland, 12 December 1940, p. 2. Translated from Swedish: Det nya 






The Changing Landscape 
Perhaps one of the biggest effects on the population – ethnic Estonian and ethnic 
Swedish alike – was the land reforms. Under the Soviet system, all land over 30 hectors 
was nationalized. Land was given to those without, although at a maximum of 12 hectors. 
All bank accounts over 800 Estonian crowns became state property. Large industries were 
also nationalized and boats over 20 tons. Houses larger than 170 square meters were 
nationalized in November. Priests and business-owners were heavily taxed and had to pay 
triple the amount for rent.11 
The land reform was explained beginning with the first issue of Sovjet-Estland. In 
an article detailing the progress of the land reform for Noarootsi (the newspaper 
incorrectly translated Noarootsi as “Nargö” – the name for Naissaar; this was corrected in 
a later issue) the pace of the changes was depicted as rapid, with strong dedication of the 
committee members who were meeting at the parish house, overseeing the local reform. 
“In Läänemaa, the land reform is carried out in a quick tempo. The work is so pressing 
and intensive that the committee does not even begrudge themselves a break on the days 
of rest, but rather the work goes on from morning until late at night.”12 The committee 
was charged with dividing up land amongst those seeking land – and taking away from 
those with larger farms, or those deemed to be bourgeois landowners. The article 
highlighted the effects of the land reform by citing examples of those that had little or no 
land previously, and were glad to have received land of their own, thanks to the 
Bolsheviks. (The article also notes a great interest among the people gathered at the 
parish house for the arrival of Sovjet-Estland.) 
The following week, the ideological background of the socialistic land reform was 
articulated by drawing comparisons to the 1919 land reform. According to the article, the 
Estonian land reform had given the best land to previous estate holders, generals that had 
fought for the enslavement of the working people, and to politicians. The working 
farmers were thus left with either poor quality land or no land at all. This injustice to the 
working farmers was sought to be overturned by the socialists. 
                                                 
11 Viktor Aman,  “Estlandssvenskarna Under Andra Världskriget och Överflyttningen Till Sverige” in En 
Bok on Estlands svenskar (Stockholm: Föreningen Svenska Odlingens Vänner, 1961), 189. 
12 “Hur försiggår jordutdelning i Nargö,” Sovjet-Estland, 17 October 1940, p. 2. Translated from Swedish: I 






Our goal is clear – to wipe out man’s exploitation of other men, to 
obliterate the possibility that one can be directed to do another’s work. 
This guarantees a huge success in all areas. The new land reform is one of 
the more important steps towards the working people’s liberation from the 
remnants of the capitalistic slavery.13 
A second article focused on the land reform was printed on the same page, accompanied 
by photographs of the Noarootsi committee at work and a group of people gathered 
outside the parish house. Sovjet-Estland depicted the committee’s work as being praised 
by the local farmers: 
The quick realization of the land reform delights those requesting land in 
Läänemaa. One is very pleased with the new farms. Farmers without land 
and with little land, that up to now dragged themselves through life 
working for large landowners, now begin to create a new and happier life 
on their new farms.14 
The article does not mention any of those who lost land, or any additional reasons why 
one would lose all or part of their land. It was mentioned that on the islands, land was 
tight, although the committees were able to satisfy almost all requests.  
Coverage of the land reform continued in the third issue, when the progress was 
noted for Noarootsi, Vormsi, and Ruhnu. In Noarootsi, 43 small farms received extra land 
and 66 new farms were created. The committee sought to allocated cultivatable land for 
the 30 hectares plots.15 On Vormsi, where the land was noted as “barren” (karg), 363 
hectares were calculated for the state land reserve. In the distribution, 86 households 
added 218 hectares and 46 hectares was given for new farms (the number of new farms 
was not indicated).16 On Ruhnu, labeled the most backward portion of all bourgeois 
Estonia, three new farms were created with land taken from the church – the largest 
landholder on the island.17 
                                                 
att kommitten icke ens på vilodagarna får unnan sig en paus, utan arbetet försiggår från morgon till sena 
kvällen. 
13 “Den socialistiska agrarreformen – början till ett nytt liv,” Sovjet-Estland, 24 October 1940, p. 2. 
Translated from Swedish: Vårt mål är klart – att utrota människans explotation genom människa, att utplåna 
möjligheten att några få kan rikta sig på andras arbete. Detta garanterar en jättelik framgång på alla 
områden. Den nya agrarreformen är en av de viktigaste steg till det arbetande folkets befrielse från det 
kapitalistiska slaveriets kvarlevor. 
14 “Agrarreformens genomförande i Läänemaa,” Sovjet-Estland, 24 October 1940, p. 2. Translated from 
Swedish: Det snabba genomförandet av agrarreformen glädjer Läänemaa’s jordönskare. Man är mycket 
nöjd med de nya gårdarna. Lantmän utan jord och med föga jord, som hittills släpade fram sitt liv utsugna 
av storbönderna, börja nu att skapa ett nytt och gladare liv på de nya gärdarna. 
15 “Agrarreformens genomförande: I Nuckö,” Sovjet-Estland, 31 October 1940, p. 2. 
16 A.T., “Agrarreformens genomförande: I Vormsö,” Sovjet-Estland, 31 October 1940, p. 2. 





A 28 November review of the Vormsi land reform in Sovjet-Estland provides 
slightly different figures. The article indicates that they received 247 requests for 
additional land and 97 requests for new farms. The large number of requests for new 
farms can perhaps be attributed to the number of families relocated to Vormsi from the 
evacuated islands of Pakrite and Osmussaare. Land was taken away from 41 farms 
(between 5 and 15 hectares were taken from each farm), with 85 farms being given 
additional land and 9 new farms created. The committee encouraged those whose requests 
could not be fulfilled to move to the mainland, where land was plentiful. The committee 
also encouraged farmers to consider forming a kolhos, and according to the article, many 
were interested in learning more about a kolhos.18 
The land reform undertaken during the Soviet occupation needed to be 
differentiated from the land reform undertaken by the Estonian government during the 
Interwar period. The concerted effort needed to distinguish between the land reform of 
1919 and the land reform of 1940. The Estonian land reform, the Soviet propaganda 
asserted, did not help the individual farmers and workers, but rather rewarded those who 
had fought in the capitalistic war and strengthened the power of the land holders. A 27 
February article described the Estonian attempt as the following: 
When the capitalistic government, shortly after the first imperialistic world 
war, came to power in Estonia, a land reform was carried out in the 
country. The intention of this land reform was to take from the Baltic 
landowners, who for centuries took the life and marrow out of the working 
people in the country, and gave the land to the country’s own inhabitants. 
When this land was given out, it became quickly evident that those in 
power took less regard of the poor farmers’ land needs and gave the new 
farms to those from the class war’s domestic officers and the like, who did 
not even need, or even consider to begin to cultivate the obtained land. The 
poor, former farmers of the manors, who really had a need for farms  once 
losing their work on the large estates, were later able to buy the land at a 
high expense from the new estate owners. Such was the capitalistic 
system’s land reform!19 
                                                 
18 “Från agrarreformens slutförande på Vormsö,” Sovjet-Estland, 28 November 1940, p. 2. 
19 “Jordreformen,” Sovjet-Estland, 27 February 1941, p. 1. Translated from Swedish: Då den kapitalistiska 
regeringen kort efter det första imperialistiska världkrigets slut kom till makten i Estland, genomfördes en 
jordreform här i landet. Avsikten med denna jordreform var att ta från de baltiska godsägarna, som under 
århundraden sugit must och märg ur den arbetande befolkningen i landet och get sedan jorden åt landets 
egen befolkning. När sedan jorden utdelades framgick det ganska snart, att de makthavande togo mindre 
hänsyn till de fattiga lantarbetarnas jordbehov och gåvo de nya gårdarna åt från klasskriget hemvändande 
officrare och till sådana, som inte alls behövde, eller ens tänkte börja bebruka den erhållna jorden. De 






The land reform, therefore, not only had a class-based discrimination which kept poor 
ethnic Estonians in a submissive position in society, but also held an ethnic benefit for the 
Estonians, keeping the ethnic Swedes in a more submissive economic environment. In 
contrast, the Soviet land reform was articulated as an equal redistribution to the workers 
and away from oppressors: 
The reform [under the Soviets] was realized in accordance to the principle 
that the farmers do not need larger farms than what he himself can work 
with. One would thereby move away from the exploitation of farmers that 
the largest landowners customarily pursued on a larger or smaller scale.20 
It was determined that the size of a farm in which a farmer could cultivate by himself was 
between 12 and 30 hectares. Under the Soviet system, all land should be cultivated 
rationally, and included set norms for the number of farm animals (two horses and five 
cows, as articulated in the article). 
 
Plowing the Soviet Fields 
Having established the land reform and its ideological background, coverage in 
Sovjet-Estland shifted to the agricultural industry. There were occasional mentions of 
collectivization, although in Sovjet-Estland’s agricultural coverage, this was minimal. 
Hints at collectivization can be seen in articles about new technology available in other 
regions and articles on the collective farms of other regions. There were no suggestions 
that this needed to be or would be done in the ethnic Swedish-populated regions, 
however, with promises of the protection of private property articulated in the Soviet 
ideology. The main focus for Sovjet-Estland was, therefore, the abolition of the bourgeois 
system. 
The first article devoted to agriculture in Estonia (there were two articles in the 24 
October issue focusing on agriculture across the Soviet Union21) was in the third issue. 
Under the headline “The Fall Plowing Cannot Be Put Aside Any Longer!” the article 
described the socialistic work ethic that was affecting all of Soviet Estonia, but not on the 
                                                 
på storgodsen, fingo senare för dyra pengar köpa jorden av dessa nyblivna gårdsägare. Sådan var det 
kapitalistiska systemets jordreform! 
20 “Jordreformen,” Sovjet-Estland, 27 February 1941, p. 1. Translated from Swedish: Denna reform 
genomfördes enligt den principen, att jordbrukaren inte behöver större gård än vad han själv kan arbeta 
med. Man ville därmed komma ifrån den exploatering av lantarbetarna, som största jordägarna vanligtvis 
bedrivit i större eller mindre skala. 
21 “Socialistiska jordbruket visar sin överlägsenhet,” Sovjet-Estland, 24 October 1940, p. 3. “Såning av 





farms. The field harvesting and fall plowing was still not complete – sure signs that many 
of the farmers were still in the bourgeois mentality of slaving for others. 
Such a negligence must now disappear. Even the country people must 
work socialistically, avail all of one’s strength and the favorable weather 
conditions. In Soviet Estonia’s farms work must not be put aside for 
another day... The lazy and idlers have no right to the people’s land. Those 
that do not cultivate their given land properly is not worthy of this land. 
All autumn fieldwork must be done properly and on time. Only through 
honorable, energetic, and hard work earns the people their wealth.22 
The bourgeois mentality, the newspaper warned, must disappear. The Soviet Union was 
depicted as the world’s largest and most advanced country in regards to agriculture; their 
policies and timeline was, therefore, the most effective. Their recommendations were to 
be followed in order to produce the best results. And if they were not “done properly” the 
people risked losing their land. 
The benefits of Soviet agriculture for those in the ESSR were already 
demonstrated a couple weeks later when it was reported that the potato market had 
dramatically been opened – namely across “our homeland – the Soviet Union”23 (stating 
it as if the reader needed to be reminded what the “homeland” now referred to). Not only 
were there increased options for markets, but a higher price was also promised. In a later 
article, it was expressed that the Soviet system was a guarantee for a successful farm.24 
There were certainly attempts in Sovjet-Estland in fostering thoughts of 
collectivization. Collectivization was depicted as a more successful option, with access to 
state financial support and increased harvests.25 The collective farms also had better 
farming equipment available to them, such as the use of tractor and horse stations.26 
A number of the articles sought to clarify the obligations of the farmers. Similar to 
the notice that the fall harvesting and plowing were to be completed, a 6 December article 
                                                 
22 “Höstplöjningen får icke uppskjutas längre!” Sovjet-Estland, 31 October 1940, p. 2. Translated from 
Swedish: Ett dylikt slarv måste numera försvinna. Även lantbefolkningen måste arbeta socialistiskt, 
begagna alla krafter och de gynnsamma väderleksförhållanden. I Sovjet-Estlands jordbruk får intet arbete 
uppskjutas till morgondagen... Latmasker och dagdrivare hava ingen rättighet till folkets jord. Den som inte 
odlar den erhållna jorden ordentligt, är icke värdig denna jord. Alla höstliga fältarbeten måste enomföras 
ordentligt och i rätt tid. Endast genom ärligt, energiskt och duktigt arbete ernår folket sin välstånd. 
23 “Större ersättning för potatisen,” Sovjet-Estland, 21 November 1940, p. 2. Translated from Swedish: 
…vårt hemlands – Sovjetunionens… 
24 “Sovjetordningen är en garanti för ett framgångsrikt jordbruk,” Sovjet-Estland, 13 February 1941, p. 2. 
25 See, for example, “Såning av vintersäd och höstplöjning,” Sovjet-Estland, 24 October 1940, p. 3. See also 
“Lantbefolkningen uppskattar kooperativa rörelsens omdaning,” Sovjet-Estland, 13 March 1941, p. 1. 
26 See, for example, “Många nya traktorsstationer,” Sovjet-Estland, 6 February 1941, p. 2. See also “Till 





reminded the farmers of the need to store their equipment inside and to ensure that they 
were properly maintained and repaired during the winter months. Only this work, the 
article instructs, will enable to equipment to last longer and be ready for the springtime 
work.27 For farmers, the end of the fall harvest did not mean the end of work. In a 
socialistic society, it was expected that the farmer would spend the winter months 
preparing his farm equipment and making necessary repairs. It was also expected that the 
farmer would continue to educate himself when not out in the fields. 
On 30 January, a workshop was held for area farmers at Birkas, the Swedish-
language school located in Noarootsi. Fridolf Isberg, the school’s headmaster, extended 
the invitation to farmers as an opportunity to ask questions concerning agriculture and the 
transition from the capitalistic to the socialistic system. An article appeared in Sovjet-
Estland following the seminar, and states that the Noarootsi council clarified for the 
farmers, what duties they had within the new socialistic society and what work should 
still be done prior to the spring. In attendance were approximately 50 farmers.28 
In continuing the farmers’ learning a regular column was published, written by 
Isberg.29 The column began in January and continued through the majority of the rest of 
the newspaper’s run. The columns sought to educate the farmers on new techniques. Later 
columns were a question and answer forum. The names of those asking questions were 
not printed, although one would suppose that the questions were sent in by readers, or 
possibly were generated by Isberg from conversations with farmers. 
When the spring arrived, notices began to appear in the newspaper regarding the 
obligatory sale by the farmers of agricultural products to the state. The 24 April issue 
announced the obligatory sale of grain, meat, milk, wool, and potatoes. This sale was 
regarded in Sovjet-Estland as the obligation of farmers in Estonia to help support the 
greater Soviet system and those people in other regions who were less fortunate in their 
harvests. The government was depicted as helping the poor households for the bettering 
of all society. 
The obligatory sale takes effect in the state’s interest, in the whole of the 
working people’s interest, in the interest of the socialistic development in 
our country, in the interest of the defense of our country. There is no doubt 
                                                 
27 “Ställ lantbruksredskapen undan i vinterkvarter!” Sovjet-Estland, 6 December 1940, p. 2. 
28 “Birkas lantmannaskola anordnar jordbruksafton för traktens bönder,” 6 February 1941, p. 2. 
29 It was not unprecedented for the headmaster to have such a column. There were periodic submissions of a 





that all the poor and average farmers, together with all of the working 
people in the towns and in the countryside receive these regulations with 
recognition and support them.30 
The sale was for the benefit of all, as was all aspects of Soviet society. The following 
week, Sovjet-Estland stated that the sale would raise the living standard for the farmers. 
They were encouraged to look at the larger picture and see their position in the Soviet 
society as a whole.31 
One of the failures in regards to the Läänemaa region, which largely impacted the 
Estonian-Swedes, was the failure to consider land quality in implementing the land 
reform. This was recognized by the Central Committee in a May report. The report, 
which was addressing the high dissatisfaction among the Estonian-Swedes, specifically 
mentioned the poor land quality on the islands of Saaremaa, Vormsi, Ruhnu, Kihnu, 
Prangli, and Hiiumaa and the communities of Noarootsi, Riguldi, and Nõva. Lowering the 
agricultural production norms in these areas was recommended. The Central Committee 
also wanted to explore the possibilities of reducing or eliminating the debts of all farmers 
owning more than 5 hectares of land.32 These regions were seen as not being adequately 
sufficient for the high level of the norms, and the problems as needing immediate 
attention. 
 
Progressive Sovietization of the Fisheries 
The Sovietization process was not an overnight procedure. Rather, it was a 
gradual change, particularly in the economic and social spheres. It was an ongoing 
process, although necessarily sped-up in newly acquired territory. Perhaps this change, 
and the propaganda campaign surrounding it, can best be illustrated in focusing on Sovjet-
Estland’s coverage of the fishing industry. Particularly in regards to the fishing industry 
(and much more-so than in agriculture), the Sovietization process was gradual, with the 
propaganda campaign geared to making the development seem to follow the will of the 
people. The ethnic Swedes were particularly hard-hit with the changes in Soviet policy, as 
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their fishing areas were largely restricted due to military concerns. These policies also had 
a more practical purpose; by limiting access to boats, the potential for illegal emigration 
would decrease. This can be seen from the illegal emigrations in November by fishermen 
from Naissaar. 
The 21 November issue announced the creation of a Fisheries Center (in Swedish 
Fiskericentralen; in Estonian Kalakeskus) in order to assist the ESSR government in 
creating a socialistic fishing industry. The Center would also assist in the organization of 
the fishermen. According to the article, 40 cooperatives had already been formed across 
Estonia, including 14 around Lake Peipsi, 3 on Saaremaa and Hiiumaa, 3 in Viru, and 1 in 
Neve. There was also said to be great interest in the formation of cooperatives among 
others, although the article made no mention of the ethnic Swedish regions (a strong 
indication that the article was simply translated into Swedish an not prepared specifically 
for the Estonian-Swedes).33 
The progressive nature of collectivization in the fisheries continued. The 
following week, it was declared that the government had taken it upon themselves to 
better the well-being of the fishermen.34 An accompanying article set the early tone to the 
progression of collectivization coverage in Sovjet-Estland.35 A December article 
presented fishing brigades (arteller) as the most suitable form of organization for 
fishermen.36 
The idea of collectivization was furthered in January by describing a visit of 
several ESSR representatives to “The Red Fishermen” fishing kolhos outside of 
Leningrad. They not only visited with fishermen, but also went to the villages and visited 
with families. All of their questions were answered “politely and clearly” (hövligt och 
redigt). Comrade Kurg, one of the representatives, noticed a dramatic improvement in the 
economy and cultural development within the kolhos, himself having visited fishing 
camps in Tsarist Russia 23 years prior. “I know very well how the Russian fishers were: 
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oppressed, ragged, filthy.”37 The change he observed was the mature, energetic people. 
“They have all that man needs,” he exclaimed.38 The government even provided them 
with advice and with boats. 
The visit provided the newspaper with the opportunity to present the benefits and 
advantages of forming a kolhos (highlighted by the accompanying photograph of a 
fisherman with three very large fish and the caption reading: “Is this a good catch?”39). As 
the article states, “Overall, the visit to ‘The Red Fishermen’ made a magnificent 
impression. In ten years they have achieved results that are the best proof in this system’s 
good direction.”40 While not directly advocating the creation of fishing kolhoses across 
the ESSR, the article expands the foundations of the idea and its benefits. The progress 
was still portrayed as a slowly evolving concept, growing in enthusiasm among the 
population. 
The concept of collectivization was advanced a little more a couple weeks later. A 
late January article reviewed the study tour for a second time, concluding by stating: 
In connection with the reorganization of our fishing sector towards a self-
sufficient committee, we conveyed to the Soviet National Fisheries 
Commissariat an oral petition to supply our fishing industry with needed 
arrangements and necessary materials (since our plans for the 1941 fishing 
year do not entail any protracted changes), which are necessary, according 
to the observations we acquired during our stay in the Soviet fishing civil 
service department and enterprise.41 
Naturally, the petition received an affirmative response, stating that the fishing industry in 
Soviet Estonia would receive extraordinary assistance. The article clearly stated that no 
major changes were planned, although one would guess that “voluntary” formation of 
such collectives would readily be assisted and promoted. 
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The idea of collectivization in the ESSR was growing more firm and more certain. 
The following week assured readers that collectivization would bring larger incomes for 
all fishermen, as well as modernization to the entire industry. Among other benefits, the 
entire village would be put to work, with the women and children doing work on the 
shores while the fishermen were out at sea. Naturally, these benefits and improvements 
were said to be possible only after 21 June 1940 with the Bolsheviks coming to power, as 
the capitalistic Estonian government had held the fishermen in poverty.42 
In advancing collectivization, Sovjet-Estland focused on the fishing industry in the 
Soviet Union for inspiration. The newspaper was able to demonstrate the resulting 
improvements in the rest of society – schools, daycares, sporting facilities.43 The Soviet 
structure was the best solution for the fishermen, making transitions to the fishing 
industry in the ESSR increasingly easier to argue, as was the case in a mid-March front-
page story. Drawing on historical comparisons, Sovjet-Estland attempted to differentiate 
between the vast possibilities offered in the Soviet structure to oppression and 
manipulation by the previous bourgeois government.44 
By the end of April, it was announced that fishermen were starting to build 
collectives in Estonia. However, these new fishing collectives being organized had yet to 
include the ethnic Swedish regions, although this was not mentioned in the article. Once 
again, the benefits of collectivization were extolled, and the new members of the new 
collectives were shown to be taking advantage of the benefits of the Soviet structure to 
better their future.45 The following week, another front-page article again highlighted the 
benefits. To do other than to build a cooperative, it was argued, would keep the fishermen 
in poverty.46 
The first indication in Sovjet-Estland of acceptance (or at least the appearance of 
acceptance) of collectives within the ethnic Swedish regions was the printing of a radio 
address given by fisherman Johan Engström in the 2 July issue. As one would expect 
from the propaganda, Engström drew from history, referring to previous oppression and 
being taken advantage of by bourgeois capitalists. But now, he says, the fishermen know 
who they are going to be selling their catches to and know that they will get a fair price. 
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The prices have been better, meaning more income to the individuals. The arrival of the 
Soviet system was greeted warmly and with enthusiasm.47 
The slow progress of the collectivization of the fisheries was intended to foster a 
growing curiosity among the fishermen and give the appearance that the move towards 
collectivization was the will of the people, and not directed from above. The issue was 
never forced first and explained later, as was the case with the land reform. However, this 
process appeared to have little progress among the Estonian-Swedish community. In the 
end, some collectivization was undertaken; Engström refers to the establishment of two 
organizations being founded on Vormsi. The idea of collectivization was demonstrated to 
have slowly evolved from the people, though. As such, it was an effective campaign. 
 
Education and Youth 
The transition into the Soviet system also impacted the youth of society, as well as 
the education system. However, progress was minimal, particularly in the case of the 
Estonian-Swedes. The slow progress can be seen to have been a result of linguistic 
difficulties as well as the high dissatisfaction within the community. Coverage of the 
education was minimal in Sovjet-Estland, with only a handful of articles, more heavily 
weighted to spring 1941. 
Before the arrival of the newspaper in October, the Birkas school in Noarootsi had 
been heavily used by the Soviets. Soldiers were stationed within the school house, 
although in the middle of June 1940, the soldiers left Birkas. The building was heavily 
damaged and garbage was left everywhere.48 Border-guards moved in shortly afterwards, 
but only temporarily. Churches and schools were closed by the new Soviet power. Each 
school was evaluated to determine the necessity and reopened following the Soviet school 
system. According to Isberg, the Birkas school was initially determined to remain closed. 
As the headmaster, he protested the decision, stating: 
We poor Swedish farmers and fishermen here in Estonia have all the time 
hoped that the new socialist government would help us to have an 
increased education in our own language, and therefore, I find it difficult 
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to understand that we suddenly should have it worse than we have had it 
before.49 
Isberg’s protest worked, and Birkas was permitted to reopen.50 The border-guards were 
moved and the building was returned to the school. The headmaster went about locating 
funds to re-renovate the building before trying to encourage students to come.  
On 31 October, the third issue of Sovjet-Estland, the start of the school year at 
Birkas was announced, the 21st school year for the school, with an enrollment of 23 
students. The article, written by Isberg, states that the school had to overcome 
considerable difficulties in the previous year, including having been forced to temporarily 
relocate on Vormsi. “Since the new, socialistic regime was carried in here in the country, 
the school’s premises could, with the present government authorities’ friendly aid and 
understanding for the cause, be released and moved back to its old location of Birkas in 
Noarootsi.”51 In the article, Isberg was clearly paying tribute to the Soviet’s policies and 
approval to allow the school to continue. In reopening the school, the state assumed 
control over the education of the ethnic Swedes, with Birkas working closely with the 
West National School Administration (in Estonian Lääne Maakoolivalitsus) located in 
Haapsalu. The state also promised the provide funds for necessary renovations and 
needed repairs, although does not mention the apparent reason for those renovations and 
repairs – the large damage done to the building by the Soviet soldiers who had lived 
there. Isberg’s article includes Soviet ideology comparing the difficulties Estonian-
Swedes had under the Eenpalu government and treatment of the ethnicity as second-class 
citizens. In contrast, Isberg states, the new government has promised the Estonian-Swedes 
the same rights as the majority. “When we here at the school now begin a new school 
year, we come to do it in a whole new spirit and with great expectations for the future, 
knowing that we now are a free people in a free socialistic land, where all are equal.”52 
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Perhaps it can be argued that Isberg’s inclusion of ideology was felt to be a 
necessity; as headmaster of the school, he would have wanted to ensure that the education 
could continue for the Estonian-Swedes. He became a regular contributor of articles to 
Sovjet-Estland through his agricultural columns. However, none of his other articles 
contain such stark propaganda overtones of Soviet ideology. By having his name signed 
at the end of the article, it gave the appearance of his full support of the Soviet 
government and the socialist ideology; few other highly ideologically-based articles were 
ever signed. 
School celebrations for the second half of the 1940-1941 school year were 
announced in Sovjet-Estland in late November (there had been no similar announcements 
in the newspaper covering the first half of the school year). The most important occasions 
to be marked were the anniversary of Lenin’s death (23 January) and the May festivities 
(1 and 2 May). For Lenin’s death day, it was announced a lecture would be given in 
memory of Lenin. The students were to prepare something to demonstrate the meaning of 
Lenin’s work. During the May festivities, the school would be closed, although on 30 
April the students were to be taught the meaning and significance of the festivities. Other 
dates included in the article were the end of the third quarter (22 March) and the dates of 
spring break (24-31 March). The fourth quarter was to end 28 May, with exams beginning 
on 30 May. All school work was to be completed by 7 June.53 
The Swedish school in Tallinn was mentioned on 4 January. The Swedish 
Cultivation Friends (SOV) was credited with the creation of the school (the main 
Estonian-Swedish cultural organization prior to the Soviet’s arrival had also been credited 
by Isberg in his article), although like Birkas, the school was taken over by the state and 
reopened. The article points to some difficulties facing the school – there were only 15 
students enrolled and only a single teacher to handle all of the subjects for all six grade 
levels. These set-backs were blamed squarely on the bourgeois Estonian policies of 
previous years. 
The school’s student population is, for the present, much lower 
(approximately 15), but this is not due to the school but rather the 
bourgeois Estonian government’s twisted legislation. Eenpalu and 
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company were nervous that the “outsiders” would denationalize the 
Estonian people, and therefore prescribed in 1935 that children from 
mixed marriages only should have the right to go in such a school that had 
the father’s language as the teaching language. In Tallinn at that time there 
was a large percentage of mixed marriages between Swedish women and 
Estonian men, so the natural right was taken from these parents of a 
mutual arrangement concerning their children’s possibility to education in 
the language they preferably wanted.54 
It was a strong attack against the Eenpalu policies, serving to highlight the different 
mentalities between the capitalist government and the Soviet policies of equality. There 
were high hopes for a brighter outlook at the school. With the government support and 
encouragement, surely the number of students and teachers could be increased overtime, 
particularly considering the new government’s minority-friendly stance, the article 
argued. 
While the schedule of major days and the difficulties facing the schools were 
discussed in Sovjet-Estland, the newspaper did not discuss changes in the educational 
system or the new subjects being taught. According to Isberg, where students had 
previously been taught the Estonian language, geography, and history they were now 
taking five hours of Russian language and two hours of Stalinist government.55 As was 
the case throughout Estonia, books needed to receive approval by the state, and this 
heavily affected the Swedish-language schools, as no textbooks in Swedish were 
approved or available for use in the 1940-1941 school year. Religious books, Estonian 
history books since 1918, and children’s literature were collected and burned. New 
literature, translations, artwork, theater, and music were all subject to state approval and 
had certain criteria. This meant that the schools had to make substitutions with other 
materials, including the use of Sovjet-Estland as teaching materials.56 
The value of using the newspaper can certainly be raised; as previously 
mentioned, Per Wieselgren was horrified at the poor language skills in the newspaper, 
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fearful that school children would learn improper Swedish. However, the newspaper did 
present the new Soviet ideology and a historical background of the Soviet Union – both 
of which could have proven to be fair propaganda materials. This was risky, though, since 
the content could have more easily been countered at home by parents who also received 
Sovjet-Estland and sharply disagreed with the content. 
In all public buildings, a “Red Corner” was created, with portraits of Marx, 
Engels, Lenin, and Stalin; propaganda slogans; and local news. The young communists 
organization and the Pioneers – a Soviet version of scouting – visited Birkas in an attempt 
to recruit students.57 However, the Pioneers had little success in recruiting members 
among the Estonian-Swedes. 
The Sovietization of society was an ongoing process that was intended to continue 
over a longer period. The propaganda and agitation aimed at the youth was particularly 
important in this regard. The end of the school year was marked, as was the 
announcement of two new Swedish-language textbooks. During the first year of Soviet 
occupation, two textbooks were published in Swedish – Läsebok för Folkskolan 
(Elementary School Reader)58 and Läsebok för Mellanskolan (Intermediate School 
Reader).59 These were meant to be used in the Swedish schools in Estonia, but because of 
the war against Germany and the approaching frontline, the books were never distributed, 
and thus never used. The textbooks can, however, be used to see the future plans for the 
ethnic Swedes in terms of education and the attempts at propaganda that was to be aimed 
at the ethnic Swedish youth, examples of the anticipated propaganda campaign to be 
aimed at the children in the schools. Both books were compiled by Vormsi school teacher 
Tomas Gärdström (and overseen by Anton Vaarandi, the editor of Sovjet-Estland). 
The books’ anticipated arrival was announced in the 11 June issue of Sovjet-
Estland, after the 1940-1941 school year had been completed. The article highlights the 
devotion of the Bolsheviks to provide the ethnic Swedes with the opportunities to develop 
their culture, socialistic in content, and points to their support of Swedish-language 
education for the minority. Although the print run (1150 copies) was smaller than their 
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Estonian-language counterparts, the article states that the books would cost the same 
price, 2 rubels 50 kopek.60 
Läsebok för Folkskolan is a collection of 76 short stories and poems. Many entries 
feature nature themes; some are fiction, others are non-fiction. There are definite 
examples of propaganda at various stages. The table of contents provides an indication of 
the origin of the stories: some were written by ethnic Swedes (well-known figures such as 
August Strindberg and Pär Lagerkvist, as well as those in the Estonian-Swedish 
community such as Gärdström himself), some texts were written and translated from 
Estonian, and some were from Russian (including a story by Leo Tolstoj). The majority 
of the stories, though, do not list an author, simply stating that they were translated. Most 
likely, these were translated from Russian, as many of them are strong examples of 
propaganda. 
One of the more overt examples of propaganda through the use of a parable is 
chapter 13 in Läsebok för Folkskolan, “The Children Build a Collective.” In the short 
story, a group of children are given some land. Each child owns a different farm 
implement. None of the children want to let the others borrow their implement, nor do 
they want to work the others’ crop. As a result, they fight and nothing is harvested. Father 
then comes along and suggests they build a collective. The children don’t know what a 
collective is, so Father explains it to them, extolling the benefits. The children do so, and 
when Father next visits, he sees that their land is flourishing and they are all sharing in the 
success. The children are appreciative of Father showing them the way, and offer him 
some of their crops.61 The collective is seen as the only logical solution in such a 
situation. Once it is implemented, the children are happy and their farm is successful. The 
story can be viewed as a parable to the Soviet’s collectivization of Estonian land, with a 
clear reference to Stalin acting as the Father. Since Father (Stalin) had shown them the 
way to work the land most effectively, they are more than willing to offer him part of 
their crops to thank him. 
In contrast to Läsebok för Folkskolan, Läsebok för Mellanskolan does not list the 
authors or indicate when stories were translated. The book contained 45 chapters. While 
there were short stories, there was an increased focus on history and ideology, presenting 
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the historical figures and leaders of the Soviet Union; stories about Lenin and Stalin 
dominate, but there are also chapters relating to the Soviet celebrations. This collection 
focused less on parables and more on overt propaganda. 
The ESSR Central Committee’s May report also drew attention to the political 
work among the Estonian-Swedish children. The Central Committee wanted comrade 
Cher to monitor and control the work being conducted among the ethnic Swedes in 
Läänemaa, including the political education of the youth. The Committee wanted to 
strengthen and engage the youth into the comsomol movement, and particularly into the 
Pioneers. In addition, the Committee suggested increasing Sovjet-Estland to six pages in 
order to incorporate a youth-section (perhaps equating it to the work of Noorte Hääl).62 
As in other areas of the May report, little work was accomplished in this area, made more 
difficult by the German advance. Perhaps the easiest of the Committee’s recommendation 
was the expansion of the newspaper, although even this was not accomplished. 
 
Diminishing the Dogma of Religion 
In terms of gaining the Estonian-Swedes’ support, arguably one of the more 
damaging of the new Bolshevik policies was the Soviet policy towards religion. Religion 
had been central to the formation of the Estonian-Swedish identity, and signified a close 
connection with Sweden, which naturally was severed with the arrival of the ESSR. 
While it was not a major topic covered in Sovjet-Estland, the anti-religious policies of the 
Soviet Union were mentioned on occasion. 
The Soviet Union ideology was not compatible with religion. Riho Altnurme 
states that the attack against religion in 1940-1941 was external, with the internal affairs 
of the church not affected. He states: 
It must be said that it is not reasonable to speak about the sovietization of 
the Church during the first year of Soviet occupation. The Church was put 
into a difficult situation by introducing the measures of deep secularization 
of society by the Soviets, but it still remained apart from the process of 
sovietization.63 
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The church was still impacted by the Soviet presence, though, and an anti-religious 
sentiment pervaded in the propaganda. 
There are several occasions of blatant anti-religious sentiment, and examples of 
how the churches and clergy were negatively impacted by the Soviets in Sovjet-Estland. 
The land reform hit the churches particularly harshly. In areas were land was restricted 
(such was the case on the islands of Vormsi and Ruhnu) with a limited amount of land for 
a large number of those seeking land, church property was taken away by the state and 
appropriated by the committees. 
The first signs of the anti-religion position of the Soviets was seen in Sovjet-
Estland’s coverage of the land reform. In the 31 October 1940 issue, in providing an 
overview of the land reform’s progress in various area, it was indicated that land was 
taken away from the church on Ruhnu. With land limited on the island, the largest land 
holder was the church with 45-48 hectors. The article states that the land was divided 
among three farmers seeking land.64 A later article stated that five people were given land 
taken from the church.65 
The next sign was more negative and more direct in its approach against religion. 
A 6 December article brought attention to the Läänemaa youth communists work in 
enlightenment in “questions of religion.” The article stated: 
Since the education of the people in Läänemaa has been much neglected 
and in succession a number of sects have come up, the young communists 
in Läänemaa have taken the task of antireligious development work into 
action for the liberation of the people from the blinding dogma and service 
to the priests’ purse. The ELKNÜ [the Estonian youth communist 
organization] Läänemaa division’s members have even begun their work.66 
This was a devastatingly harsh attack against religion. While this was a regional news 
brief, there was no mention of a direct call to action against religion in the Estonian-
Swedish communities. It is intriguing that the editors ran such an article without 
previously providing the propaganda as to why religion was so horrible and why the 
Soviet ideology ran counter to religion. This background propaganda would have 
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66 “Läänemaa ungkommunisters upplysningsarbete i religionsfrågor,” Sovjet-Estland, 6 December 1940, p. 
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upplysningsabete för att befria folket från förblindande dogmer och tjänandet av prästernas penningpung. 





lessened the blow of any negative responses among the readers – readers who had largely 
based their ethnic identity to links with the Lutheran church during the independent 
Estonian period. There was certainly a large danger of alienating the target audience with 
such blatant remarks made without the benefit of previous propaganda on the topic. 
Religion on Ruhnu was again the center of attention in the 4 January issue. The 
church was depicted as having hoarded supplies away from the people, such as having 
five chamber organs while the local school went without any, indicating that teachers had 
previously not been able to teach school children to sing. Also at issue was the church’s 
possession of a sewing machine that was not available to the public to use. The behavior 
of the Ruhnu pastor was singled out and presented as absurd. In response to the 
nationalization of some of the church’s property and rooms in the parish for community 
use, Pastor Isakson was described as attempting to hoard objects from the rooms, such as 
the curtains. According to the article, items were found to have been hidden away in the 
attic. Sovjet-Estland attempted to portray him as acting superior and oppressive of others 
(qualities repeated scorned in Soviet ideology) and depriving the greater community of 
resources that the Soviets believed all were entitled to use collectively. Although religion 
was not the main topic of the article (it was an overview of socialisms arrival on Ruhnu), 
a portion of it was intended to belittle the pastor, but also religion in general.67 
Background propaganda clarifying the Soviet ideology in reference to religion 
was not to be found in Sovjet-Estland until the 13 February issue in an article entitled 
“The Origins and Evolution of the Religions.” The article attempts to link religion to 
oppression by the priests as a method of exerting a control over the people and holding 
them in darkness. Religion originated with the cavemen – people who knew little of the 
current world. The various development of religions was explored – Christianity 
developing from Judaism – with religious differences leading to wars. The church was 
commended for its cultural development of the people during the Middle Ages. However, 
society has outgrown the church. 
The Bible teachings have long since been overthrown, but one has not had 
success in overthrowing the belief in a higher power among the masses. 
One comes to a point where all discussions must end, and that point is the 
origin of life... We cannot believe all of the sagas and legends that were 
thought up during prehistoric times. They attempted to explain a number 
of things in their own way and following their ability. We know more than 
                                                 





they did and abandon their theories. Our decendents will know more than 
us and so continues the cultural curve, constantly rising.68 
By placing religion as a creation of man and then drawing in the sagas and legends, it was 
attempted to diminish the role of the church and the belief in a god. Socialists should 
place their belief in the system and in society. 
The belittling of religion, except in the cases mentioned, was infrequent and 
highly irregular in Sovjet-Estland. Their appearance certainly shined a light on the Soviet 
ideology, and would have been negatively received among a population that firmly 
believed in a higher power. 
 
In each of these areas – the land reform, agriculture, fisheries, education, and 
religion – the Soviet policy was at odds with the Estonian-Swedes. Despite their best 
intentions and attempts to convince them otherwise, the Soviets failed in their propaganda 
attempts in each of these areas. The Estonian-Swedes had strong attachments to their land 
and therefore would take sharp exceptions to any alterations. And the Swedish-language 
schools and religion had been cornerstones in the development of the Estonian-Swedish 
identity. The difficulties in starting Pioneer programs among the youth in the Estonian-
Swedish communities not only provides a sharp image of the failure of propaganda 
efforts in school, but also can be seen as a reflection of the rejection to the ideology in 
their homes. Perhaps if more propaganda material had been made available in Swedish in 
the schools, and over a longer period of time, the Soviets would have had increased 
success. Or perhaps they would have been equally unsuccessful. 
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Chapter 5: Foreign Horrors and Domestic Bliss 
The war’s annihilation work is terrible… The capitalistic world’s 
economic connection has ceased as a result of the war. There is not a 
single bourgeois country that has not been touched, directly or indirectly, 
by the war… Despite the war, which rampages all around, the Soviet 
people continue their calm, developing work. Thanks to Stalin’s sensible 
foreign policy, the socialist land’s borders have extended.1 
 
During the first Soviet occupation, two contrasting pictures were presented to the 
Estonian-Swedes through Sovjet-Estland. The first picture was tragedy and hardship 
abroad, a bleak overview of life in the capitalistic world beyond the borders of the Soviet 
Union. The second picture was of positive images and promises of life in the Soviet 
Union and under the socialistic system. Both pictures presented a similar image, however, 
with the same goal: that the Soviet system was the best option for a happy future. In 
combination, these two images can be viewed as an attempt to portray life abroad as harsh 
and uncertain, while life in Soviet Estonia is filled with promise and certainty. Both 
images arguably had the same goal. It was an effort to create an unconscious belief 
among the audience that life would be better for them by remaining in Estonia within the 
socialistic system, and dispelling emigration thoughts. Arguably, what was attempted was 
a shift in focus of the Estonian-Swedes away from Stockholm towards Moscow. 
In both of these cases, it cannot be stated that the articles were written specifically 
for the Estonian-Swedes. Articles in these areas heavily relied on the TASS and ETA new 
agencies – under tight control from the Soviets. However, the selection of articles that 
were subsequently translated can be seen in some cases as specifically chosen based on 
the audience (except for domestically, which was often similar to content in the Estonian 
newspapers). While the newspaper was slow to respond to the negative reception of the 
ideology, specific areas appear to have been addressed, particularly in the area of the 
growing thoughts of emigration. 
This chapter focuses on these two pictures – news from abroad portraying 
negative images of life and domestic news portraying positive images. The role of the 
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news agencies will be explored first, followed by the promises of the Soviet Union. News 
from abroad has been separated into news concerning Sweden and news focusing on 
other regions, because of the close historical and cultural links the Estonian-Swedes had 
with Sweden. Also described in this chapter are the promises of Soviet life and specific 
attempts by the Sovjet-Estland editorship to dissuade the Estonian Swedes from 
emigrating to Sweden. The international coverage in Sovjet-Estland presented a constant 
picture of difficulties and hardship abroad, compounded by the war, which was depicted 
as a result of capitalistic tendencies. Equally important in looking at international 
reporting is what Sovjet-Estland did not print. The pictures being painted were not 
complete, but rather was the representation the editors wished to express. The propaganda 
was carefully being crafted in all aspects. 
The war surrounding the Soviet Union was a constant throughout Sovjet-Estland. 
One can hardly explore the propaganda campaign from this period without focusing on 
the war, and how the international events were reported and used to further the Soviet 
propaganda effort. Prior to the German declaration of war on 22 June 1941, the Soviet 
Union was often described as immune to the struggles of war – both economically and on 
the warfront itself. As a result of Stalin’s foreign policy, the propaganda campaign 
exclaimed, the people of the Soviet Union lived in peace amid the chaos of the capitalistic 
war. Framed as such, the Soviet Union was then described as a savior of Estonia, by 
protecting the people from the certainty of the encroaching war. 
Quite naturally, the focus of the war coverage shifted dramatically with the 
German declaration of war. In the next two months before the German occupation of 
Estonia began (and the final two months of the newspaper), the effectiveness of the 
Sovietization was put to the test, attempting to bring together all of the previous 
propaganda campaigns to convince the people for the need to rise up and defend the 
“native land” (fosterland) from the invading fascists and in the ideology that communism 
would prevail. 
Coverage of the Second World War can be divided into two categories: war 
coverage prior to 22 June 1941 and war coverage after 22 June. Coverage of the war prior 
to the 22 June war declaration by Germany against the Soviet Union was predominately 
focused on warfare and conflict in far-off regions with the Soviet Union not involved. If 
one follows the newspaper coverage, it can be argued that the Soviet Union was pre-
occupied with peace prior to 22 June, and following the declaration of war was involved 






Soviet News Agencies 
Articles were routinely published from two Soviet news agencies – the Soviet-
wide agency TASS (Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soiza) and the Soviet-Estonian 
news agency ETA (Eesti Teadete Agentuur). These articles provided domestic and 
international news, interpretations, and analysis on a complete spectrum of topics. The 
articles were not prepared with the Estonian-Swedes in mind, but rather were part of a 
larger media organization; the news agency was intended to distribute news content 
throughout the Soviet system, sharing the same ideological goals but with a wide variety 
of audiences. The individual articles selected for publication in Sovjet-Estland would 
have been translated into Swedish from either Russian or Estonian. 
The role of TASS as the Soviet news agency needs to be considered in covering 
the topic of foreign news. The Soviet news agency cannot be compared with other 
international news agencies such as the Associate Press or Reuters. The articles were 
selected and written to fit the Soviet ideology and sometimes included news analysis. 
This occurred under tight scrutiny and censorship. Martin Ebon, in his book The Soviet 
Propaganda Machine, writes, “TASS acts as the mouthpiece of the Soviet government: It 
collects and disseminates carefully selected news items, it prepares commentaries on 
world affairs, answers statements by other governments, and publicizes a wide variety of 
accusations.”2 He states that often this was done by “emphasizing troubles in the world at 
large while glorifying Soviet achievements.”3 While negative news would be a constant 
feature of TASS foreign news coverage, only positive news would be included in Soviet 
news. News would come to the TASS offices from reporters, but also from the embassies 
around the globe.4 The resources of TASS was extensive for news gathering. 
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TASS was regularly cited for foreign and Soviet-wide articles, but typically not 
for news within the ESSR. This role was filled by ETA. Presumably, ETA would also 
submit articles to TASS for publication in other regions, fitting into the larger news 
agency network within the Soviet system. Occasionally, ETA would add content to TASS 
articles, with both news agencies being credited. The use of news agencies enabled the 
editor to select news content for the specific audience of the newspaper, while 
maintaining the same ideological perspective that was required of the highly-centralized 
system.  
In Sovjet-Estland, articles from the news agencies were primarily printed on the 
third and fourth pages – the third page was typically domestic ESSR and Soviet-wide 
content with the forth page devoted primarily to foreign news content. The far-and-wide 
reach of TASS and ETA provided expansive foreign and domestic news coverage for 
Sovjet-Estland. Readers were able to be informed of international events in a timely 
fashion which the editors of Kustbon had been restricted from doing because of economic 
concerns. This can be seen as a dramatic difference from Kustbon, which had relied on 
news gathered from other newspapers, and was fairly weak on international news content. 
The vast resources of TASS became evident following the 22 June 1941 German 
declaration of war. Through TASS, reporting from the front lines was able to be 
transmitted quickly, and although written from the Soviet perspective, gave the readers an 
idea on the progression of the war effort, although declining to give coverage of 
considerable Soviet defeats as the Germans progressed rapidly. Columnists on the 
frontlines repeatedly were translated for publication in Sovjet-Estland, particularly from 
the main Soviet newspaper Pravda.5 Although these articles did not carry a TASS byline, 
the content would certainly have come through this route. 
 
Promises of the Soviet Union 
In addition to the promises for ethnic minorities (and the Estonian-Swedes in 
particular) covered in earlier chapters, Sovjet-Estland sought to draw further comparisons, 
between life within the USSR and life in the outside world. The resulting picture, which 
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was meant to convince the Estonian-Swedes to remain in Estonia, provided a contrasting 
point of stability when compared to the world outside the Soviet system (Sweden in 
particular), which was portrayed as filled with economic difficulties and hardship. In 
contrast, life within the Soviet system was given as peaceful, stable, and filled with 
promises of success. 
The Soviet Union was depicted as being unique, in large part because it was based 
on the ideological premise (or the appearance of being based on) the abolition of 
oppression and taking control away from the bourgeois capitalists, enabling all the 
workers to live in peace. In an article relating the Bolshevik October Revolution to those 
in Estonia, a 6 November article stated, “The Soviet Union is the only land in the whole 
world that pursues a strict peace politics, where citizens may peacefully continue 
socialism’s development work, where there is no hunger or phases of war.”6 It was argued 
that the development of the rest of the world was hindered by the capitalistic tendencies, 
which inevitably brought about war. 
News from within the Soviet system demonstrated a bright future of peace and 
prosperity. Jobs were plentiful, and articles described the plans and changes for Estonia 
that would create more jobs. From the beginning of the publication of Sovjet-Estland and 
throughout its almost year-long publication, the Soviet system was praised. Of particular 
note were the economic and industrial benefits, including employment opportunities, and 
improved healthcare. Sometimes this was demonstrated through profiles of other regions 
within the Soviet Union, with the implicit meaning that those in Estonia would enjoy the 
same treatment. On other occasions, there were specific articles about what was to come 
for Estonia. 
In the first issue, on 17 October 1940, an article on the third page proclaimed the 
Soviet plans for Tallinn. Tallinn would become a large, modern city with a population 
increase from the current 160,000 to half a million within five years. The article stated, 
“Within leading Soviet circles, one is of the view that Tallinn has all the conditions to be 
a considerable port and industrial city.”7 The plan included an increase in recreational 
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areas and dramatic increases in residential and industrial neighborhoods, to transform the 
city. Likewise, Haapsalu was to become a treatment and seaside resort town for the 
working people of the Soviet Union.8 
Many articles provided a glimpse regarding the promises of the Soviet system in 
terms of access to employment. A 28 December article expressed the need for thousands 
of woodmen across Estonia, promising higher wages and improved living conditions.9 
The creation of more than 800 new villages in the Ukraine was highlighted on 28 
November. These villages included official buildings, schools, sports facilities, and 
parks.10 In addition to the new villages, access to electricity and mechanical farming 
equipment at Ukrainian kolhoses was mentioned on 6 December.11 In both of these cases, 
the benefits of collectivization can be inferred as providing access to funding from the 
government and improving farming equipment. 
According to the propaganda in Sovjet-Estland, the Soviet Union was able to 
create and guarantee full employment because it was isolated from the unstable 
capitalistic forces. For example, a 24 January 1941 article showed a factory in Krivorosje 
and spoke of the industrial progress that lay in Estonia’s future within the Soviet Union. 
According to the article, the Soviet Union led the world in diverse spectrums of industry, 
under the leadership of the party of Lenin and Stalin, making great economic and cultural 
triumphs. “The Soviet Union is a state with a planned economy and is not affected by any 
crises. Therefore, also in the Soviet Union, an economic future like that is possible, of 
which the capitalistic world cannot even dream of.”12 
Throughout the Soviet Union, the Soviet system was depicted as overly generous 
in regards to healthcare. A 31 October article points to the opening of 27 new city 
hospitals with 2350 beds and 17 new village hospitals. In addition, care for children was 
expended.13 On 21 November, an article touted plans to increase medical research, 
highlighting the Soviet successes in treating infections.14 Medical treatment in the 
Ukrainian village Ostapje was profiled in a half-page article on 19 December. The 
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isolated town boasted a dramatic decrease in the childhood mortality rate and in 
epidemics under the Soviet system. A village hospital had been established, with 
connections to medical personnel in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. “The working 
people’s hygiene stands in the center of the Communist Party’s and the Soviet 
government’s attention. Nowhere else in the outside would has medical assistance 
organized so detailed as in the Soviet Union.”15 
These successes in other areas of the Soviet Union were put into an Estonian 
context with a 6 December front-page article on cost-free medical help within the ESSR 
for all of the working people.16 On the island of Ruhnu, where healthcare had often been 
provided by Sweden, makeshift arrangements were undertaken, such as the use of a 
temporary ambulance and a clinic “established by Elisabeth Lorentz, who has therapeutic 
knowledge.”17 Specific initiatives were also announced in the 13 March issue in regards 
to the ESSR. Of vital importance was the education of maternal care, and their opposition 
to abortion and prostitution. The article also announced that 25 new doctors would 
graduate from the University of Tartu in the spring, with an additional 35 graduating in 
the fall (one can assume that these students were the product of the independent Estonian 
period, although the Soviets were claiming credit for their graduation), and that if more 
doctors were needed in Estonia, they would be made available from other areas of the 
Soviet Union.18 
Throughout the promises of the Soviet Union, the idea was to connect the readers 
of Sovjet-Estland with people across the Soviet Union, to foster friendship of various 
nationalities, and to create an encompassing identity with regions further away. The 
promises also attempted to place high hopes in the possibilities of the Soviet system – 
possibilities previously not possible for the people of Estonia. The successes in far-
reaching villages would be applied to the villages of Estonia and the Soviet experience 
was filled with prosperous possibilities. 
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Naturally, failures or difficulties were not mentioned in the newspaper, as this 
would have be contrary to the aim of the propaganda. However, Jascues Ellul states, “All 
propaganda that makes false promises turns against the propagandist.”19 Certainly, the 
Soviet occupation was hindered in its process of rapid Sovietization by the arrival of the 
Germans in the summer of 1941. Many of these promises went unfulfilled in the one-year 
of occupation. 
 
News from Abroad 
Foreign news can be seen as a compliment to the promises of the Soviet system. 
Taken together, the reader would see prosperity in the Soviet Union and instability in the 
outside world. While coverage of the war added to this picture, numerous articles focused 
on economics, housing, food shortages and rationing, and healthcare. The news from 
abroad, relegated to the last page of each issue (except after the declaration of war by 
Germany when foreign news dominated most pages), demonstrated the difficulties of the 
workers in the capitalistic world and the uncertainty of life abroad. The majority of these 
articles carried TASS and/or ETA bylines, and readily can be viewed as selected news to 
meet the socialistic ideology, while not portraying an accurate picture of life abroad. In 
order to counter this appearance, though, foreign news frequently cited or mentioned 
foreign news organizations. 
The first issue had a plethora of news briefs, mostly focused on Europe (articles 
focusing on Sweden will be covered in the following section). Articles included rationing 
in Finland,20 the demilitarization of the Åland Islands,21 food shortages in Denmark,22 
development of dictatorships in French towns,23 the opinion of an American that England 
would win in a long war against Germany,24 the Nazification of Norway,25 and rising 
unemployment in Denmark.26 There was also an article highlighting the 29th anniversary 
of the revolution against the Chinese monarchy,27 an overview of a report indicating a 14 
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percent decrease in the grain yield across Europe,28 and an article on the continuing 
expansion of the imperialistic war.29 The grain yield article was unique in that it 
mentioned the war in Europe as a factor in making the decrease increasingly more drastic, 
stating that importing grain from other regions were hampered (although not stating that 
the lower harvest was a result of the war). In most other cases of foreign news, the war 
was not indicated as a factor, particularly in declining economic conditions in capitalistic 
countries. 
Throughout the almost year-long publication of Sovjet-Estland, the foreign news 
was consistent; the capitalistic countries were facing high unemployment, workers were 
being laid off, shortages of food and supplies were constant. This non-stop negative news 
intended to highlight the differences between the communist and capitalist systems, 
without making a direct comparison. As opposed to the communist system where 
decisions were made for the workers, the capitalist countries were forcing their policies 
onto the population, without regard to the effects of the workers and with drastic 
consequences. 
The coverage of the war (prior to 22 June 1941) compounded the contrast between 
life in the peaceful Soviet Union and the war-prone capitalistic countries, suffering the 
devastating effects of the war effort. Workers were depicted in particularly harsh terms, 
with the effects of the housing shortages, high unemployment, and rationing. However, 
the economic difficulties and rationing in the capitalistic countries were not always 
explained to be a result of the war-effort. For example, it was reported that trade and 
cargo passing through Sweden had dropped considerably from 7.2 million tons in 1939 to 
2.6 million tons in 1940 pointing to a weakening Swedish economy, without also stating 
that the harbor was being blockaded as a result of the war.30 Sovjet-Estland provided 
regular updates on the war, with a heavy focus on London and Northern Africa. 
Prior to the 22 June 1941 German declaration of war, Hitler’s Germany faired 
better than other countries in the foreign news coverage. This, however, can be attributed 
to few articles focusing on Germany, except in reference to the continuing war. 
The war itself was viewed as a capitalistic affair, and a result of imperialism and 
rulers intent on ignoring the people’s will – in large part a reflection of the First World 
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War which led to the Russian Revolution. Civilians were largely impacted by the effects 
of the war. In the first issue of Sovjet-Estland, the “imperialistic war” was described as 
continually expanding, with civilian populations suffering the consequences: 
Suffering most by that [the German bombardment of London] is the 
civilian population. The supreme German commander indirectly gives 
consent to this. One calls this bomb attack a vengeful action against 
English pilots who bomb residential areas in German cities. The promise 
to spare civilian populations is, therefore, forgotten.31 
The war was dominating the capitalistic countries. The “bloody struggle” (blödiga kamp) 
was being fought for reasons of capitalism and imperialism, with the leader’s ignorning 
the plight of the people.32 
According to a 9 January 1941 article, “The capitalistic world’s economic 
connections have been broken by the war. There is not a single bourgeois country that has 
not been touched, directly or indirectly, by the war.”33 War as interpreted by the Soviet 
Union was not a possibility in the socialistic society. The capitalistic countries were 
demonstrated to be unable to cope with the economic and political consequences of a war, 
and yet were still willing to push ahead in the fighting. 
Skepticism to the articles in Sovjet-Estland can be seen to be high; Per Wieselgren 
called the newspaper “a profitable, pleasurable joke” (ett profitabelt skämtnöje) and 
“naïve Bolshevik propaganda” ( naiv bolsjevikpropaganda). He wrote, “The newspaper 
was read by everyone as a jest newspaper, but the humorless communists didn’t 
understand that and were properly pleased with the editorial efforts.”34 The Estonian-
Swedes can perhaps be seen as more skeptical of the news content, particularly 
considering the high level of emigration sentiments among the population. In an attempt 
to give the articles credibility and legitimacy, foreign newspapers were frequently cited. 
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intressen hotar att utvidga sig allt mera. 
33 “De kapitalistiska länderna år 1941,” Sovjet-Estland, 9 January 1941, p. 4. Translated from Swedish: Den 
kapitalistiska världens ekonomiska förbindelser ha genom kriget avbrutits. Det finns intet borgerligt land, 
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34 Per Wieselgren, Frå n Hammaren till Hakkorset, Estland 1939-1941 (Stockholm: Idé och Form Förlag: 
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The most common newspapers cited were from Sweden and Finland, along with British 
and American newspapers. 
Swedish newspapers demonstrate the wide spectrum of ideology represented, 
typically not relying on foreign communist newspapers. The newspapers include: Dagens 
Nyheter,35 Svenska Dagbladet,36 Göteborgs Handels Tidning,37 Aftonbladet,38 
Finanstidningen,39 Nya Dagligt Allehandas,40 Göteborgs Posten,41 Socialdemokraten,42 
Stockholms Tidningen,43 Jönköping Vulkan,44 Örebro Kuriren,45 Västerbottens-Kuriren,46 
Västmanlands Läns Tidning,47 Ny Dag,48 Arbetaren,49 and Arbetar-Tidningen.50 Finnish 
newspapers included: Helsingin Sanomat,51 Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti,52 Uusi Suomi,53 
Åbo Underrättelser,54 Pohjolan Sanomat,55 and Arbetarbladet.56 
Of all the newspapers cited, the most common was the American New York 
Times.57 Other American newspapers were the Christian Science Monitor,58 New York 
Herald Tribune,59 and the Washington Post.60 The following newspaper were cited from 
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36 Sovjet-Estland, 31 October 1940, p. 4; 4 June 1941, p. 4; 11 June 1941, p. 4; 18 June 1941, p. 4; 30 July 
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50 Sovjet-Estland, 15 May 1941, p. 4. 
51 Sovjet-Estland, 25 June 1941, p. 4. 
52 Sovjet-Estland, 6 November 1940, p. 4; 21 November 1940, p. 4; 6 February 1941, p. 4; 25 June 1941, p. 
4. 
53 Sovjet-Estland, 16 January 1941, p. 4. 
54 Sovjet-Estland, 30 July 1941, p. 4. 
55 Sovjet-Estland, 25 June 1941, p. 4. 
56 Sovjet-Estland, 13 March 1941, p. 4; 25 June 1941, p. 4. 
57 Sovjet-Estland, 28 November 1940, p. 3; 19 December 1940, p. 4; 6 February 1941, p. 4; 13 March 1941, 
p. 4; 27 March 1941, p. 4; 29 April 1941, p. 4; 8 May 1941, p. 4; 15 May 1941, p. 4; 22 May 1941, p. 4; 4 
June 1941, p. 4; 2 July 1941, p. 4; 23 July 1941, p. 4. 
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Great Britain: Daily Mail,61 Sunday Times,62 Times,63 Daily Telegraph and Morning 
Post,64 News Chronicle,65 Daily Express,66 Sunday Express,67 and Flit.68 
Germany newspaper included: Dienst aus Deutschland,69 Deutsche Bergwerks-
Zeitung,70 Kölnische Zeitungs,71 Frankfurter Zeitung,72 Bayrische Ostmark,73 and 
Bromberger Rundschau.74 Newspapers from other Western European countries include: 
from Austria, Süd-Ost Echo;75 from Belgium, Ulenspiegel;76 from Denmark, 
Federlandet;77 from France, Le Matin,78 Depeche,79 Temps,80 Au Travail,81 Journal,82 
Jour-Echo de Paris,83 and Petot Parisien;84 from Greece, Ethnos85 and Vradyni;86 from 
Italy, Giornale d’Italia,87 Popolo d’Italia,88 Corriere della Sera,89 and Messaggero;90 
from Spain, Arriba91 and Mundro Obrero;92 and from Switzerland, Journal de Genève,93 
Gazette de Lausanne,94 Volksrecht,95 Basler Nachrichten,96 National Zeitung,97 Neue 
Züricher Zeitung,98 and Suisse.99 
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90 Sovjet-Estland, 6 August 1941, p. 4. 
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Eastern European newspaper cited included: from Bulgaria, Völkischer 
Beobachter;100 from Hungary, Pesti Hislap,101 Pest,102 and Budapest Ertesite;103 from 
Rumania, Buna Vestire,104 Curentul,105 and Universul;106 from Turkey, Vatan,107 Son 
Telegraf,108 and Tan;109 and from Yugoslavia, Vreme.110 Four Russia newspaper were also 
cited: Trud,111 Krasnyl Flot,112 Vetsjernjaja Moskva,113 and Krasnaja Zvezda.114 
Newspapers from more far-off locations were also cited. They include: from Chile, La 
Hora;115 from India, Bombay Chronicle116 and Tribune;117 and from Asia, Ogoneki,118 
Hotji,119 Kokumin,120 and Mijako.121 
In addition to the TASS and ETA news agencies which regularly ran articles in 
Sovjet-Estland, three international new agencies were regularly cited in foreign news 
articles: Associated Press,122 Reuters,123 and United Press.124 A fourth agency, Overseas 
News, was cited in the final edition.125 
                                                 
96 Sovjet-Estland, 27 February 1941, p. 4. 
97 Sovjet-Estland, 8 May 1941, p. 4. 
98 Sovjet-Estland, 8 May 1941, p. 4. 
99 Sovjet-Estland, 22 May 1941, p. 4. 
100 Sovjet-Estland, 30 January 1941, p. 4. 
101 Sovjet-Estland, 12 December 1940, p. 4. 
102 Sovjet-Estland, 28 December 1940, p. 4. 
103 Sovjet-Estland, 3 April 1941, p. 4 
104 Sovjet-Estland, 28 November 1940, p. 4. 
105 Sovjet-Estland, 12 December 1940, p. 4. 
106 Sovjet-Estland, 2 July 1941, p. 4. 
107 Sovjet-Estland, 6 August 1941, p. 4. 
108 Sovjet-Estland, 6 August 1941, p. 4. 
109 Sovjet-Estland, 6 August 1941, p. 4. 
110 Sovjet-Estland, 28 November 1940, p. 4; 6 March 1941, p. 4. 
111 Sovjet-Estland, 24 October 1940, p. 4. 
112 Sovjet-Estland, 24 January 1941, p. 4. 
113 Sovjet-Estland, 27 February 1941, p. 4; 20 March 1941, p. 4. 
114 Sovjet-Estland, 6 March 1941, p. 4; 13 March 1941, p. 4; 20 March 1941, p. 4; 3 April 1941, p. 4; 10 
April 1941, p. 4; 22 May 1941, p. 4; 2 May 1941, p. 4. 
115 Sovjet-Estland, 27 February 1941, p. 4. 
116 Sovjet-Estland, 20 February 1941, p. 4; 11 June 1941, p. 4. 
117 Sovjet-Estland, 11 June 1941, p. 4. 
118 Sovjet-Estland, 13 February 1941, p. 4; 25 June 1941, p. 4. 
119 Sovjet-Estland, 20 February 1941, p. 4; 25 June 1941, p. 4. 
120 Sovjet-Estland, 20 February 1941, p. 4. 
121 Sovjet-Estland, 20 February 1941, p. 4. 
122 Sovjet-Estland, 6 November 1940, p. 4; 14 November 1940, p. 4; 12 December 1940, p. 4; 28 December 
1940, p. 4; 4 January 1941, p. 4; 16 January 1941, p. 4; 30 January 1941, p. 4; 27 February 1941, p. 4; 27 
March 1941, p. 4; 17 April 1941, p. 4; 24 April 1941, p. 4; 8 May 1941, p. 4; 11 June 1941, p. 4. 
123 Sovjet-Estland, 21 November 1940, p. 4; 12 December 1940, p. 4; 19 December 1940, p. 4; 28 
December 1940, p. 4; 4 January 1941, p. 4; 30 January 1941, p. 4; 6 March 1941, p. 4; 3 April 1941, p. 4; 
17 April 1941, p. 4; 24 April 1941, p. 4; 8 May 1941, p. 4; 28 May 1941, p. 4; 4 June 1941, p. 4; 18 June 





Every issue of the newspaper carried at least one foreign newspaper or news 
organization citation, with numerous issues containing a wide variety of sources. The use 
of sources from such a wide variety of areas and ideological backgrounds emphasized the 
enormous resources available to the newspaper’s staff. It emphasized that Sovjet-Estland 
was connected to the outside world in way Kustbon never had been able to be. By citing 
foreign sources, particularly of a different ideological background, the news included 
would gain the appearance of credibility as being an accurate depiction, whether or not 
this was the case. 
 
View of Sweden in Sovjet-Estland 
Particular attention was given to Sweden in Sovjet-Estland. It is enlightening to 
separate coverage of Sweden from other foreign news because of the ethnicity of the 
audience, the strong ties that had existed between the Estonian-Swedes and Sweden, and 
because of the high emigration thoughts among the Estonian-Swedes. With contact 
severely restricted between the Estonian-Swedes and Sweden during the Soviet presence, 
the coverage in Sovjet-Estland can be viewed as an attempt by the Bolsheviks to shift the 
focus of the ethnic Swedes away from Sweden and towards Moscow. 
News of Sweden in Sovjet-Estland certainly came from TASS and was regularly 
cited in the byline. The tone of the articles from Sweden was demonstrated already in the 
first issue, with three news briefs focusing on the new view of the audience’s ancestral 
homeland. The articles focused on the increased spending by the Swedish government for 
the War Department,126 the rationing of bread,127 and the increasing economic difficulties 
of Swedish farmers.128 These articles served to emphasize three areas: the high cost of 
war (which according to the propaganda, was a capitalistic tendency that the Soviet Union 
was immune to), shortages in supplies and food, and the difficulties of workers (in this 
case, farmers). While none of the articles attempted to draw conclusions or comparisons, 
when combined with the news articles found in the rest of the newspaper, it would be 
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difficult to not draw a distinction between the promises of the Soviet Union and the 
difficulties of life abroad. 
In the following weeks, reports included price increases in Stockholm,129 
uncertainty among Swedish workers over job security,130 the closing of factories,131 and 
housing shortages.132 The negative news from Sweden was constant, encompassing all 
aspects of life, and all areas in which Sovjet-Estland was demonstrating as positive 
features of the Soviet system. Foods were being rationed and herds were dying of 
starvation; healthcare was uncertain. Foreign trade was declining, however the articles did 
not attribute the decline to the effects of the war. 
Sweden was a clear concern for the Soviets in terms of the Estonian-Swedes. In 
order to be successful at convincing them of Soviet ideology, the strong connections 
between the Estonian-Swedes and Sweden had to not only be severed, but the image of 
Sweden distorted into a country of uncertainty and failure. The positive attributes of 
Soviet society had to be contrasted with the negative aspects of Swedish society. Direct 
comparisons in Sovjet-Estland were rare, though. Instead, an indirect method was 
employed – juxtaposing the positive attributes and promises of Soviet life found in the 
first three pages (typically) with the negative news about Sweden on the last page. 
Promises of jobs versus rising strikes and unemployment. The abundance of crops versus 
rations and rising prices. This was a steady campaign throughout Sovjet-Estland. While 
other countries were also regularly mentioned, the dominance was focused on Sweden. 
The image of Sweden being a land in crisis was overly prevalent; there were crises 
in the economy, with a lack of food or jobs, and there appeared to be no end in sight. It 
was also described as being a land in political crisis; supposed reformers were depicted as 
being ignored, so that the capitalistic elite could continue to exploit the workers. A June 
article stated: 
The crisis within Sweden’s inner life moves towards a catastrophic 
decrease in exports, industry, and their working people’s prosperity. This 
goes still deeper. Every sort of reformer and opportunist is losing their 
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influence, and the belief in a high-placed theory of “the co-development of 
socialism and capitalism” fades even more.133 
To face the threat of war and maintain a neutrality stance all of the political parties had 
joined in a coalition, excluding the communist party.134 Naturally, the Soviet propaganda 
did not depict the government as unified and the communists as isolated. 
Coverage of news from Sweden can best be described as selective, highlighting 
negative aspects. While this coverage was similar to the news from other western 
capitalistic countries, the news from Sweden in Sovjet-Estland served an additional 
purpose above the distinction drawn on an ideological basis (the capitalist system was 
bad, the communist system was good). With a high frequency of open dissent among the 
Estonian-Swedes and the expressed desire for them to emigrate to Sweden, the coverage 
of Sweden should also be viewed as an attempt to dissuade the emigration thoughts with 
an underlying sentiment that life in Sweden would be uncertain and worse than life in 
Estonia. Combined with the domestic-Soviet news that described the Soviet Union as 
prosperous and with promises of future benefits, it can be argued that Sovjet-Estland 
attempted to shift the focus of the Estonian-Swedes from Stockholm (and their role as 
ethnic Swedes abroad) to Moscow (and their role as an equal ethnicity in the Soviet 
system, as described in Chapter 2). 
Across the board, the view portrayed in Estonia of Sweden was bleak. High 
unemployment; poor working conditions; rationing of food – Sweden was a land of 
uncertainty and hopelessness. This was meant to contrast with the bright and stable future 
the Soviets were providing and promising for the inhabitants of Estonia and covered 
extensively in the other pages of Sovjet-Estland, and was a subtle method of convincing 
the Estonian-Swedes to remain. This type of news was similar to how other Western 
countries were depicted. 
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Coverage of Sweden, however, deserves special attention when looking at Sovjet-
Estland. News from Sweden was regularly covered, as opposed to the relatively 
infrequence of coverage of Estonia in Ny Dag. The focus on Sweden in foreign coverage 
in Sovjet-Estland can be explained by the close connection between the Estonian-Swedish 
national identity and Sweden. In attempting to create and redefine the ethnic Swedish 
national identity along socialistic lines, the Soviets were attempting to shift the focus 
from Stockholm to Moscow. 
In contrast to Ny Dag’s purpose and intent, Sovjet-Estland’s reporting of Sweden 
was intended, in large part, as a deterrent to emigration – in combination with local 
reporting extolling the benefits and promises of the Soviet system. There was little 
mention of news from Sweden in the Estonian-language newspapers, although in Sovjet-
Estland, negative news from Sweden can be found in the majority of issues. 
The majority of the articles about Sweden were brief, summarizing the main 
effects – with figures, if available – without offering a cause, or how the country was 
attempting to improve the situation. Only negative news was reported, so if segments of 
the economy were not in a decline, but rather improving, this would not have been 
reported in Sovjet-Estland. 
One can not classify the articles as incorrect or falsehood. In large part as a result 
of the war, Sweden did suffer from economic difficulties, leading to the rationing of 
goods. However, the war was never portrayed in these news briefs; the articles were 
intended to stand on their own without the full explanation. 
There is also evidence in Sovjet-Estland of a segment of society that accepted the 
Soviet propaganda, and wished to increase interactions. This segment of the ethnic 
Swedes, however, lived in Sweden and sent their greetings, with some longing for similar 
communistic progress to occur in Sweden. The number of copies that were regularly sent 
to Sweden has not been able to be determined, however, the presence in Sweden of 
Sovjet-Estland can be seen as an early stage in Terry Martin’s “Piedmont Principle,” in 
which a later goal would be an extension of the Soviet domestic policy towards a foreign 
policy.135 On several occasions, Sovjet-Estland printed letters from Sweden. 
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The Swedish response to Sovjet-Estland took on a personal approach early on. In 
the 21 November issue, the following announcement was printed: 
Young communist in Sweden wishes to exchange letters with a Swedish-
speaking young communist in Soviet Estonia. (A girl around the age of 17 
would be desirable.) The letter should be sent to the address: Ingvar 
Augustsson, Wallenbergsgatan 1-a, Gothenburg, Sweden.136 
To what effect this letter had on the reader cannot be determined (whether anyone 
responded also cannot be stated). According to a note from the editor in the 6 December 
issue, the newspaper was receiving greetings and subscriptions from Sweden on an 
almost daily basis. The editor was quite humble in his statement: “It pleases all the 
Estonian-Swedes who gather around Sovjet-Estland a lot, and naturally the editorial staff, 
that one entertains such a large interest in our little Swedish-language newspaper in the 
ESSR.”137 The editor extended his appreciation for the subscriptions and the greetings, as 
well as passed along “comrade greetings and heartfelt thanks” (“kamratliga hälsning och 
hjärtliga tack”) to the Publishing House of Working Culture (Förlaget Arbetarkultur) and 
the newspaper Ny Dag for their work in Sweden. 
 
The Beginning of the End: The War Against Germany 
The structure and tone of Sovjet-Estland changed dramatically with the 25 June 
1941 issue. The German declaration of war on 22 June meant an end to the image of the 
Soviet Union being a land of peace and meant direct involvement in the war that had 
previously been portrayed as being restricted to the capitalistic countries. The newspaper 
had to shift from its propaganda campaign of strengthening the communistic culture 
among the Estonian-Swedes to a propaganda campaign to mobilize the population against 
the German war effort. 
Jeffrey Brooks and David Brandenberger point to difficulties in Soviet 
propaganda to adequately deal with the sudden onslaught of war, frequently relying on 
the localized efforts rather than the central control which had existed previously. 
Brandenberger writes: 
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…the pages of the central press during the first days and weeks of the war 
reveal a cacophony of contradictory rallying calls that were only gradually 
arranged into a more effective propaganda campaign… In the absense of 
fresh instructions, state publishing – loath as ever to innovate – merely 
combined the existing line with snippets of new wartime speeches while 
waiting for initiative from above.138 
This can certainly be seen in Sovjet-Estland, which seemed to be inadequately prepared to 
shape the propaganda for the appropriate audience. Largely lacking were specific articles 
aimed at the Swedish minority. Instead, articles and speeches were translated, although 
from a much greater variety of sources than previously. This follows the trend noticed by 
Brooks, who writes: 
An assortment of narrators with differing viewpoints – poets, writers, 
literary correspondents, local reporters, regular journalists, officials, and 
Stalin himself – began to use the press in different ways to advance one 
objective: victory over the invaders.139 
Even in Sovjet-Estland, a more diverse collection of sources was used, featuring Soviet 
columnists reporting from the frontlines. 
While the arrival of the war demonstrated the vast resources of the Soviet press in 
having access to these different narrators, in the case of Sovjet-Estland, it also exposed 
considerable weaknesses. The impact of the war necessitated a speedy turnover time in 
production and preparation of content. Less time was given to translate at the same time 
as the number of articles available for translation increased. Less time was also given to 
proof content and noticeable goofs appeared. There was a return to the poor spelling of 
the early weeks of the newspaper, particularly of the use of “fösterländska”140 instead of 
“fosterländska” meaning “native country” and the frequent misspelling of “Röda armén” 
(Red army) as “Röda armen” (Red arm).141 Although previously diligent in producing a 
newspaper each week (although at times changing the day of publication), a week was 
missed in mid-July between the 9 July and 23 July issues. This was preceeded by a two-
page issue – the shortest issue of the entire pressrun. Also demonstrating their being 
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pressed for time, page 2 through 4 (all except the front page) in the 6 August issue were 
incorrectly numbered, listing the newspaper as issue number 24 instead of 31. 
The German declaration of war fit into the Soviet interpretation that the war was a 
capitalistic affair, according to the propaganda; Germany brought the war to the Soviet 
Union despite the Soviet tendency for peace. The people were obliged to rise up and 
protect the peace-seeking society from the capitalistic greed. This is not to say, however, 
that war was a complete surprise. Sovjet-Estland held regular updates of the war in 
Western Europe, which appeared to favor France and Britain throughout its pressrun 
despite the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact linking German and the Soviet Union. 
Once the Germans attacked, the view of Germany in press coverage was 
completely altered. Whereas Sovjet-Estland had previously avoided articles on German 
life such as the frequent articles concerning other Western countries, with the 25 June 
issue, Germany became the major aim of its negative attack campaign. Certainly criticism 
of other countries did not cease, although the news from other areas was largely limited, 
being pushed aside for the more pressing matters of wartime propaganda. 
The war also brought a sudden prominence to the Red Army in the propaganda. 
Whereas rarely pictured or mentioned in earlier issues, following 22 June, photographs 
off the military appeared in each issue (except the 2-page issue which had a portrait of 
Stalin on the cover) – “Brave Soviet pilots,”142 a woman signing up to be a nurse on the 
frontlines and a group of men at a mobilization point,143 submarines,144 and soldiers.145 
Also appearing was a soldier who bravely captured an enemy tank146 and the ruins of a 
“fascist plane” that was shot down.147 Articles were written on topics of heroism and 
bravery on the frontlines.148 
As each of the Soviet leaders gave a speech, the text was translated and published 
in Sovjet-Estland for the Estonian-Swedes. They included radio addresses by: V.M. 
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146 Sovjet-Estland, 13 August 1941, p. 1. 
147 Sovjet-Estland, 13 August 1941, p. 2. 
148 See, for example: “Rödarmisternas hjältemod,” Sovjet-Estland, 2 July 1941, p. 3. J. Tsvetoff, “Manlighet 
och tapperhet,” Sovjet-Estland, 9 July 1941, p. 2. N. Virta, “Sovjetläkarnas tapperhet,” Sovjet-Estland, 6 





Molotov’s 22 June address,149 Stalin’s 3 July address,150 K. Säre’s 5 July address to 
Estonians,151 and J. Laurstin’s 16 July address.152 From the date they were delivered, the 
staff had from three to seven days to translate before the articles were published. 
However, while the official speeches were translated and articles from the 
frontlines pervaded, minimal focus was given to preparing propaganda articles 
specifically for the Estonian-Swedes. In one case, an article under the headline “The 
Estonian-Swedish farmers’ duty in the fight against fascism,” the only reference made to 
the Estonian-Swedes is in the final sentence: “We must show that the Estonian-Swedes 
battle fascism honorably.”153 Sovjet-Estland attempted to link historical oppression to the 
Baltic Germans with the need to rise up against fascism.154 This involved a shift in focus 
away from the repeated assertions in earlier issues that placed the larger focus on 
oppression during the Interwar period, when it was oppression by bourgeois Estonians. 
Historically, the Baltic Germans and the Estonian-Swedes regularly cooperated with each 
other during the independent Estonian period. This contradiction was never addressed, 
although the revised message sought to portray the benefits and protections afforded to 
minorities in the Soviet Union. In the seven final issues beginning with the German 
declaration of war, there were only five articles concerning the Estonian-Swedes and the 
war.155 
 
In presenting foreign and domestic news, the Soviet propaganda was attempting to 
demonstrate the ideal life as being within the Soviet structure. These dual pictures of 
horror abroad and tranquility at home were an effort to emphasize the fluctuation of the 
capitalistic world to the detriment of the working people and to promote the progress and 
                                                 
149 “Viceordföranden I USSR-s Folkkommissarieråd och utrikesfolkkommissarien V.M. Molotovs radiotal 
den 22 juni,” Sovjet-Estland, 25 June 1941, p. 1. 
150 “Ordföranden I Statlig Försvarskommitten J.V. Stalins radiotal den 3 juli 1941,” Sovjet-Estland, 9 July 
1941, p. 1. 
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July 1941, p. 2. 
152 “Vice ordförande I ESSR-s Statliga Försvarskommitté kamrat J. Lauristins radiotal den 16 juli 1941,” 
Sovjet-Estland, 23 July 1941, p. 1. 
153 “Den estlandssvenska bondebefolkningens uppgift i kampen mot fascismen,” Sovjet-Estland, 30 July 
1941, p. 1. Translated from Swedish: Vi måste visa, att estlandssvenskarna med heder utgå ur kampen mot 
fascismen. 
154 “Estlandssvenskar, för en gemensam kamp mot fienden tillsammans med de övriga sovjetfolken!” 





potential available with socialism. This was accomplished in large part through the 
extensive news gathering and distribution mechanisms, namely the TASS news agency 
for the Soviet Union and the ETA news agency for Soviet Estonia. For the Estonian-
Swedes, propaganda also involved encouraging a break away from their Sweden-focused 
mentality towards a Moscow-focused outlook. Extra coverage of hardships in Sweden 
were meant to sour thoughts of a potential emigration movement by presenting a life of 
uncertainty abroad. 
However, the 22 June 1941 German declaration of war brought a dramatic change 
to Sovjet-Estland. Images of the Soviet Union as a land of peace and stability had altered 
in an effort to mobilize mass support in the war effort. The arrival of the war was the 
ultimate test of the previous propaganda efforts: if the population had successfully 
accepted the Soviet ideology, they could be mobilized to rise up against the fascist threat 
in order to protect the homeland. This was not the case for the Estonian-Swedes, though, 
and with the arrival of the war, efforts to focus attention on the minority were greatly 
diminished. If the population had not been convinced earlier, after 22 June it was too late. 
                                                 
155 In addition to those already mentioned, see: “Estlandssvenskarna enhälligt vid mobilisationspunkterna,” 
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Chapter 6: Truth and Consequences 
The self-critique and the party’s inner democracy are themselves 
inseparable. Only the party’s inner democracy gives the Bolsheviks the 
self-critique the possibility to develop. Self-criticism is a worthwhile 
method for the education of party members. It is not unknown for a 
Bolshevik, says comrade Stalin, that the self-critique’s order is grounded 
for our party’s action, as a means for the strengthening of the proletariats’ 
dictatorship and the soul of the method for the cadres’ Bolshevistic 
upbringing.1 
 
Despite the best intentions of Sovjet-Estland, sentiments among the Estonian-
Swedes remained largely resistant to the Soviet ideology. Repeated attempts were made 
in various areas – whether in promoting the Estonian-Swedish culture, highlighting the 
elections, drawing distinctions between domestic life and foreign life – but the new 
ideology was rejected. Policies were rejected and criticism was high. Certainly one would 
expect Sovjet-Estland, as the primary organ of propaganda aimed at the Estonian-Swedes, 
to attempt to shape the arguments to best appeal to the audience. This appears to have 
occurred only minimally, though. Sovjet-Estland was not a representation of the Estonian-
Swedes any more than it was an accurate and complete picture of life in 1940-1941 
Estonia. It was propaganda. 
Sovjet-Estland was under the direct control of the Bolsheviks. However, the 
perfect picture of life in Soviet Estonia was not always presented in the newspaper. 
Although infrequent, there are examples of criticism and doubt to be found in the pages. 
While the intent and whether these apparent slips were missed by the censors cannot be 
determined, they can perhaps be used as evidence that the newspaper was not as closely 
looked over as it should have been – perhaps as a result of a limited number of 
individuals at the upper levels of the party with a knowledge of Swedish. The content of 
Sovjet-Estland was not completely consistent and did feature some examples of dissent 
among the population. 
                                                 
1 “Bolsjevistisk självkritik,” Sovjet-Estland, 4 June 1941, p. 3. Translated from Swedish: Självkritiken och 
partiets inre demokrati äro sinsemellan oskiljaktiga. Endast partiets inre demokrati ger den bolsjevistiska 
självkritiken möjlighet att utveckla sig. Självkritik är en givande metod vid uppfostran av partimedlemar. 
Det är icke obekant för en bolsjevik, säger kamrat Stalin, att självkritikens lösen är grunden för vårt partis 






Appeals were made for more cooperation in the newspaper by the locals, and in 
some cases, these appeals were answered.2 Participation from the community in the 
production, though, appears to have been minimal throughout the newspaper. Sovjet-
Estland remained a newspaper created by the Bolsheviks with limited interaction from the 
target audience. 
One of the overarching themes in Sovjet-Estland was to convince the ethnic 
Swedish population to remain in Estonia, to put aside thoughts of emigration and join the 
socialistic community completely. With the first issue arriving on the very day that the 
first group of Estonian-Swedes were arriving legally on the shores of Sweden,3 
emigration was a key concern; if one group had received permission, why couldn’t 
others? Sovjet-Estland had to deal with this, although as an organ of propaganda was 
restricted in its method, not willing to admit that a portion of the population was not 
joyously welcoming the arrival of the Soviets. To admit this would have been a far 
greater travesty for the propaganda campaign, because it would have given credence to 
the emigration thoughts. 
In the final months of the first Soviet occupation, the Bolsheviks moved towards 
increasing terror. As was the case with all ethnic groups, the Estonian-Swedes were hard 
hit by deportations and forced mobilizations. And similar to propaganda aimed at the 
ethnic Estonians, there was no mention of either the deportations or forced mobilizations 
in the newspaper. 
Considering the difficulties the Estonian-Swedes faced, not only in the Soviet 
occupation but also in the increased Estonianization policies of the previous government, 
it is hardly surprising that when the opportunity presented itself, a vast majority of the 
population emigrated to Sweden. The arrival of the Germans not only raised hopes of an 
independent Estonia, it also raised the hopes and possibilities of emigration. 
 
                                                 
2 A small ad appeared in the 13 February issue of Sovjet-Estland (page 2) inviting readers to send notices 
from their hometowns into the editorial offices. 
3 The Pakrite island Swedes were not the first group of ethnic Swedes to receive legal permission to 
emigrate from the Soviet Union. There was a group of approximately 900 ethnic Swedes from the village of 
Gammalsvenskby (Old Swedish Village) in the Zmejovka district of the Ukraine that received permission to 
emigrate to Sweden in 1929. Approximately 70 of this group later emigrated further to Canada, while 243 
returned to the Ukraine by 1931. The remaining émigrés were placed throughout Sweden with the largest 
concentration on the island of Gotland. See: Jörgen Hedman and Lars Åhlander, Historien om 





Dissatisfaction and Emigration Thoughts 
Emigration thoughts among the Estonian-Swedes were a major concern for the 
Bolsheviks. The topic was frequently discussed in the Läänemaa communist party 
meetings.4 The topic of emigration thoughts was rarely openly discussed in Sovjet-
Estland, although the sentiments could be found throughout the community. Instead, it 
was intended for the reader to make a connection between the promises of the Soviet 
Union and the horrors of life abroad with the idea that they should remain in Estonia. 
However, there were a few instances when the topic was explicitly raised. 
The October 1940 departure of the 110 Pakrite islanders for Sweden (with the 
approval of the Soviet Union) was not initially mentioned.5 A reference was made of 
them in the 18 June issue with a reprint of an article originally published in the Swedish 
newspaper Arbetarfolket. The article depicted some of the hardships the recent émigrés 
faced, in particular the tale of a 76 year-old former fisherman who on Pakrite had two 
motorboats and a rowboat and now only has an old rowboat which leaks. Hardships were, 
according to the article, leading to homesickness for the Pakrite islands and a longing to 
be in Soviet Estonia where there is a goal, a future.6 However, the Swedish newspaper 
that originally published the article was a communist newspaper, and the thoughts of 
returning to Soviet Estonia held by a few were distorted by the article’s author. It can be 
argued that by not mentioning the departure of the Pakrite islanders earlier and not 
attempting to incorporate it into the larger ideology and propaganda, the door appeared to 
remain open for future legal emigration for the Estonian-Swedes, perhaps irreparably 
hampering the entire propaganda and agitation campaign. 
Throughout the 43-issues of Sovjet-Estland attempts were consistently made to 
convince the Estonian-Swedes that life was better in Estonia and to convert them to the 
Soviet-ideology. Sovjet-Estland attempted to isolate emigration thoughts as those of a 
minority. This was rarely this done in an overt manner. 
When I bicycle back towards Riguldi colony I think: Home? Though the 
old woman was Swedish, she didn’t want to leave Estonia, her home. It is 
not easy to leave the native country, to leave the soil that your forefathers 
                                                 
4 See, for example: ERAF [Eesti Riigiarhiivi Filiaal] 1-1-6, EK(b)P Läänemaa Komitee koosolekute ja 
maakond parteiaktiivi nõupidamise protokollid (ärakirjad). See also: ERAF 1-1-48, EK(b)P Läänemaa 
Komitee Informatsioonid. 
5 The date of their arrival in Stockholm ironically coincided with the appearance of Sovjet-Estland – 17 
October 1940. 





have cultivated. The soil is barren and stony and still one loves it. It is the 
soil of the native country. It is impossible to replant an old tree – then it 
languishes away. Those that propagate moving away to “the old native 
country” should remember that.7 
The author attempted to develop a closer relationship with the audience by writing in the 
first-person. This was a technique occasionally employed by the newspaper. While the 
author was rarely identified, these articles can be seen as a direct appeal, gaining 
credibility. The articles also routinely involved a conversation between the author and 
unidentified locals within the Estonian-Swedish areas. 
As with the foreign affairs articles that cited foreign newspapers to gain credibility 
(mentioned in Chapter 5), direct appeals were also used through the use of personal, first-
person articles – reminiscent of articles by columnists in Kustbon which recounted certain 
adventures, observations, or daily interactions with local people. Interestingly, the author 
(or authors) of these articles was never indicated, though. This would have been more 
effective in gaining additional credibility. These first-person articles recount interactions 
with locals – Estonian-Swedes who were also not identified – that demonstrated support 
for the Soviets among the population. These articles were a reinforcement of the other 
articles in the newspaper, meant to shed a more personal light on the society and to 
further isolate those with dissenting views. 
The thoughts of emigration persisted and grew throughout the Soviet period. Per 
Wieselgren writes in his memories of the period that the sentiments grew following the 
forced evacuation of the island regions, and the military take-over of the Birkas school 
(although this was later returned and opened in October 1940). Those that were displaced 
lived “in deplorable conditions and could not obtain any settlements or any proper 
profitable gainful employment.”8 These thoughts spread from the displaced to incorporate 
the vast majority of Estonian-Swedes. Oskar Cher, the Läänemaa communist party 
secretary, prepared information on 8 October 1940 indicating that 10 of the 
                                                 
7 “Stämningsbilder från Lännemaas kustbyar i Rikull,” Sovjet-Estland, 17 October 1940, p. 2. Translated 
from Swedish: När jag cyklar tillbaka mot Rikull nybygge tänker jag: Hem? Fast gumman var svenska, 
ville hon icke lämna Estland, sitt hem. Det är icke lätt att lämna fosterlandet, att lämna jorden som dina 
förfäder ha odlat. Jorden är ofruktbär och stenig och äntå älskar man den. Det är fosterlandets jord. Det är 
omöjligt att omplantera ett gammalt träd – då tvinar det bort. De som propagera omflyttandet till “det gamla 
fosterlandet” borde komma ihåg detta. 
8 Per Wieselgren, Frå n hammaren till hakkorset, Estland 1939-1941 (Stockholm: Idé och Form Förlag, 
1942), 152. Translated from Swedish: …under de bedrövligaste villkor och kunde icke erhålla några nya 





approximately 20 families that had been displaced from Osmussaar and sent to Vormsi 
were demanding new farms, or they would depart for Sweden.9 
L. Malmre prepared a letter concerning the situation on Vormsi on 6 Decemeber. 
The recipients included comrades Säre, Ruus, and Lauristin. In the letter, he indicated that 
the Estonian-Swedes were signing lists indicating their desire to emigrate – 90 percent of 
those in Borrby and 100 percent of those in Diby and Norrby had signed. He listed four 
reasons for their emigration thoughts: 
1. There is no certainty about the possibility for survival in the future. 
2. The taxes are unbearable if it will be per hectare. 
3. They have heard from Russian soldiers, that Vormsi will be evacuated 
for the establishment of military bases. 
4. Without fishing, the owners of the smaller farms have no possibilities 
to earn a living.10 
 
Malmre does mention some hesitation, though. His letter concluded by stating, “It 
commonly demonstrates that light-heartedly they would not leave.”11 However, it was 
later noted on 20 February 1941 that, in the opinion of Läänemaa committee, thoughts of 
emigration were not based on economic considerations, but rather a question of 
nationality. In addition, it was mentioned that all of the school teachers in Riguldi were 
advocating emigration.12 
Agitators were frequenting the Estonian-Swedish areas; it was mentioned on 12 
February that 29 agitators had been working in Riguldi alone. Their work noted that some 
individuals did not want to leave their farmland, but indicated that if the children left, 
there would be no reason for them to remain.13 
 
Support and Criticism 
Given the high amount of dissent among the Estonian-Swedes, one would have to 
assume that the audience accepting the Soviet ideology in Sovjet-Estland would be 
                                                 
9 ERAF 1-1-48, EK(b)P Läänemaa Komitee Informatsioonid, 1. 
10 ERAF 1-1-77, L. Malmre kirjad ja A. Klingbergi aruanne olukorrast eestirootslastega valdades ning 
tõlge ajalehes ‘Västmanlands Läns Tidning’ ilmunud artiklist, 1. Translated from Estonian: 1. et ei ole 
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kalapüügita vähemate talude omanikel ei ole võimalik ülalpidamist hankida. 
11 ERAF 1-1-77, L. Malmre kirjad ja A. Klingbergi aruanne olukorrast eestirootslastega valdades ning 
tõlge ajalehes ‘Västmanlands Läns Tidning’ ilmunud artiklist, 1. Translated from Estonian: Üldiselt paistab, 
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minimal. Certainly one cannot equate subscription to acceptance, however in assessing 
the impact of the Sovjet-Estland propaganda campaign, it is important to consider the 
subscription rate. Quite unsurprisingly, the newspaper’s consistent filler-placement ad 
claiming that “all Estonian-Swedes read Sovjet-Estland” was considerably exaggerated. 
However, Wieselgren stating that no one accepted the propaganda is also an exaggeration, 
perhaps reflecting a biased view of one who had fled from Estonia.14 
Wieselgren states that the newspaper was used in the classrooms, largely since 
textbooks were not yet available.15 A February Central Committee report from the 
Administration of Propaganda and Agitation (Â Óïðàâëå í è å Ïð îïàãà í ä û È Àãèòàöèè), 
Neeme Ruus writes that there were 800 copies of the newspaper being sent out each week 
to the ethnic Swedes. His number could be elevated, though, as the report being sent to 
Moscow also states that among the Estonian-Swedes there is a “great interest for 
Marxism-Leninism.”16 An 8 May article in honor of Bolshevik Press Day states that the 
newspaper had a press run of 1100 copies.17 However, how many of those remained in 
Estonia and how many were sent to Sweden is unknown.18 As letters from those in 
Sweden published in Sovjet-Estland can attest, a significant number of subscribers lived 
abroad. The same article lists the Kustbon subscription rate at only 200 copies, certainly a 
considerable increase for Sovjet-Estland if the numbers are to be believed. Clues to the 
subscription among Estonian-Swedes can also be found in a May Central Committee 
report concerning the Estonian-Swedes, which listed the goal to increase subscription in 
select towns (without listing current levels). The report expresses the following 
subscription goals: for the island of Vormsi, 240 subscribers; Riguldi commune, up to 
150; Noarootsi commune, up to 100; Harjumaa, up to 50; and Ruhnu, up to 50 
subscribers.19 Goals for other regions were not given, and there was no mention of 
subscription numbers or goals for Sweden. 
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Hints of the limited subscriptions among the Estonian-Swedes was shown in an 
unexpected location – a 22 May article on Neeme Ruus’ visit to Vihterpalu. The article 
states: “In Vihterpalu, where one does not have a single subscriber to Sovjet-Estland, one 
saw a great interest among them for the newspapers Comrade Ruus brought with him.”20 
This statement was used to articulate the support for Ruus, but is striking in stating that 
none of the residents subscribed to the newspaper. The interest was demonstrated, 
according to the author, but one would assume that by May, ethnic Swedes in Vihterpalu 
would have had at least some exposure to the newspaper in other areas of their life. 
The archives can also be used to show approval, but even in the archival, support 
was minimal among the Estonian-Swedes. Archival materials of interviews for 
Communist Party membership in Läänemaa, for example, only list two individuals of 
Swedish ethnicity, Johannes Vesterman and Joosep Blomberg, both from Riguldi and 
both interviewed for membership on 10 March 1941.21 This is not to state that only two 
Estonian-Swedes were members of the Communist Party. Lists of names of party 
members were not compared with lists of Estonian-Swedes. Instead, this reflects only the 
interviews found in the Läänemaa committee’s reports and minutes in which ethnicity 
was stated. 
The editors referred to appreciation within the community for the newspaper – not 
a complete endorsement by the entire ethnic Swedish community – but of an individual 
identified as Comrade Oskar Nilson of Riguldi. He was quoted in an article as stating, “I 
read Sovjet-Estland, which is the first Swedish-language newspaper the state has given to 
us. Before we had to satisfy ourselves with our own little newspaper.”22 
The level of participation by the Estonian-Swedes cannot be accurately measured 
through the use of Sovjet-Estland. As a tool of propaganda, the image was regularly 
manipulated to meet the goals of the campaign – to attempt to isolate the thoughts of 
emigration and dissent as belonging to a minority. Certainly doubt can be cast on all 
articles tat were unsigned or failed to state names. However, participation can illuminate 
                                                 
20 Åhörare. “Kamrat Neeme Ruus talade i Vipall och Rikull,” Sovjet-Estland, 22 May 1941, p. 2. Translated 
from Swedish: I Vipall, där man ej hade en enda prenumeration på Sovjet-Estland, visade man ett stort 
intresse för de av kamrat Ruus medhavda provnumren. 
21 ERAF 1-1-6, EK(b)P Läänemaa Komitee koosolekute ja maakond parteiaktiivi nõupidamise protokollid 
(ärakirjad), 38-39. The interviews were conducted in Estonian, and in both cases the interviewees 





some suggestions as to how wide-spread the newspaper was. Fridolf Isberg, for example, 
was a regular contributor. It would be inaccurate to state that there was no participation 
with the Soviets amid the Estonian-Swedes. Names were occasionally used in articles, 
although the level of their support could always be questioned, as well as possible reasons 
for the support. Those named in the paper can be doubted about the level of their 
participation and support of the Soviets. Indeed, Isberg focused on the education of 
agricultural techniques – a topic absent of the Soviet ideology. It can be argued that his 
articles with ideology were concessions for the greater goal of maintaining a Swedish-
language school at Birkas, which according to his memoir about the period indicates was 
not a certainty. However, with such high numbers of public dissent to the Soviets, even 
the limited amount of support such as submitting articles is noteworthy. 
There are a few examples of overt interaction between readers and the newspaper 
staff (excluding the case of Isberg’s agricultural column which regularly sought questions 
from readers). One such exchange occurred over the issue of sports in the Estonian-
Swedish regions. An initial article was published on 20 March by an unnamed author. 
The article provided an ideologically based overview of sports among the Estonian-
Swedes, almost going so far as to hint that any sports gatherings and athletic success can 
be directly attributed to the Soviet effort. According to the article, sports in capitalistic 
countries only sought out top athletes and attempts at breaking records. In contrast, the 
Soviet Union was devoted to bringing the joys of sporting activities to the masses. 
Focusing on the Estonian-Swedish areas, the author proudly states that ethnic Swedes are 
always in first place whenever they compete (which seems to be at odds with the criticism 
of sports in capitalist countries), although hopes that the bureaucracy that existed 
previously would disappear, particularly the differences between those in the towns and 
those out in the countryside, whose young competitors were easily intimidated.23 
A few weeks later a counter article was printed, submitted by Viktor Aman. His 
article is striking in its complete lack of ideology, basically countering the claims of the 
previous article point by point. While not directly attacking the ideology, one can 
certainly read into it an almost anti-Soviet position. It is therefore surprising that it was 
                                                 
22 “Nuckö och Rikull förbereda sig för valen,” Sovjet-Estland, 20 December 1940, p. 2. Translated from 
Swedish: Jag läser “Sovjet-Estland”, vilken är den första svenskspråkiga tidningen som staten givit oss. 
Förr fingo vi nöje oss med vår egen lilla tidning. 





printed at all. Aman states that when sporting competitions had been established in the 
ethnic Swedish areas earlier, the goals were not to bring the best athletes into the 
spotlight, but rather to come together as a community. In response to the intimidation of 
countryside competitors mentioned in the previous article Aman writes, “If some shy boy 
really would be frightened by the forward-rushing upper secondary boys and girls, it 
would be most advisable for him to run home and let mama blow on the pain.”24 His no-
nonsense contempt for the previous writer’s sentiments placed sporting activities among 
the Estonian-Swedes as a community activity, more so than a competition. He concluded, 
“Sports have required both sweat and hardship, but here if ever has been shown among 
the Swedes solidarity, good camaraderie, and bold fighting spirit, which has brought 
triumphs.”25 Aman’s article is striking in that it counters so strongly the statements of the 
previous writer without directly countering the ideology. It can be seen as an example of 
dissent, although the editors must have seen some value to its inclusion. 
However, Aman’s dissent was not the only example. In the first issue, an article 
mentions that there was not uniform support for the Soviets. The article states, “…Yet not 
everyone was pleased with the changes [since 21 June]. Even among the Swedish 
minority there are those behind the times, people unversed in political questions that do 
not find their way about within the new society. Luckily their numbers are not large!”26 
While labeling them as out of touch with society, such a statement indicated a lack of 
support, even if it was suggested that this was minimal. 
In another example involving a rare moment of candor, the Estonian-Swedes were 
sharply criticized in terms of the wall-newspapers in the schools. The article on 19 
December placed blame for the poor quality on the local leaders, and their lack of 
knowledge on the importance of the wall-newspapers. Specifically singled out for 
criticism were the schools in Noarootsi, Sutlepa, and Riguldi.27 However, the poor quality 
                                                 
24 V. Aman, “Om sporten,” Sovjet-Estland, 3 April 1941, p. 2. Translated from Swedish: Om någon blyg 
gosse verkligen skulle bli skrämd av de framstormande gymnasiegossarna och –flickorna, så vore det 
lämpligast för honom att löpa hem och låta mamma blåsa på det onda. 
25 V. Aman, “Om sporten,” Sovjet-Estland, 3 April 1941, p. 2. Translated from Swedish: Idrotten har fordrat 
bade svett och svårigheter: men här om någonsin ha svenskarna visat sammanhållning, god kamratanda och 
frejdig kamplust, som bringat seger. 
26 “Stämningsbilder från Läänemaas kustbyar i Rikull,” Sovjet-Estland, 17 October 1940, p. 2. Translated 
from Swedish: Efter den 21. juni förändrare sig stämningen i Rikull. Dock var det icke alla som gladde sig 
åt förändringen. Även bland svenska minoriteten finns det efterblivna, i politiska frågor obevandrade 
människor som icke finner sig till rätta i det nya samhället. Lyckligtvis är deras antal icke stort! 





of the wall-newspapers as well as the inability to recruit Pioneers in the schools can also 
be seen as signs to discontent and dissent. Once attention was brought to the deficiency, 
however, the wall-newspapers needed to be improved. 
Examples of dissent and criticism offer an altered picture of Sovjet-Estland. The 
majority of the articles sought to express a uniformity of support among the people for all 
of the socialistic policies and changes occurring in society. A reader with doubts, though, 
would certainly reject such claims of uniformity. While participation remained low in the 
newspaper, some Estonian-Swedes found a way to work within the system and make their 
voices heard, even if it wasn’t in direct, full support of the system as the editors would 
have hoped for. 
 
“Why I Don’t Leave For Sweden” 
Despite the high numbers that had indicated a desire to leave, the newspaper 
published statements to the contrary, making it appear that those with emigration thoughts 
were only a small minority. An article appeared in Sovjet-Estland on 6 March 1941 under 
the headline “Why I Don’t Leave For Sweden” written by “J.L.” Among the reasons 
provided for not leaving Estonia were: a love of their home towns; uncertainty of 
healthcare coverage in Sweden, particularly for the elderly; the need abroad to overwork 
to pay for basic necessities such as food; because those who left already don’t describe 
life in bright colors; and because life in Sweden certainly cannot be as peaceful nor have 
enough bread for everyone as in Estonia.28 Clearly, the writer was tieing into the foreign 
new portraying Sweden as a land in distress. Following these reasons was a letter, 
supposedly from an Estonian-Swede living in Vormsi, identified only by the initials 
“T.L.” He writes: 
We that have been pushed around, who have been tread on without rights 
in the capitalistic power’s misery, have had our eyes opened with the 
advantages that the Soviet power brought for us. Yes, all of us Swedes can 
now understand and see that it is the Soviet Union that comes to help and 
save us from the phases of the war. The Soviet power has created work 
and bread for thousands who in the capitalistic Estonia wandered around 
unemployed, broken and worn out, seeking work that was almost 
impossible to find. Estonia’s joining the Soviet Union made our economic 
life independent from the capitalist powers and transformed it into 
blooming. The Soviet Union furnished these rights to us Estonian-Swedes, 
                                                 





which we lacked previously. I believe, for my part, that all Swedes living 
along Soviet Estonia’s coast have understood which advantages the Soviet 
power has brought us. I believe, that we Estonian-Swedes already all are 
so clear of the circumstances in the capitalistic lands, that we will not be 
fooled in the capitalistic empire, although there are possibilities to travel to 
the motherland. I believe that I interpret all the Estonian-Swedes’ 
conviction correctly, if I state that the Soviet Union strengthens our 
national independence and helps with our free national development, with 
our land’s economy and our culture’s growth, promotes for us a strong 
material and cultural upswing and that our native region begins a new 
blooming.29 
 
There are several interesting points that the writer raises. It is clearly intended to be taken 
as a representation of the greater Estonian-Swedish community. He is attempting to 
isolate and covert those who would disagree, pointing to the advantages the Soviets had 
brought and highlighting the misery that existed. The author refers to employment and 
food, both of which were frequent topics of shortages in the western world throughout 
Sovjet-Estland’s publication. It is intriguing that he mentions there were possibilities to 
go to Sweden, considering the only groups to do so were the 110 from the Pakrite islands 
and those who had left illegally. Others who requested permission to emigrate never 
received responses. However, his use of the term “motherland” in referring to Sweden 
would seem to run counter to other propaganda around the Soviet Union which was 
attempting to draw comparisons between Stalin being the father-figure for the 
motherland, the Soviet Union.30 
The following week, another article appeared, claiming that the people of Vormsi 
(with the largest concentration of Estonian-Swedes) were against the idea of leaving 
                                                 
29 T.L., “Varför jag inte reser till Sverige,” Sovjet-Estland, 6 March 1941, p. 2. Translated from Swedish: Vi 
som blivit tillknuffade, där vi ha legat nedtrampade och utan rättigheter i den kapitalistiska maktens elende, 
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i Sovjetunionen gjorde vårt ekonomiska liv oberoende av de kapitalistiska makterna och förde det till 
blomstring. Oss estlandssvenskar har Sovjetunionen skaffat de rättigheter, som förr fattades oss. Jag tror för 
min del, att alla svenskar, som bo på Sovjet-Estlands kust, ha förstått, vilka fördelar sovjetmakten har bragt 
oss. Jag tror, att vi estlandssvenskar redan alla äro så klara om förhållandena i de kapitalistiska väldet, 
fastän det finns möjligheter att resa till moderlandet. Jag tror, att jog tolkar alla estlandssvenskars 
övertygelse rätt, om jag påstår, att Sovjetunionen befäster vårt nationella oberoende och hjälper till vid vår 
fria nationella utveckling, vid vår lanthushållnings och var kulturs höjande, befrämjar för oss ett kraftigt 
materiellt och kulturellt uppsving och för vår älskande hembygd börjar en ny blomstring. 
30 See, for example, David L. Hoffmann, Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-





Estonia for Sweden.31 At first sight, these articles can be seen as a reflection of the 
general opinion of the public – which is exactly how it was interpreted by the communist 
newspaper Ny Dag in Stockholm when it was reprinted.32 However, these articles are an 
example – one of the more overt attempts in Sovjet-Estland – to convince the ethnic 
Swedish minority to not continue thoughts of emigration. By publishing these articles, the 
Bolsheviks hoped to portray those among the Estonian-Swedes with thoughts of 
emigration as isolated, and convince them that they were alone, realizing that life in 
Estonia was better than before, and better than the uncertainty of living in Sweden. 
Later in the month of March, the community profiles (mentioned in Chapter 2) 
began. Although these profiles carried no ideological component and did not mention the 
topic of emigration, they can be viewed as serving that purpose. By emphasizing their 
strong connections to the land and the communities, the emigration thoughts would 
hopefully diminish. This argument, however, failed to consider the forced relocation in 
the summer 1940 which heavily impacted the Estonian-Swedes, the rumors circulating 
that further evacuations were inevitable, and the land reforms that had effected their 
connections with the land. 
By late May 1941, the Central Committee was calling the Sovietization efforts 
towards the ethnic Swedes a failure, concluding that the failed efforts had led to thoughts 
of emigration.33 Aggressive measures would have to be taken to dispel emigration 
thoughts and the Central Committee laid out those specific efforts. While some were 
markedly similar to those that had been followed all along, many plans were new and 
marked a privileged position for the Estonian-Swedes that would be unavailable to the 
Estonians. They also illustrate that the Bolsheviks had listened to, and attempted to 
address, some of the specific concerns that had been expressed by the ethnic Swedes. 
Among the planned changes included finding and recruiting ethnic Swedes that were 
friendly to the Soviet Union for activists and agitation. The translating of more literature 
into Swedish and spreading this material in the Swedish-inhabited areas. The promoting 
of cultural organizations among the Swedes (such as choirs, art, orchestra, theatre, 
choreography) was to take place. The lowering of the procurement norms for the ethnic 
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Swedish areas considering the poor soil quality; reducing the debt within farming 
communities; and making disbursements to those that had been resettled.34 Specifically 
for Sovjet-Estland, the report also suggested working to increase the subscription rate, 
strengthen ties with correspondents while further educating them, improving the content 
of the newspaper, and extending the publication to six pages to allow for the inclusion of 
a youth-oriented section.35 
 
Deportations and Terror 
The Soviet Union implemented a policy of instilling fear within the people of 
Estonia. While this remained minimal for the majority of the first year of Soviet 
occupation, the pace increased dramatically in June 1941. “People belonging to different 
layers of society were arrested, including workers and even Soviet activists. Nobody 
could be sure of tomorrow. Officially nothing was said about the arrests, which increased 
the fear even more.”36 
On 14 June 1941, the largest mass deportations occurred around the Baltic States. 
Done on a Saturday late at night, the rounding-up of people was wide-spread and fast-
paced. Across Estonia, approximately 10,000 people (of all ethnic groups) were deported. 
The ethnic Swedish population was also affected by these deportations, with the loss of 
36 people,37 including six school instructors.38 Although perhaps minimal in numbers 
when comparing the total deported, proportionally the ethnic Swedes were deported at a 
similar rate as ethnic Estonians. Among those deported from the ethnic Swedish 
communities were Nikolaus Blees (an instructor at Birkas), Mathias Westerblom (a 
former Estonian parliamentarian and leader of SOV), Major Anders Lindkvist (from 
SOV), M. Gottkamf, Tomas Gärdström (a teacher and compiler of the two Soviet 
textbooks in Swedish), Anders Nyman (a leader of SOV), and A. Vesterblom. 
Those deported included a large number of what can best be described as the 
Estonian-Swedish intelligentsia – teachers and leaders in the former cultural organization. 
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Perhaps one of the more striking names, though, was the inclusion of Gärdström in the 
deportation. As the compiler of the two textbooks for the Soviets (the announcement 
appeared in that week’s Sovjet-Estland – 11 June), one would have expected him to have 
been spared that fate. 
The following week’s Sovjet-Estland remained silent about the deportations. 
There was no official word about why these people were rounded up or what their fates 
were. It was as if the deportations had never even occurred. Gracing the pages instead 
was the focus on the upcoming anniversary of the Bolsheviks coming to power in 
Estonia. 
Men were also mobilized by the Soviets. Although the Swedish minority had not 
been included in the first wave of mobilization, in 1941 314 ethnic Swedes were 
mobilized,39 including Viktor Pöhl (Birkas) and A. Lindström. Many more had escaped 
mobilization by hiding in the forests or other hiding locations at night.40 In Sovjet-
Estland, there were reports of men voluntarily joining the war effort against the fascists, 
and looking for more people to report to mobilization points.41 There was no mention, 
however, of forced mobilizations. Mobilized men were sent to the forest region of 
Archangel, where large numbers died of starvation or from the cold. Of those ethnic 
Swedes mobilized or deported, only 129 eventually returned.42 The others all presumably 
died. 
While targeting those who were vocally opposed to the Soviets – individuals who 
were also leaders in the Estonian-Swedish national identity – the actions ignored the 
findings of the May report. The Central Committee report had specifically listed as one of 
its tasks to give the Estonian-Swedes a one-year reprieve from mobilization in the Soviet 
army for those ethnic Swedes in the party, political instructors, and teachers considering a 
the shortage of qualified individuals in these areas.43 The report, though, was prepared 
before the German declaration of war and before the situation in Estonia for the 
Bolsheviks looked grim. The deportation and mobilization of these Estonian-Swedes was 
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not in the long-term interest of a developing Estonian-Swedish identity, as many were in 
what little category one could claim as an intelligentsia. It marks a failure of ideological 
conversion attempts, and a complete failure of the propaganda campaign with little 
promise of a qualified continuation; targeting teachers when there was already a shortage 
casts serious doubt that a continued campaign could have lasted. 
 
Departure of the Estonian-Swedes 
On 13 September 1940, a Committee for Rågö-Swedes44 was formed in Sweden 
with the intent of bringing the displaced Swedes from the Pakrite island to Sweden. The 
island, along with Naissaar and Osmussaar, had been evacuated in the summer to make 
way for Soviet military bases. An initial request was made by the Swedish legation in 
Moscow, although the government did not pursue it further. On 17 October 1940, 110 
Estonian-Swedes from the Pakrite islands arrived in Stockholm aboard the “Estonia.” It 
was approximately a third of the island’s inhabitants, and apparently the first to indicate a 
desire to emigrate. During the first Soviet occupation of Estonia, this was the only group 
of people legally permitted to emigrate, and little information is known as to why their 
application was accepted while the requests of others went unanswered. The Committee 
assisted the newly arrived ethnic Swedes to settle in Sweden, collecting and distributing 
funds, and assisting with citizenship problems. 
For the remainder of the first Soviet occupation, the emigration possibilities 
appeared to remain static with no legal possibilities to leave and difficulties to leave 
illegally. The outlook for Estonia changed when Germany attacked the Soviet Union on 
22 June 1941. By early July, German forces were at the southern border of Estonia. 
Several ethnic Swedes on Ruhnu successfully recaptured the island from the four Soviets 
in July, but lost it in August when a larger group of Soviets arrived.45 While many had 
hoped that the arrival of the Germans would mean a return of Estonian independence, the 
Soviet occupation of Estonia was replaced by a German occupation. The nationalization 
undertaken by the Soviets were simply transferred to German control and the land 
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reforms remained in effect. Emigration thoughts persisted and grew among the Estonian-
Swedes. 
Throughout the Second World War, Sweden attempted to maintain a flexible 
policy of neutrality in order to not be pulled into the war. While all of her neighbors were 
either occupied or engaged in battle, Sweden was successful at maintaining her 
independence. Sweden engaged in concessions to all sides (depending on who was the 
most imminent threat and with the best advantage at the time). During the German 
occupation of Estonia and with German and Finland acting as co-belligerents against the 
Soviet Union, Sweden permitted Germany to transport troops on their way to Finland to 
travel through Swedish railways, waterways, and airspace beginning 26 June 1941. 
Swedish foreign policy, however, moved away from concessions to Germany following 
the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in February 1943.46 
In December 1941, Birkas was visited by a German delegation, including a Dr. 
Lienhard. Several of the students and faculty were stripped and body measurements were 
taken. They were later notified that the Estonian-Swedes were Germanic with certain 
Baltic features.47 This would become important a few years later when determining 
ethnicity would be necessary. From 18 January to 14 February 1942, a committee from 
Sweden visited the Estonian-Swedes, coming via Berlin. Among the delegation were 
parliamentarian James Dickson, doctor Gerhard Hafström, and Major Carl Mothander. 
Following their return to Sweden, the Committee for Aid Expeditions to Estonian-Swedes 
was founded under the leadership of C. Lindhagen.48 
Through the Committee, the Swedish Red Cross visited the Estonian-Swedish 
regions in the second half of June 1942.49 They brought with them two tractors, 50 boat-
motors, clothing, farming supplies, books, an automobile for transporting the sick, 
medical supplies, and two nurses.50 Ironically, many of these boat-motors were later used 
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by the Estonian-Swedes to emigrate illegally. In spring 1942, the Swedish Foreign 
Ministry began negotiating with Berlin over the fate of the Estonian-Swedes. As a result 
of their negotiations, the medical ship “Seagull II” traveled to Estonia in May 1943 and 
returned with 42 sick or elderly ethnic Swedes who had relatives living in Sweden. The 
ship “Odin” made three similar trips in November and December of the same year, 
returning with an additional 736 ethnic Swedes. Additionally, 60 Estonian-Swedes were 
transported during this period via Finland.51 
In terms of Swedish diplomacy over the Estonian-Swedes, the Swedish 
government would have had greater success in negotiations with Berlin up until 
Stalingrad. However, once the process of repatriation of the ethnic Swedes had begun, it 
became easier to maintain. As the situation changed for Germany, the local officials in 
Estonia like Lienhard were more willing to cooperate on their own in an attempt to gain 
favor with the West, in case Germany eventually lost. In January 1944 as the chances for 
a German victory increasingly seemed dim, the Swedish Foreign Ministry attempted to 
negotiate for all of the remaining Estonian-Swedes.52 The cultural organization for the 
Estonian-Swedes was put in charge of determining ethnicity, and membership in Friends 
of Swedish Culture (SOV) quickly soared. For many, membership in the organization was 
viewed as a guarantee of their ability to leave, and in some instances, ethnic Estonians 
successfully emigrated through this process. The agreement reached between the 
Germans and the Swedes included a complete press black-out of the action, prohibiting 
the media to report anything about the arrangement or the arrival of people.53 
German SS-Waffen officer Dr. Lienhard, who spoke Swedish, organized 
transportation in cooperation with the Committee for Aid Expeditions to Estonian-Swedes 
and the Swedish Red Cross aboard the cargo ship “Juhan.” This resulted in nine voyages 
flying under the Nazi flag between 21 June and 11 September 1944 and the transportation 
of 3,335 Estonian-Swedes to Stockholm. An additional 70 ethnic Swedes traveled aboard 
the Estonian boat “Triina” on 22 September.54 The 50 kronor passage cost was paid for by 
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the Swedish state.55 Following the final voyage of the “Juhan”, the Committee for Aid 
Expeditions to Estonian-Swedes attempted to ease the ability of ethnic Swedes to come to 
Sweden via other countries, particularly from Germany. Approximately 300 Estonian-
Swedes were able to make it to Sweden as a result of this.56 
Beginning in January 1944, the Soviets began advancing towards Estonia again. 
In February, Naissaar, the Pakrite islands, and Osmussaar were once again evacuated.57 
The pace was relatively slow until September. On 22 September 1944, Tallinn was 
recaptured. As the Red Army moved closer, the pace of mass transportations increased; 
“Juhan” had the final transport in September. 
By the end of the war, approximately 7,900 Estonian-Swedes had fled to Sweden 
– 4,357 legally. Upon their arrival in Sweden, they were first placed in Stockholm until 
work could be located. Each family was given a loan of 300 crowns for clothes and 
household goods. The Committee for Rågö-Swedes, which overtook the responsibility of 
all the Estonian-Swedes, organized the purchase of 51 fishing places and 83 farms. In 
total, the Committee spent 4,418,000 crowns, or approximately 557 crowns per person. 
Sweden, which had an abundance of jobs at the end of the war, was able to accommodate 
the work needs of the new arrivals. Kustbon was able to restart and resume publication in 
June 1944 after a four-year hiatus. This time, however, it was published in Sweden. As a 
community, the Estonian-Swedes grew stronger following the immigration, with the 
experience uniting them, regardless of where they were placed in Sweden. 
Their arrival in Sweden caused some debate and disagreements. As they were not 
citizens of Sweden, fishermen were vocal in their opposition to their ability to use 
Swedish-fishing areas. King Gustav V attempted to intervene in the dispute by speeding 
up their citizenship applications, rather than requiring them to wait five years. Ethnicity 
did not mean automatic citizenship for the Estonian-Swedes. Sweden also rebuffed Soviet 
attempts to reclaim their citizens. While the Soviet government was granted permission to 
meet with some of the refugees, they were not able to force anyone to return. In the case 
of those who had left illegally, the Soviets argued that they had stolen nationalized 
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property – namely the boats. The Swedish government agreed to return this property to 
the Soviet Union. 
For those remaining in Estonia, with such a small fraction of the ethnic Swedish 
population, the Bolsheviks saw no need to continue and resume a propaganda campaign 
in Swedish aimed at the group. Sovjet-Estland did not resume publication and Soviet 
policies attempted an attitude of assimilation into the Estonian majority. The numbers 






Even the Swedes here were glad for the agitation-brigade’s visit, and after 
having been given an overview of the war, the local farmers promised an 
even higher degree of help than before in order to annihilate the hated 
German fascist barbarians and bandits, and in doing so assure the Soviet 
power which strives to deliver the whole world’s working people from 
exploitation and to create a certain foundation for the working people’s 
joyous and carefree life.1 
 
For ten months, the ethnic Swedish population living in Estonia drew the attention 
of the government in Tallinn. A newspaper was published for them in their native 
language and government representatives periodically came to their communities to meet 
and talk with them, in some cases speaking their language. The Estonian-Swedes were 
repeatedly told that the government considered them as equals with the majority culture, 
deserving of encouragement and resources to expand their cultural development. The 
Estonian-Swedes were told that they were just as deserving, if not more, to have 
economic possibilities available to them to lift them out of poverty. They were just as 
entitled as other groups to be full and active members of society. 
If it wasn’t for their frustration with and opposition to the ideology of the 
Communist Party and methodology of the Sovietization process, the Estonian-Swedes 
had never had a better situation. Week after week, Sovjet-Estland portrayed an image of 
prosperity and possibilities available to the Estonian-Swedes, but the majority were 
reluctant to believe the propaganda being offered in the newspaper. Perhaps it was the 
reduction of the land in the land reforms, or the humiliation of the clergy that turned the 
population against the ideology. Perhaps it was the loss of their cultural organization 
(SOV) and the closing of their newspaper. Or perhaps it was the knowledge that a group 
of their ethnic brethren had received permission to emigrate to Sweden (and the 
willingness of Sweden to accept them). 
The audience of Sovjet-Estland can best be described as a hostile audience; as the 
archival material from the Läänemaa Communist Party demonstrates, thoughts of 
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emigration pervaded the Estonian-Swedish communities. It is enlightening, therefore, to 
investigate how the editors directed the newspaper for this hostile audience. What one 
finds is that the only side represented in the pages of each issue was one of overwhelming 
excitement and support for the Bolsheviks. This can be seen as an attempt to isolate those 
with opposing viewpoints, but it can also be used as an example of the party fooling 
themselves to give the appearance of greater support (particularly to those higher up in 
the political structure). Much as Neeme Ruus sought to receive approval from Moscow by 
noting a “large interest” among the Estonian-Swedes for Marxist-Leninism despite 
numerous reports from Läänemaa to the contrary, the editors of Sovjet-Estland wanted to 
portray their work as being effective and widely supported. And the false view worked in 
some regards – those in Sweden who saw and subscribed to the newspaper had full 
confidence in its complete accuracy. 
In many respects, Sovjet-Estland was a failed propaganda attempt. The newspaper 
was unsuccessful at converting the ethnic Swedish population of Estonia to the socialist 
ideology. But even worse, it failed at quieting resentment amid the communities to the 
Soviet policies. The subscription rates remained low (even if exact numbers have not 
been determined) and public resentment remained high. The main goals of Sovjet-Estland 
were a failure. 
But it was not a complete failure. There are aspects of the campaign that can be 
seen as having benefited the Estonian-Swedes. While the weekly reporting of change was 
an important function of Sovjet-Estland, the main themes throughout its pressrun of 17 
October 1940 to 13 August 1941 were ideology, national identity, and preventing 
emigration. If one were to rate the effectiveness in these three areas in the 43 issues, there 
were some benefits and successes in two of the three areas. 
Whether or not the ideology was accepted, Sovjet-Estland was effective in 
presenting the Estonian-Swedes with a background in Soviet history and the development 
of the socialist ideology. The basic principles were laid out in the “What is socialism” 
series and reinforced in almost all of the articles that followed. In preparation for the 
election, considerable agitation and propaganda campaigns were undertaken to not only 
explain the Soviet political structure, but also instill in the people the rights and 
obligations of living in a socialist society. Sovjet-Estland provided the Estonian-Swedes 
with the historical understanding of the holidays and celebrations, giving them the context 
in which to participate. The ethnic Swedes were told through the various articles how 





of the Estonian-Swedes to the socialist ideology should be viewed largely as a failure, the 
education of that ideology was a success. 
Returning to Benedict Anderson’s view of nationalism as the creation of imagined 
communities, largely through print capitalism, the newspaper can be a power uniting 
force for an emerging national identity. The Estonian-Swedes had this in Kustbon prior to 
the Second World War when it was published in the Estonia and again following the war 
when it was published in Sweden. The newspaper adapted to the political and economic 
environments in order to continue publication, with the editors all maintaining a strong 
need to foster the concept of Swedishness among the ethnic Swedes. Identity and culture 
were constant themes, meshing perfectly with Anderson’s theory on the development of 
the national identity. 
Sovjet-Estland sought to be a suitable replacement to Kustbon while presenting 
the Soviet ideology, attending to the needs of the ethnic Swedish minority. The Estonian-
Swedish national identity and culture were again strong themes, although through the 
guise of socialism. Sovjet-Estland was not a replacement of Kustbon, though; Sovjet-
Estland did not receive the support or the respect within the Estonian-Swedish 
community that would be necessary in furthering the ideas of national identity. The 
newspaper was also created by an outside group with little direct participation from the 
ethnic Swedish community themselves, therefore making it difficult to place within 
Anderson’s theory. 
However, the publication of Sovjet-Estland by the Bolsheviks demonstrated a pro-
minority policy in a way previously not offered to the ethnic Swedes. While the Interwar 
Estonian constitutions sought to protect minority rights, government policies increasingly 
became more nationalistic. In contrast, the Soviets not only expressed their commitment 
to minority protections, but repeatedly demonstrated these commitments by reaching out 
to minorities. The Estonian-Swedes were just one example of many across the Soviet 
Union that were encouraged and given the resources to develop their national identity, 
although restricted to being socialistic in content. The treatment of the Estonian-Swedish 
minority was not unique but fits into a well-established pattern of national minorities. 
There are a number of things that makes the Estonian-Swedish case unique. They 
were a small minority that had been developing a national identity for several decades 
before the Soviets arrived. Their identity was largely intertwined with contacts to Sweden 





brethren in Finland. Their location on the islands and coastal regions of Estonia had long 
made them on the fringes of society. 
The one area where Sovjet-Estland had no success was in emigration thoughts. 
Even before publication began, the Estonian-Swedes were contemplating leaving. Only a 
third of the Pakrite islanders were given the right to leave, and very few left on their own 
accord illegally. The possibility existed, though. The community was small enough and 
well-connected enough for them to know about the emigration, and it was arguably a 
significant mistake for Sovjet-Estland to put off addressing this concern. Once the 
foundation had been laid with emigration, it was difficult to offer reasons to change their 
minds. The promises of the Soviet Union extolled in the ideology and the domestic news 
went unfulfilled. While as a group the Estonian-Swedes were being treated better than 
previously, as individuals their situations worsened. 
The problems in the propaganda campaign were recognized by the Estonian 
Central Committee in May 1941. Their report found that the Soviet efforts had been a 
failure and sought to put into place changes that would improve the situation for the 
Estonian-Swedes. These improvements were to be in political and ideological education, 
the economic standing by lowing production norms and providing compensation for land 
lost in forced evacuations, and linguistic resources such as increased books and films 
made available in Swedish. These improvements were to be achieved by increased 
involvement in campaigns by ethnic Swedes, expanding the newspaper and increasing 
subscriptions, attracting more youths, delaying military service. 
These actions were never given a chance to be put into action; the next month the 
Germans declared war and Soviets shifted from the development of the Estonian-Swedes 
in socialism to the mobilization of the entire society. The propaganda no longer attempted 
to convert the Estonian-Swedes to the Soviet ideology but to convince the people of the 
need to rise up in defense of their native land and prevent the fascist advance. The ethnic 
minority was nearly lost in the shuffle in the redirected propaganda campaign. National 
identity was no longer of much importance. And if the readers had not been convinced of 
the ideology by that point, there was little hope of the people voluntarily rising up in 
support of the Soviet Union against the Germans. 
These moderate benefits of the campaign go more towards benefits to the ethnic 
group than benefits for the Soviet Union. As a group, the Estonian-Swedes benefited by 
having increased attention focused on them by the Soviet government. It can be said to 





Their wartime experience, and particularly their emigration from Estonia arguably 
brought them closer together as a group, strengthening their distinctness from the 
Swedish identity. Sovjet-Estland can be seen to have aided this development, although 
with quite a different end result than was anticipated and hoped for in its creation. 
It is difficult to guess what could have happened if the German declaration of war 
never occurred. Would the Central Committee’s plan have been put into action? Would 
the campaign have continued with increased success? Or would the group have caused 
such a commotion within Estonia and in the international community as to warrant 
permission to emigrate? One can only hazard a guess of what could have been. 
By investigating the propaganda campaign found in Sovjet-Estland, the Soviet 
policies in the recently acquired territory can be seen. With a hostile audience, the 
campaign is especially interesting. The attempts to shape the thoughts of the population 
were largely a failure, although the newspaper never stopped trying. The Soviet ideology 
dictated that it was a noble cause to pursue, and necessary for the liberation from the 
masses of capitalism. It was a doomed effort, though. Thoughts of emigration were just 
too strongly maintained. And once the large number finally were able to depart for their 
Swedish homeland during the German occupation, there was little value or need in 
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Vormsi Ormsö / Vormsö 
 
                                                 





Appendix B: Sovjet-Estland Publication Dates 
Volume 1: 1940 
No. 1 – Thursday, 17 October 
No. 2 – Thursday, 24 October 
No. 3 – Thursday, 31 October 
No. 4 – Wednesday, 6 November 
No. 5 – Thursday, 14 November 
No. 6 – Thursday, 21 November 
No. 7 – Thursday, 28 November 
No. 8 – Friday, 6 December 
No. 9 – Thursday, 12 December 
No. 10 – Thursday, 19 December 
No. 11 – Saturday, 28 December 
 
Volume 2: 1941 
No. 1 (12) – Saturday, 4 January 
No. 2 (13) – Thursday, 9 January 
No. 3 (14) – Thursday, 16 January 
No. 4 (15) – Friday, 24 January 
No. 5 (16) – Thursday, 30 January 
No. 6 (17) – Thursday, 6 February 
No. 7 (18) – Thursday, 13 February 
No. 8 (19) – Thursday, 20 February 
No. 9 (20) – Thursday, 27 February 
No. 10 (21) – Thursday, 6 March 
No. 11 (22) – Thursday, 13 March 
No. 12 (23) – Thursday, 20 March 
No. 13 (24) – Thursday, 27 March 
No. 14 (25) – Thursday, 3 April 
No. 15 (26) – Thursday, 10 April 
No. 16 (27) – Thursday, 17 April 
No. 17 (28) – Thursday, 24 April 
No. 18 (29) – Tuesday, 29 April 
No. 19 (30) – Thursday, 8 May 
No. 20 (31) – Thursday, 15 May 
No. 21 (32) – Thursday, 22 May 
No. 22 (33) – Wednesday, 28 May 
No. 23 (34) – Wednesday, 4 June 
No. 24 (35) – Wednesday, 11 June 
No. 25 (36) – Wednesday, 18 June 
No. 26 (37) – Wednesday, 25 June 
No. 27 (38) – Wednesday, 2 July 
No. 28 (39) – Wednesday, 9 July 
No. 29 (40) – Wednesday, 23 July 
No. 30 (41) – Wednesday, 30 July 
No. 31 (42) – Wednesday, 6 August 
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Summary in Estonian – Kokkuvõte1 
Vähemuse agiteerimine: 
Eestirootslastele suunatud propaganda okupeeritud Eestis 1940-1941. 
 
Esimese Nõukogude okupatsiooni aasta vältel proovis Nõukogude Liit käivitada 
laiaulatuslikku sovetiseerimisprotsessi, mis oli suunatud Eesti ühiskonna kõikide tahkude 
vastu. Aasta vältel läbiviidud kampaania üks lahutamatutest koostisosadest oli 
kommunismi levitamine rahvale. Protsessi kaasati ka väikesearvuline etniliste rootslaste 
kogukond, mis moodustas umbes 0,7 % Eesti rahvastikust, ja kes olid Tsaari Venemaa ja 
Eesti valitsuse poolt täiesti ära unustatud. Propagandakampaania mõjutas eestirootslaste 
rahvusliku identiteedi arenemist läbi sotsialismi prisma, kusjuures etniliste rootslaste 
rahvusgrupp oli sealjuures priviligeeritud seisuses. Propagandakampaania keskne organ 
oli Nõukogude poolt kirjastatud rootsikeelne ajaleht Sovjet-Estland. Kampaania proovis 
mõjutada eelkõige rahvuslikku identiteeti ja levitada Nõukogude ideoloogiat. 
Jõupingutused jooksid suuresti liiva, kuna suur osa sihtgrupist avaldas avalikult soovi 
emigreeruda Rootsi. 
Käesoleva töö eesmärgiks on uurida nimetatud kampaaniat, samuti selgitada välja, 
milline oli ideoloogiline taust, mispärast selline kampaania üleüldse ette võeti. 
Magistritöö käsitleb ajalehte Sovjet-Estland, mis ilmus teise maailmasõja esimese 
okupatsiooniaasta jooksul; uurimisobjektiks on ajaleht, mille sihtgrupiks oli nii 
poliitiliselt, rahvusvaheliselt kui ka siseriiklikult vähetähtis ning väikesearvuline etniline 
grupp, mis moodustas vähem kui 1 % kogu rahvastikust. Siiski arvasid okupandid, et 
sellisele vähetähtsale ühiskonna segmendile, mis koosnes peamiselt vaestest 
põllumeestest, kalameest ja meremeestest, tasub tähelepanu pöörata.  
 Nõukogude Liidu esimene okupatsioon algas 18. juunil 1940 (millele järgnes 
kogu territooriumi liitmine Nõukogude Liiduga 6. augustil 1940), ja kestis kuni sakslaste 
saabumiseni 1941. aasta suvel. Pea aastapikkune Nõukogude okupatsioon pani aluse 
kiiretele muutustele Eesti ühiskonnas tervikuna, mis päädis täieliku integreerimisega 
Nõukogude süsteemi. Muutused tähendasid kõikide keskvõimu poolt taunitud 
organisatsioonide ning väljaannete sulgemist ja/või asendamist Bolševistliku partei 
kontrolli all olevatega. Intensiivne sovetiseerimine puudutas kõiki Eesti elanikke 
                                                 





vaatamata nende rahvusele, elukohale, töökohale või poliitilisele eelistusele. Tegu oli 
Oktoobrirevolutsiooni sünnitatud ning sellejärgselt väljaarenenud bolševistliku süsteemi 
võimalikult kiire sisseseadmisega Eestis. Selleks, et saavutada hea tulemus, pidi lisaks 
administratiivsele, poliitilisele ja kultuurilisele muutusele kaasnema ka muutus inimestes 
endis. Viimatimainitud eesmärgi saavutamiseks Eesti elanike seas rakendati tööle aktiivne 
propagandamasin ning viidi läbi agitatsioonikampaaniaid. 
 Teiste vähemuste hulgas elas Eestis umbes 8,000 etnilist rootslast. Eestirootslased 
elasid peamiselt Loode-Eesti saartel ja rannikualadel. Suurim kogukond asus Läänemaal, 
ning suuremaid asualasid võis leida ka Harjumaal ja Saaremaal. Propaganda oli suunatud 
muuhulgas ka eestirootslastele, mille tagajärjel asendati juulis 1940 ilmumise lõpetanud 
eestirootslaste ajaleht Kustbon  (Randlane) ajalehega Sovjet-Estland (Nõukogude-Eesti), 
mille esimene number avaldati 17. oktoobril samal aastal.  
Sovjet-Estland sai Eesti Kommunistliku (Bolševistliku) partei Lääne maakonna 
ametlikuks häälekandjaks. Seega asendus eestirootslaste poolt väljaantav rootsikeelne 
ajaleht eestirootslaste jaoks väljaantava ajalehega, mille peatoimetajaks sai eesti 
rahvusest Anton Vaarandi. Seoses sakslaste pealetungiga nädalalehe ilmumine katkes 13. 
augustil 1941. Selleks ajaks oli trükitud 43 numbrit, vahele oli jäänud nädalane paus juuli 
keskel 1941.  
Ajalehe toimetus asus Tallinnas ENSV Riikliku Kirjastuskeskuse Ajalehtede 
Kirjastuse ruumides pikk tänav 58. Sovjet-Estland trükiti Tallinna trükikojas Punane Täht. 
Nädalaleht oli ainuke Läänemaa väljaanne kuni 1940. aasta detsembris alustas ilmumist 
ajaleht Töötav Läänlane, mis oli samuti kohalike kommunistide ametlik väljaanne. 
Väljaanne oli tavaliselt neljaleheline, mis kasvas kuueleheküljeliseks parteikongressi 
eriväljaande puhul ja kahanes kaheleheliseks siis kui ilmus teade, et Saksamaa on 
Nõukogude Liidule sõja kuulutanud.  
Sovjet-Estland ei kajastanud täielikult ei Eesti sündmusi ega ka rootslaste seas 
toimuvat. Informatsiooni esitamine Sovjet-Estlandi veergudel nagu ka muudes nõukogude 
väljaannetes oli suunatud propaganda ja agitatsioonitöö elluviimiseks. Artiklid näitasid 
nõukogulasi positiivse nurga alt ning esitasid valikulist teavet. Lehtedest puudusid 
loomulikult teated deporteerimistest, kodanike väärkohtlemisest ja rahulolematusest, 
vägivaldsetest mobilisatsioonidest, eestirootslaste lahkumisest Rootsi ning 
vastuhakkudest okupatsioonijõududele. Vastupidi, ajaleht pani rõhku ideoloogiale, 
administratiivsete muutuste kajastamisele Eesti valitsuses ja Eesti ning eestirootslaste 





Stalinism mõjutas kõiki ühiskonna aspekte, kaasaarvatud eesti-rootslasi nende 
viimaste Eestis veedetud aastate jooksul. Sovjet-Estland on kujukas näide sellest, kuidas 
nõukogude võim end Eestis positsioneeris ning oma propagandat üritas teostada. 
Vaadeldes üht kindlat ühiskonna osa, ilmnevad detailid, mida pinnapealsel vaatlusel 
võibolla ei märka - eriti mis puudutab fakti, et teise maailmasõja käigus kadus Eestist 
kolm vähemusgruppi: eesti-rootslased, baltisakslased ja juudid. Keskendumine eesti-
rootslastele kui ühele vähemustest, võib heita uut valgust mitte ainult olukorrale tollases 
okupeeritud Eestis, vaid ka Stalinismi natsionalistlike initsiatiivide elluviimisele uutel 
territooriumidel, kusjuures vaatamata sellele, et eesti-rootslased moodustasid vaid alla 
ühe protsendi rahvastikust, tegid okupandid märkimisväärseid pingutusi et teha nende 
seas propagandat. Eesti-rootslased on selles osas eriti hea näide, kuna nad sobivad Stalini 
arusaamaga rahvusgrupist ja samuti seetõttu, et eksisteeris rootsikeelne Nõukogude 
propaganda ja keskvalitsuse raportid rootsi rahvusest elanike kohta. Selgub, et mõnes 
valdkonnas olid eesti-rootslased kui rahvusgrupp ENSV-s kõrgema sotsiaalse staatusega, 
mida Nõukogude rahvuspoliitika uurija Terry Martin nimetab “affirmative action” ehk 
võrdsete võimaluste loomine. 
 
1. peatükk 
Eesti-rootslastele ajalehe loomisel 1940. aastal üritasid toimetajad hõlmata väga 
marginaalset lugejaskonda. Rootsi rahvusest elanikke oli arvuliselt vähe ja neil oli vähe 
otsest poliitilist kaalu, seda vaatamata oma sidemetele Soome ja Rootsi hõimlastega. 
Sovjet-Estland üritas läbi ajaloolise vaatevinkli tuua teravaid näiteid kodanluse soovist 
eesti-rootslasi majandusliku ja poliitilise surutise abil ühiskonna ääremaile tõrjuda. 
Enamlased toetusid enim kahe sõja vahelisele perioodile – ajale mil eesti-rootslaste kui 
rahvuse identiteet Eestis arenes jõudsalt.  
Pärast esimest maailmasõda oli vähemuste olukord äsja iseseisvunud Eestis 
ebakindel. Vastavalt 1922. aasta rahvaloenduse andmetele  moodustasid vähemused 
rahvastikust 12,3 %. Suurimad vähemused olid: venelased (8,2%), sakslased (1,7%), 
rootslased (0,7%), juudid (0,4%) ja muud (1,3 %). Mitmel juhul oli rahvusvähemuste näol 
tegemist kunagise võõrvõimu esindajatega, seda nii Saksa, Vene kui Rootsi puhul. Eesti 
riik asus vähemusrahvaste õigusi kaitsma muuhulgas ka 1922. aastal vastuvõetud 
Põhiseaduses (paragrahvid 20 ja 21), mis sätestas vähemuste huvide vastavuse riigi 
huvidele. Iseseisvuse ajal kerkisid siiski pinnale konfliktid natsionalistliku debati käigus 





rahvuslikku identiteeti ja viimased soovisid säilitada oma rahvusliku identiteeti ja jätkata 
selle kultiveerimist. Lisaks üritas valitsus anda lisagarantiisid Kultuurautonoomia 
seadusega, mis võeti vastu 12. veebruaril 1925. Seadus ei pakkunud vähemustele siiski 
täielikku kaitset, jättes tähelepanuta pikaajalised garantiid etnilisest kuuluvusest lähtudes. 
Pinged kasvasid 30ndatel, eriti pärast Konstantin Pätsi riigipööret ja sellele järgnevat 
autoritaarset valitsemiskorda. Kuigi Päts kinnitas vähemuste õigusi 1937. aasta 
põhiseaduses, oli ajastu jooksul tunda natsionalistliku poliitika süvenemist. 
Rootsikeelse ajalehe ilmumine rootsi rahvusest elanikele sai teoks 1918. 
Järgnevatel aastatel proovis ajaleht Kustbon olla katalüsaatoriks Rootsi identiteedi 
rõhutamisel ja rahvusliku ühtsuse loomisel eesti-rootslaste hulgas. Ajaleht julgustas neid 
olemaks tegusad ja osavõtlikud Eesti kodanikud, säilitades ja tugevdades samal ajal oma 
eripärast kultuuri. Ajaleht sõltus pidevalt majanduslikest ja poliitilisest oludest kuni eesti-
rootslaste häälekandja Nõukogude võimu poolt suleti. Kustbon oli sõltumatu ajaleht, mida 
andis alguses välja poliitiline organisatsioon Svenska Folkförbundet. Pärast poliitiliste 
organisatsioonide keelustamist 1935. aastal, lõpetas leht ajutiselt ilmumise; kuni Kustbon 
1936. aastal kultuuriorganisatsiooni Svenska Odlingens Vänner egiidi all taas ilmuma 
hakkas, andis Nicolas Blees välja ajalehte Nya Kustbon nime all. Mõjutusi sai ajaleht ka 
1934. aasta seadusest, mis nõudis eestikeelsete kohanimede kasutamist isegi rootsikeelses 
väljaandes.  
Seoses surve kasvuga Eestile 1939. aastal pärast Molotov-Ribbentropi pakti 
allakirjutamist oli Eesti sunnitud evakueerima mitmed saared lubamaks Nõukogude 
Liidul rajada sinna oma sõjaväebaasid. Etniliste rootslaste jaoks tähendas see täielikku 
evakueerumist oma kodudest Osmussaarelt, Pakri saartelt ja Naissaarelt; oma kodudest 
sunniti ümber asuma umbes 600 eestirootslast. Osa elanikke Pakri saartelt proovis saada 
Rootsi saatkonnalt Tallinnas luba emigreerumiseks Rootsi. Lõpuks sai Nõukogude võimu 
käest loa 110 (ehk kolmandik) avalduse esitanutest, ning nad lahkusid 1940. aasta 
oktoobris. Need inimesed olid ainukesed, kes said ametliku loa ENSVst emigreeruda.  
 
2. peatükk 
Üks propagandakampaania juhtmõtteid keskendus eestirootslaste rahvuslikule 
identiteedile. Sageli korratud fraas ajalehes rõhutas mõtet, et Nõukogude süsteemis olid 
kõik rahvad võrdsed. Seda tõestati ikka ja jälle ajalooliste näidetega rahva (loe: 
eestirootslaste) majanduslikust, kultuurilisest ja keelelisest ikestamisest eestlastest 





ülestõusu Nõukogude päästva reþ iimiga, jättes mulje nagu oleks eestirootslasi tuldud 
vabastama eestlaste ikke alt, ja proovisid seoses sellega näidata Nõukogude poliitikat 
eestirootslasi soosiva nurga alt. Tugeva Nõukogude ideoloogia survel joonistusid välja 
erinevused rahvakillu loomuliku identiteedi ja pealesurutud Nõukogude mõjuga 
identiteedi vahel. 
Siiski polnud selline natsionalismi õhutamine rootsikeelse vähemuse seas 
ainulaadne. See järgib teatud järjekindlat Nõukogulikku õpetust rahvaste staatusest ja 
kohtlemisest Nõukogude Liidu territooriumil. Nõukogude rahvaste poliitika kujunes välja 
juba enne Oktoobrirevolutsiooni, mille peamisteks ideoloogideks olid Lenin ja Stalin. 
Selle asemel, et vastandada natsionalismi Bolševike propageeritud 
revolutsiooniõpetusele, katsus Lenin sobitada diskursuse Bolševike ideoloogiasse, 
rõhutades hoopis natsionalistlike meeleolude toetavat mõju revolutsiooni ideele. 
Stalini arusaam rahvuse olemusest sobis suurepäraselt eestirootslastega, kes elasid 
omakeelses kogukonnas ja neil oli enamvähem ühesugune majanduslik olukord, ühine 
ajalugu ja kultuur. Lisaks oli suhteliselt vaeste talumeeste ja kalurite seisund soodne 
pinnas Nõukogude majanduspoliitika sisseviimiseks. Kirjeldatud näitajad tegid 
eestirootslaste kogukonna (vähemalt teoreetiliselt) kommunistliku ideoloogia ja 
sovetiseerimise jaoks ideaalseks märklauaks, mis asetas nad erilisse seisusesse Eesti 
Nõukogude Sotsialistlikus Vabariigis. 
Eestirootslaste rahvusliku identiteedi nõukogulik versioon üritas kombineerida 
areneva identiteedi elemente ja kujundada protsessi soovitud suunas. Paljudel juhtudel 
oleks taoline riiklik identiteedi rõhutamine võib-olla eestirootslastele isegi kasulik olnud. 
Sovjet-Estland üritas näidata oma toetust eestirootslaste rahvuslikule identiteedile 
lingvistiliste vahenditega, pakkudes elanikele omakeelset ajalehte ja organiseerides aeg-
ajalt rootsi keelt rääkivate valitsusametnike külaskäike kogukondadesse. Ajalehe rootsi 
keel polnud kaugeltki täiuslik, sisaldades üsna palju grammatilisi vigu. Samuti üritas 
väljaanne siduda lugejaid ühe regionaalse identiteediga, pühendades viis numbrit 
erinevatele piirkondadele: Ruhnu, Põõsaspea, Rooslepa, Noarootsi ja Vormsi.  
Kirjeldatud numbrid üritasid tugevdada sidet inimeste ja maa vahel, ning väärivad 
äramärkimist ideoloogilise sisu puudumise poolest. 
 
3. peatükk 
Selleks, et inkorporeerida Eesti ühiskond suuremasse Nõukogude süsteemi, oli 





Propagandavahendina kandsid ajalehes avaldatud artiklid pea alati Nõukogude ideoloogia 
sõnumit. Artiklid olid kirjutatud Nõukogulikust vaatenurgast, pakkumata muid 
alternatiivseid lähtekohti. Äsjaannekteeritud territooriumil, kus toimus kiire poliitilise, 
sotsiaalse ja majandusliku keskkonna muutus, oli vajalik selgitada elanikele uut 
ideoloogiat. Loodeti, et kui inimesed mõistavad kommunismi ideoloogiat, on nad 
muutustele vastuvõtlikumad ja sobituvad Nõukogude ühiskonda aktiivsete kodanikena.  
Sovjet-Estland proovis eestirootslasi harida lugematute artiklitega Nõukogude 
ideoloogiast sarjas „Mis on sotsialism“ („Vad är socialism“). Hilisemad valimistele 
pühendatud artiklid valgustasid lugejaid nõukogude poliitilisest süsteemist, rõhutades 
nõukogude kodanike rolli ja kohustusi. Uutelt kodanikelt oodati Nõukogude Liidu 
ülistamist. Lähenevate nõukogude pühade eel selgitas ajaleht nende tausta ja ajaloolist 
tähtsust. Järgnevalt õpetati lehes seda, kuidas Eesti elanikud neid pühi peaksid tähistama, 
ning hiljem kajastati seda, kuidas eestlased ja mõnel puhul ka eestirootslased neid 
tähtpäevi olid tähistanud. Mõnikord seisnes see vaid selles, et tähtis päev leidis 
äramärkimist koolis, aitasid puhkepäevad ja tähtpäevad aru saada Nõukogude kodaniku 
rollist uue ühiskonna kontekstis. Levinuim meetod kuidas eestirootslaste tulevast rolli 
Nõukogude süsteemis rõhutada, oli nende halva kohtlemise meenutamine Tsaari-
Venemaa ja Eesti Vabariigi ajal. 
Eestirootslastele suunatud argumentidest leidis tihti kasutust ka mõte, et 
Nõukogude kord oli nende päästjaks. Argumendi loogika oli järgmine: kui Nõukogude 
võimu poleks kehtestatud, oleksid eestirootslased praegugi veel vaesed ja kapitalistliku 
Eesti valitsuse natsionalistliku poliitika ohvrid. Ideoloogiate erinevuse rõhutamiseks tõi 
Sovjet-Estland näiteid ajaloosündmustest. Suur osa ajaloolistest näidetest puudutas 
vähemuste õigusi. Artiklite raskuskese asus peamiselt Eesti Vabariigi ajal toimunud 
vähemuste rõhumisel. Vähem leidis argumendina kasutust Tsaari-Venemaa ajal toimunud 
rõhumiste kirjeldamine.  
 
4. peatükk 
Režiimimuutus raputas tõsiselt kõiki ühiskonna osi. Ajalehe Sovjet-Estland üks 
eesmärkidest oli nendesamade muutuste teadvustamine ja ideoloogiline õigustamine, 
kasutades tööliste ja põllumeeste eelnevat vähest väärtustamist oma kasuks ära.  
Ajalehe propaganda apelleeris korduvalt paranenud majandusnäitajatele, uute 
töökohtade loomisele ja tehnoloogia täiustamisele, mis oli propagandistliku ajalehe 





valdkondadest, eriti põllunduse, kalapüügi, hariduse ja religiooni vallas toimunud 
muutused põhjustasid eestirootslaste seas vastuseisu. Vaieldamatult olid need 
valdkonnad, mis seostusid kõige tihedamalt rahvusliku identiteediga. Eestirootlased olid 
enamuses põllumehed ja kalamehed, ning neid elualasid mõjutasid nõukogude süsteemiga 
kaasnenud muutused enim.  
Nii maareformi, põllumajanduse, kalanduse kui ka hariduse ja religiooni osas 
vastandusid eestirootslaste huvid nõukogude poliitikale. Vaatamata parimatele 
kavatsustele ja katsetele eestirootslasi ümber veenda, kukkus nõukogude propaganda 
haledalt läbi kõikides valdkondades. Eestirootslastel oli tugev side oma maaga ja nad 
suhtusid kõikidesse maaga seotud muutustesse väga vastumeelselt. Rootsikeelsed koolid 
ja jumalasõna moodustasid eestirootslaste identiteedi nurgakivi.  Pioneeriliikumise 
vaevaline juurutamine eestirootslastest noorte seas pole ainult tõestuseks 
propagandakampaania edutusest koolis, vaid seda võib vaadelda ka kui ideoloogia koduse 
tõrjumise peegeldust. Võib-olla oleks suurema hulga rootsikeelse propaganda pikaaegne 
levitamine koolis toonud endaga kaasa suuremat edu. Kuid võib-olla ka mitte. 
 
5. peatükk 
Esimese nõukogude okupatsiooni vältel esitas Sovjet-Estland eestirootslastele 
kaks teineteisele vastanduvat pilti. Esimene kujutas traagilisi ja raskeid aegu välismaal, 
mis tähendas seda, et manati silme ette sünge pilt Nõukogude liidu välisest kapitalistlikust 
maailmast. Teine kujutas aga positiivsetes värvides lootusrikast elu sotsialistliku 
riigikorraga Nõukogude Liidus. Mõlemad teenisid aga sedasama eesmärki, nimelt mõtet, 
et vaid Nõukogude kord oli hea elu parim retsept. Neid kahte koos vaadates näeme, et elu 
välismaal katsuti näidata ebakindla ja karmina, kuivõrd Nõukogude Eestis oli elu 
lootusrikas ja kindel. Eesmärk oli luua publiku seas alateadlik mulje sellest, et jäädes 
sotsialistliku režiimiga Eestisse oleks neile parem ja see omakorda peletaks eemale 
emigreerumise mõtted. Vaieldamatult oli tegu katsega suunata eestirootslaste tähelepanu 
Stockholmi suunalt Moskva poole. 
Kajastades kodumaiseid ja välismaiseid uudiseid, katsus Nõukogude propaganda 
kujutada nõukogude süsteemis valitsevat ideaalset elu. Taoliste kaheste piltidega 
kohutavast olukorrast välismaal ja harmoonilisest elust kodumaal üritati portreteerida 
kapitalistliku maailma ebakindlust ja kahjulikkust töölistele ning ülistada sotsialismi 
potentsiaali ning edusamme. Seda üritati saavutada suuresti tänu laiaulatuslikule info 





Eesti NSV vastava organi ETA. Eestirootslastele tähendas see survet suunata oma 
tähelepanu Rootsi-keskselt mõtlemiselt Moskva-kesksele. Rootsis valitseva raske 
olukorra detailne kajastamine pidi peletama emigreerumismõtted, kuna elu välismaal on 
ebakindel. 
Ajalehe toon ja struktuur muutus kardinaalselt 1941. aasta 25. juuni väljaandes. 
Sakslaste sõjakuulutus 22. juunil lõhkus kujutluspildi Nõukogude Liidust kui rahuriigist 
ja tähendas otsest sõtta astumist, mida loeti nõukogude propagandas vaid kapitalistlike 
riikide pärusmaale kuuluvaks teguviisiks. Eestirootslaste kommunistliku kultuuri 
tugevdamise asemel pani ajaleht nüüdsest rõhku rahva õhutamisele Saksamaa 
sõjategevuse vastu. Arusaam Nõkogude Liidust kui rahumeelsest ja stabiilsest ühendusest 
oli muutunud üleöö masside mobiliseerimiseks, et alustada sõda. Sõda oligi eelneva 
propagandakampaania proovikiviks: kui rahvas oleks Nõukogude ideoloogia omaks 
võtnud, oleks nad ilma pikemata fašistide vastu kodumaa kaitseks välja astunud. Seda aga 
eestirootslastega ei juhtunud ning sõjategevuse kandudes Eestisse, lakkas vähemusele 
osutatud tähelepanu. Kui rahvast ei suudetud veenda enne 22. juunit, siis pärast seda oli 
juba kindlasti liiga hilja. 
 
6. peatükk 
Vaatamata ajalehe püüdlustele jäi eestirootslaste meelsus nõukogude ideoloogia 
poolt enamjaolt mõjutusteta. Propageeriti küll Eesti ja Rootsi kultuuri, reklaamiti 
valimisi, näidati lõhet kodumaise ja välismaise vahel, kuid uus ideoloogia ei leidnud 
poolehoidu. Arhiivimaterjalidest selgub, et Eestist lahkumise meeleolud olid 
eestirootslaste seas vägagi aktuaalsed, ning see põhjustas bolševike parteile peavalu. Üks 
peamistest ajalehe eesmärkidest oli veenda eestirootslasi loobuma emigreerumismõtetest, 
jääma Eestisse ning sulanduma täielikult sotsialistlikku ühiskonda. Emigratsioon oli 
nõukogude võimu jaoks tähtsal kohal juba algusest peale: ajalehe esimene number ilmus 
selsamal päeval kui Rootsi saabusid esimesed seaduslikult Eestist ümberasunud 
eestirootslased. Kui juba osa sai loa lahkumiseks, miks ei võinuks teised järgida nende 
eeskuju? Sovjet-Estland pidi olukorraga leppima, ja vaikima oma propagandafunktsiooni 
tõttu maha tõsiasja, et osa rahvast ei tervitanud nõukogude okupante oma maal.  
Ka eestirootslastest ei läinud terrorilaine mööda ja nad kannatasid võrdselt 
ülejäänud eesti rahvaga deporteerimiste ja sundmobilisatsioonide läbi. Küüditatute hulgas 
oli kõige enam inimesi, keda võis nimetada eestirootslaste intelligentsiks – need olid 





Estland kõikidest taolistest sündmustest. Just nende inimeste deporteerimisest ja 
mobiliseerimisest sündis pikas perspektiivis eestirootslaste identiteedile kõige rohkem 
kahju. Teguviis on tõestuseks ideoloogilise mõjutamise ebaõnnestumisest ja 
propagandakampaania täielikust läbikukkumisest. 
Sakslaste saabudes olid emigreerumise mõtted eestirootslaste seas valdavad. Tänu 
Rootsi Punasele Ristile, Rootsi Kirikule ja Waffen SS ohvitserile Dr. Lienhardile 
õnnestus paljudel saada luba ümberasumiseks Rootsi. Teise maailmasõja lõppedes oli 
Rootsi põgenenud 7,900 eestirootslast, kellest 4,357 olid lahkunud seaduslikult. Seoses 
sellega, et Eestisse olid jäänud vaid vähesed eestirootslased, ei hakanud Sovjet-Estland 
uuesti ilmuma. Sihtgrupi suurus ei õigustanud edasisi pingutusi. 
 
Kümne kuu jooksul elasid eestirootslased valitsuse kõrgendatud tähelepanu all. 
Nende jaoks ilmus emakeelne ajaleht ning valitsuse esindajad käisid regulaarselt 
inimestega kohtumas ning nendega rääkimas, mõnel juhul lausa nende emakeeles.   
Eestirootslastele räägiti pidevalt, et valitsus käsitleb neid kui eestlastega võrdseid, 
kes väärivad oma kultuuri arendamiseks julgustust, vahendeid ja võimalusi. 
Eestirootslastele räägiti, et nad mitte ainult ei olnud seda ära teeninud, vaid isegi rohkem 
õigustatud saamaks majanduslikke vahendeid oma vaesusest ülesaamiseks. Neid peeti 
samaväärseteks aktiivseteks ja täieõiguslikeks ühiskonnaliikmeteks nagu kõiki teisi 
rahvusgruppe.  
Kui see kõik ei oleks olnud (nende suureks õnnetuseks) otse vastupidi 
Kommunistliku partei sovetiseerimiseideoloogiale ja –meetoditele, oleks eestirootslastele 
kätte jõudnud läbi aegade kõige parem olukord. Nädalast nädalasse kujutas Sovjet-
Estland rikkust ja võimalusi, mis eestirootslastele avanenud on, kuid propagandana 
suurele osale eestirootslastele korda ei läinud. Võibolla oli põhjuseks maareformi käigus 
äravõetud maatükid või kirikuõpetajate alandamine, mis rahva uue ideoloogia vastu üles 
keeras. Võimalik, et põhjuseks oli oma kultuuriorganisatsiooni (SOV) kadumine ja selle 
ajalehe sulgemine. Või tuleks põhjust otsida hoopis sajandite tagant, kui nende esiisad 
olid saanud loa emigreeruda Rootsi (ning Rootsi soov neid vastu võtta). 
Paljuski oli Sovjet-Estland läbikukkunud propagandaprojekt. Ajaleht ei 
saavutanud edu eestirootslaste pööramisel sotsialismi-usku. Vastupidiselt eesmärgile ei 
suutnud propaganda muuta eestirootslaste kriitilist suhtumist Nõukogude võimu 
poliitikasse. Tellimusi oli vähe (täpseid andmed puuduvad) ja rahva rahulolematus püsiv. 





Siiski polnud kogu projekt täielik fiasko. Kampaanias võib leida aspekte, mis tõid 
eestirootslastele kasu. Kuivõrd iganädalane muutuste kirjeldamine oli ajalehe Sovjet-
Estland peamine funktsioon, olid peateemadeks 17. oktoobrist 1940 kuni 13. augustini 
1941 ideoloogia, rahvuslik identiteet ning väljarände takistamine. Kui proovida hinnata 
ajalehe efektiivsust neis kolmes valdkonnas, võib tuua välja mõned edukust tõestavad 
elemendid. 
Vaatamata sellele, kas ideoloogiat aktsepteeriti või mitte, oli Sovjet-Estland tõhus 
vahend selgitamaks eestirootslastele Nõukogude Liidu ajalugu ja sotsialistliku ideoloogia 
arengukäiku. Neid põhimõtteid tutvustas rubriik pealkirjaga “Mis on sotsialism” ning 
seda toetasid peaaegu kõik järgnevad artiklid. Valimiste eel sisaldas leht suurel hulgal 
agitatsiooni- ja propagandamaterjale selleks, et selgitada Nõukogude poliitilist struktuuri 
kui ka süstida inimestesse teadlikkust nende õigustest ja kohustustest sotsialistlikus 
ühiskonnas. Sovjet-Estland aitas kaasa pühade ja tähtpäevade mõistmisele, selgitades 
konteksti, milleks neid tähistada. Eestirootslastele selgitati lugematute artiklite kaudu 
kuidas nad peaksid sellistel puhkudel käituma ja mil moel tähtpäevi tähistada. Arvestades, 
et eestirootslaste “kommunismi-pööramine” ebaõnnestus, võib ideoloogilist koolitamist 
lugeda kordaläinuks. 
Sovjet-Estland püüdis olla sobiv aseaine ajalehele Kustbon, samal ajal jutlustades 
Nõukogude ideoloogiat ja sobitades seda eestirootslastest vähemusrahvuse hulka. 
Eestirootslaste rahvuslik identiteet ning kultuur olid taas tähtsad teemad, kuid neid 
vaadeldi läbi sotsialismi prisma. Sovjet-Estland ei suutnud siiski asendada endist ajalehte 
Kustbon; Sovjet-Estland ei saavutanud eestirootslaste seas sellist kandepinda, mis oleks 
olnud vajalik rahvusliku identiteedi mõtte edasiarendamiseks. Ajalehte toimetas ka 
kogukonnaväline grupp inimesi, kel oli kohaliku kogukonnaga vähe ühist, ning seega on 
raske paigutada Andersoni teooria raamidesse.  
Kõigele vaatamata pakkus Sovjet-Estland Bolševikepoolset vähemustesõbralikku 
poliitikat, mida varem eestirootslaste puhul praktikas polnud rakendatud. Kui kahe sõja 
vahel toiminud Eesti põhiseadused üritasid vähemusi kaitsta, muutusid valitsuste vaated 
üha natsionalistlikumaks. Nõukogude võim ei väljendanud pelgalt soovi vähemusi kaitsta, 
vaid tõestas oma püüdlusi sellega, et jõudis vähemustega tegeleda. Eestirootslased olid 
vaid üks paljudest Nõukogude Liidu vähemusrahvastest, keda julgustati ja anti vahendeid 
selleks, et nad saaksid tegeleda oma rahvusliku identiteedi arendamisega; kuigi seda 
kõike sisulises kooskõlas sotsialistlike põhimõtetega. Eestirootslaste kui vähemuse 





Rida aspekte muudab eestirootslaste juhtumi siiski eriliseks. Tegemist oli väikese 
vähemusega, kelle rahvuslik identiteet oli arenenud juba aastakümneid enne Nõukogude 
perioodi algust. Identiteet oli tihedalt läbipõimunud kontaktidega Rootsi riigi ning Rootsi 
kirikuga. Samuti olid eestirootslastel sidemed hõimlastega Soomes. Nende asualade tõttu 
rannikualadel ning saartel kuulusid nad ka ühiskonna mõttes perifeeriasse. 
Üks, kus Sovjet-Estland ei saavutanud mingisugust edu, oli väljarändemõtete 
mahasurumine. Juba enne kui sarnased artiklid ilmusid, heietasid eestirootslased 
lahkumisemõtteid. Vaid kolmandik Pakri saarte elanikest sai loa lahkumiseks, ning vaid 
vähesed lahkusid omal initsiatiivil salaja. Seda vaatamata sellele, et võimalus selleks ju 
oli. Kogukond oli piisavalt väike ja hästiinformeeritud, seega oli selle teema käsitlemise 
edasilükkamine ajalehes tähelepanuväärne viga. Kui kord oli tekkinud lahkumiseks 
põhjus, oli raske sundida inimesi oma meelt muutma. Nõukogude Liidu ideoloogilised 
lubadused ja uudised jäid sisutühjadeks ja teostamatuteks. Kuivõrd eestirootslasi kui 
rahvusgruppi koheldi tervikuna paremini, toimus igaühe olukorra pidev halvenemine.  
Propagandakampaaniaga seotud probleemid olid arutlusel Eesti NLKP 
Keskkomitees mais 1941. Raportis märgitakse, et Nõukogude pingutused ei olnud vilja 
kandnud ning seoses sellega pakkus raport välja muudatusi, mis parandaks eestirootslaste 
olukorda. Muudatused puudutasid nii poliitilist kui ideoloogilist harimist, majandusliku 
olukorra parandamist läbi tootmisnormide alandamise ja äravõetud maatükkide rahalist 
kompenseerimist. Samuti pakuti välja plaan suurendada rootsikeelsete raamatute ning 
filmide kättesaadavust. Sealjuures loodeti saavutada viimatikirjeldatud eesmärgid 
koostöös kohalike eestirootslastega, samuti suurendada ajalehe mahtu ja tellimuste arvu, 
kaasata ettevõtmistesse rohkem noori ja vabastada osa eestirootslastest 
sõjaväeteenistusest.  
Neid plaane ei suudetud kunagi ellu viia; kuu aega hiljem kuulutasid sakslased 
Nõukogude Liidule sõja ja Nõukogude võim suunas tähelepanu eestirootslaste 
arendamiselt kogu ühiskonna mobiliseerimisele. Eestirootslasi ei “valgustatud” enam 
propagandaga Nõukogude ideoloogia kohta, vaid püüti veenda selles, et rahvas astuks 
vastu fašistide pealetungile. Täielikult ümberorienteeritud propagandakampaania käigus 
kadus rahvusvähemus peaaegu täielikult pildilt. Rahvuslik identiteet ei olnud enam tähtis. 
Kui lugejaid polnud siiani toiminud kampaania ideoloogiliselt veennud, oli vähe lootust, 
et rahvas tõuseks vabatahtlikult üles kaitsmaks  Nõukogude Liitu sakslaste eest. 
Uurides ajalehe Sovjet-Estland kaudu läbiviidud propagandakampaaniat, võib 





jälgida seetõttu, et publik oli vaenulikult meelestatud. Vaatamata sellele, et inimeste 
mõtteviisi kujundamine oli suures osas läbikukkumine, ei jätnud ajaleht siiski oma jonni. 
Nõukogude ideoloogiast lähtuvalt oli rahva kapitalistliku massi käest päästmine 
hädavajalik ja üllas ettevõtmine, seda vaatamata sellele, et pingutus oli läbikukkumisele 
määratud. Emigreerumismeeleolud sihtgrupi seas ei kadunud. Ning siis kui lõpuks saksa 
okupatsiooni ajal sai  üsna suur arv eestirootslasi loa lahkuda oma kodumaale, kadus nii 
põhjus kui vajadus kampaania taasalustamiseks. 
